

A Grammar Of Belief

DIBBLE



1.7.24

LIBRARY OF THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

PRINCETON, N. J.

BR 125 .D5 1922

Dibble, Charles Lemuel.

A grammar of belief

A GRAMMAR OF BELIEF


SECOND EDITION

A GRAMMAR OF BELIEF

A Revaluation of the
Bases of Christian Belief in the Light of
Modern Science and Philosophy

BY
✓
CHARLES LEMUEL DIBBLE

Attorney at Law



✓ Modern inquiry series.

MOREHOUSE PUBLISHING CO.

MILWAUKEE, WIS.

A. R. MOWBRAY & CO. Ltd.

LONDON

COPYRIGHT, 1922
BY
MOREHOUSE PUBLISHING Co.

MODERN INQUIRIES IN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS.

THE MEMBERS OF a group of seven clergy, ministering to college students, associated with the Department of Religious Education of the Protestant Episcopal Church, in forming policies for religious work among students, have jointly examined the manuscript of this book, and desire to bring it to the attention of clergy and teachers of college and university students, with the hope that it will be found to meet a need.

Rev. LeRoy S. Burroughs, Ames, Iowa.

Rev. John T. Dallas, Hanover, N. H.

Rev. Cyril Harris, Ithaca, N. Y.

Rev. Harris Masterson, Houston, Texas.

Rt. Rev. William G. McDowell, Jr., Auburn, Ala.

Rev. F. C. F. Randolph, Columbus, Ohio.

Rev. Ronalds Taylor, College Park, Md.

FOREWORD.

WHEN A BOY goes to college, what happens to his interest in religion? Well, in the first place, he certainly doesn't lose it. No one who has sat before an open fire with a circle of college men and heard the discussion range through all things in heaven above and in the earth beneath and in the waters under the earth, can doubt their interest in religion.

That is precisely why so many of them become agnostic. If they didn't care, they might go on repeating with thoughtless lips old platitudes, without ever wondering whether the new learning was going to fit them. It is because they do care enough about religion to require that it shall be true, that they turn from it when it seems to be discredited.

Generally, the young man, and the young woman, too, comes to college with no adequate idea of religious doctrine. He has probably never concerned himself about it. If he has thought to inquire, the chances are that he has been answered after the manner of half a century ago. For most people seem to think that old ideas, like old clothing, are good enough for boys. When he gets to college he learns that the world was not made in seven days, and that his great grandfather resembled an ape, and that Moses did not write the first five books of the Bible. The professor hasn't time to explain to him that God can work as well in a million years as in seven days, and that a man's ancestors are not nearly so important to him as his descendants, and that you don't have to know the author of a book to tell whether or not it is worth while.

The college man sees theology,—the old theology,—forever on the defensive with science, and forever losing ground. Thinks he, if religion is real, why remain on the defensive? Why not meet science on its own ground, and

base theology, like science, upon the facts of experience? This is exactly what modern theologians have been doing; only the college man doesn't know where to look for them.

Ever since my own undergraduate days I have felt resentment that the Church did not help me to reconstruct my ideas about religion so as to harmonize them with what I was learning in the class-room. And so, without any special fitness for the task, being a practising lawyer, I have for several years been trying to assist the students of a nearby college to make this reconstruction. In that effort, the outline that follows has gradually developed. I have tried to give the student a new orientation, a new way of looking at things both religious and scientific. I have tried to take the house of his religious life off its insecure foundations and place it on a new base, without injuring any essential parts of the building.

Modern developments in science and philosophy have profoundly changed men's viewpoint toward religion and have invalidated many of the arguments formerly relied upon in support of the doctrines of Christianity. Properly understood, however, science and philosophy have not overthrown Christianity, but have confirmed it. Science and theology appear to be in conflict only because we have misunderstood their scope. Neither is absolute in the sense of being unrelated to the human intellect and reason; both are evolved to classify and explain experience, the one physical, the other spiritual. Neither a doctrine of theology nor a law of science is a fiat imposed by authority or inexorable necessity; but each is a formula whereby we summarize the facts of experience. Both the law and the dogma are finally tested by the results achieved through their application. Hence every dogma must be held to be valid which fulfills the following requirements: if it is congruous with the legitimate conclusions of science; if it epitomizes and mediates religious experience; if it evokes right action. A frank revaluation in this light of the bases of belief is the purpose of this course.

Being neither a professional theologian, nor a professional scientist, I have endeavored to maintain an open mind as to the conclusions of both. There is, as it seems to me,

a distinct advantage in this viewpoint. It ought to be possible for one not a specialist in either science or theology, but sympathetic with each, to effect a more disinterested appraisal of both and of the relations between them. He can come at the problem without any of the preconceptions current in either field and ought to be able to get a better perspective. At any rate, such a viewpoint ought to approach more closely to that of the "ultimate consumer," to whom these discussions are addressed.

This position, on the other hand, lays one under the obligation of humility as to the particular material dealt with. I cherish no illusions of infallibility. I can hardly hope to have avoided error in statements either scientific or theological. I trust, however, that such errors will not seriously impair the usefulness of this outline. What I have endeavored to provide is not matter, but method, and of the validity of that method, as I have outlined it above, I am profoundly convinced. It ought to be possible, on the other hand, for the leader and members of the group to make the corrections or additions which appear to them to be demanded; while still using this method of presentation as a point of departure from which to formulate their own view. Indeed such conflict in ideas between text and discussion group will be found to stimulate interest and will result in independent and worth-while conclusions.

While these discussions were originally worked out for college students, I have found that the demand for some systematic presentation of the relation between science and religion is equally insistent on the part of nearly all men and women today,—certainly of all those who look below the surface. To all such inquirers this book is dedicated.

Although I assume responsibility for whatever appears in this outline, I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the Rev. Paul Micou of the Episcopal Department of Religious Education and to the "Student Inquirers," a group of student pastors of the Episcopal Church, for their advice in its preparation and for making possible its publication; to the Very Rev. B. F. P. Ivins, D.D., Dean of Nashotah House, for the inspiration to undertake this work; and to the Rev. Frank Gavin, Th.D., of Nashotah House,

to the Rev. Stanley M. Cleveland of Madison, Wis., and to the Rev. Burton S. Easton, D.D., of the General Theological Seminary, for their exceedingly valuable suggestions.

Kalamazoo, Michigan, 1922.

NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION

Some minor changes have been made in the text of this edition and additional suggestions for collateral reading have been included in the notes.

It is suggested that one reading the book individually, and not as a basis for group discussion, will do well to adopt the Chinese method of beginning at the back, and to read first the essays in Part II. These will be found to present more fully the underlying theory and method of approach employed in the discussions and will lay a foundation for them.

Kalamazoo, Michigan, 1923.

PART I.

DISCUSSION TOPICS.

A.—WHY BELIEVE? (The Philosophy of Theism.)

1. QUO VADIS? Problem: Can Society prosper without vital religious belief? Whither is society headed? The importance of vital religious belief to society and to the individual. Present day difficulties of belief. Essentials of vital religious belief; it must not contradict science and common sense; it must epitomize religious experience; it must evoke right action. Can belief again be made vital?

II. THE WARFARE OF SCIENCE WITH THEOLOGY. Problem: Has science banished religion, and if not, how may theology be reconstructed? The story of the losing fight of a theology based on mistaken premises. The gradual contraction of the notion of special interference of Providence in the fields of cosmogony, meteorology, anthropology, medicine, history, biology, and psychology. Causes of agreement between Aristotelian natural philosophy and scholastic theology. Are causes of disagreement unavoidable, or may science and theology again be harmonized?

III. THE GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE. Problem: Are matter and material laws the only objective reality? Relativity and subjectivity of the basic concepts of science. The mind a telephone ex-

change. Percepts, concepts, space, time, motion, matter, cause and effect, natural law.

IV. THE GRAMMAR OF THEOLOGY. Problem: How far may we trust our intuitions? The inside of the telephone exchange. Mental tendencies or "senses". The sense for rationality, the basis of science. The sense for right and for reverence, the basis of religion. The religious evaluation of the universe. Specific religious experience. Dogma.

V. THE WILL TO BELIEVE. Problem: When belief and disbelief are both possible, which should we choose? The loom of thought. Understanding and hypothesis. Practical hypotheses and our attitude toward them; belief, doubt, and denial. The legitimacy of belief. Credulity.

VI. THE IDEA OF GOD. Problem: Has modern science made it impossible to believe in a personal God? Practical importance of the question. History of the idea of God. *May* we believe in a personal God; do science or philosophy deny God? *Should* we believe in a personal God; affirmative arguments. The relation of God to the material universe and to man.

VII. THE WILL. Problem: Is the human will really free, or is our conduct pre-determined? Objections to freedom of the will, religious, philosophical, and scientific. Are these objections unanswerable? Does science negative moral freedom? The teaching of philosophy and ethics. May the will be conditioned and yet be free?

VIII. LIFE ETERNAL. Problem: Has modern science made this belief untenable? If tenable, can it be said to be more than a mere possibility? History of the idea of immortality. *May* we believe it; does science or philosophy deny it? *Should* we believe it; affirmative arguments.

B. WHAT THINK YE OF CHRIST? (Christian Dogma.)

IX. THE CREATING GOD. Problem: Has the theory of evolution substituted Natural Force for God as the creator of the material universe and of man? Theory of special creation. Theory of evolution. The philosophy and theology of evolution. Miracles.

X. THE REVEALING GOD. Problem: If the Bible is not infallible, how can it be said to be inspired by God, since God does not err? Fallibility of the Bible. History of the idea of Biblical infallibility. What is inspiration? The inspiration of the Bible.

XI. THE NICENE IDEA OF GOD. Problem: Is the dogma of the Trinity intelligible, and, if so, has it any practical bearing? Definition. History of the development of the dogma. The meaning of "person". The dogma in terms of modern thought. The concepts of transcendence, immanence, and humanity; their necessity to an adequate idea of God.

XII. JESUS THE MAN. Problem: Does historical criticism leave us any assurance of the facts of Jesus' life; and, if so, what do we gather of it? Present conclusions as to the records. Brief survey of his life, death, and resurrection. His conception of his messiahship and the conception of his disciples.

XIII. WHAT THINK YE OF CHRIST? Problem: If Jesus was man, how can he be said to be divine in any other sense than men in general? How is the Divine Life to be accounted for? The interpretation of the primitive Church and its development. A modern restatement.

XIV. THE JUDGING GOD. Problem: If man is the creature of his heredity and environment, why

should God hold him to account; does not modern science conflict with the idea of hell? Moral responsibility. Conscience. What is crime, and what steps do we take to protect ourselves from it? What is sin, in its objective and subjective aspects, and what steps does God take to eradicate it? Heaven and Hell.

XV. THE ATONING GOD. Problem: If God is both loving and omnipotent, why does he permit sin, pain, and sorrow? The answers of philosophy,—utilitarian, epicurean, stoic, skeptic, atheist, pessimist. The answer of "Christian Science". The answer of Christianity,—eternal life and atonement. The meaning of atonement.

XVI. THE LOVING GOD. Problem: Is intercommunion possible between God and man; and how can God answer prayer without violating natural laws? The subconscious. Conversion. Prayer, its nature and effect. Christian mysticism. Spiritual healing, its possibilities and limitations.

XVII. THE LIFE WORTH WHILE (Christian Ethics). Problem: If I deal justly and practice charity, have I not fulfilled my whole duty? The eternal question, "What is the chief end of man?" The answer of Christianity. The duties of life,—toward God, toward my neighbor, toward myself. Results of over-emphasis of either sort of duty, as shown by history. The reward of life.

XVIII. THE IDEA OF A CHURCH. Problem: Why should I join the Church? If I live a Christian life, is that not all that is required? The Catholic and Protestant ideas of the Church. The history of corporate religion. Value of the organic idea. The Church as the Beloved Community. The Church as the Body of Christ. Limitations on the authority of the Church.

XIX. THE IDEA OF A SACRAMENT. Problem: If God is everywhere, of what advantage is a sacrament? The Catholic and Protestant ideas of a sacrament. The history of sacrificial and sacramental religion. The value of public worship. The value of sacraments. Baptism. Eucharist.

XX. THE IDEA OF A MINISTRY. Problem: Is it needful, or right, that anyone should represent God to me, or me to God? The history of priesthood. Value of a priesthood. Limitations. Roman theory. The Apostolic Succession.

XXI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE. Problem: Is not Christianity largely a syncretism of other religions and a corruption of the teaching of the Master; and how are we to get at the real essence of Christianity? Influences from without. Development within. The deposit theory. The theory of development. How may we distinguish between true development and corruption? The value of authority.

XXII. PRESENT DAY PROBLEMS. What has the Church to contribute in the social crisis, and how may she best do it? What should be her relation to politics, to economic and social questions, and to philanthropy? The problem of the reunion of Christendom; is it advisable, is it possible, would it be permanent? The method and terms of reunion, various proposals. What will the Church of the future be? What element might each of the present divisions of Christendom contribute?

PART II.

Essay I. THE RELEVANCY OF RELIGION.

Essay II. DOGMA.

Essay III. THE GRAMMAR OF THEOLOGY.

Essay IV. THE NICENE IDEA OF GOD.

Essay V. NATURE AND RELIGION.

PART III.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE LEADER OF THE DISCUSSIONS.

PART I

A.—WHY BELIEVE?

The Philosophy of Theism.

DISCUSSION I.

QUO VADIS?

1. Whither is society tending? The World War and possibility of recurrence. Increase of crime. Social unrest. Economic and political instability.

2. Whither is religion tending? Churches deserted. Shortage of clergy. Loss of influence. Loss of vital religious belief.

Problem: Can society prosper without vital religious belief?

3. What is religion?

- a. Definition. Religion is belief in, reverence towards, and effort to establish right relations with, a Supernatural Power or Powers.
- b. Three elements: belief, intellectual; reverence, emotional; and effort to establish relations, practical.
- c. Necessity of all three elements: they correspond to the three departments of human activity, lacking which any religion would be one-sided. The last two are admittedly essential, but it is the fashion to belittle the function of belief. This is a fallacy. Belief is the backbone of religion.

4. Function of religious belief.

- a. In relation to conduct. Belief in divine aid gives us self-confidence and courage. Belief in immortality makes us plan for eternity, instead of for time. If assured of only five years of life we would plan differently than if assured of twenty. If assured of immortality we plan for continuous development here and hereafter, gain a proper perspective, and lose selfish motives.
- b. In relation to happiness. Our anxieties are quieted and our life made normal. Man is incurably religious and is restless till he finds rest in God. Belief in a God of love, wisdom, and power makes life worth while. The saintly men whom we know are the happy men.
- c. In relation to society. Society is composed of individuals; and their right conduct and happiness, their proper adjustment and normal functioning, constitutes social well-being. The social necessity of religion is proved by its universal acceptance. "If there were no God, it would be necessary to invent one," says Voltaire. Hence it is that religion has always normally been regarded as an affair of the whole community (Disc. XVIII). Its most primitive manifestation was tribal rites and its highest development in civilized communities takes the form of collective worship, organization and service.

5. The reason why belief is not seen to have a practical bearing is because we have not tried it. We do not really believe, except occasionally. In the old days, when belief was vivid, it was a mighty force. Can it be made vivid again? Can it be presented

so that men shall *really* believe all the time? That attempt is the purpose of this course. (See the essay entitled *The Relevancy of Religion* in Part II.)

6. Present day hindrances to belief.

- a. Advancement of science, so as to seem inconsistent with religion.
- b. Great commercial and material development has created a materialistic atmosphere.
- c. Emphasis by some theologians on antiquated methods of presentation. It is no longer possible to foreclose discussion in this, or any other field, by an appeal to authority.

7. Purpose of the course.

- a. To define the scope of science as not inconsistent with religion.
- b. To define the scope of theology as not inconsistent with science.
- c. To restate the fundamental doctrines of theology, deriving them from the facts of religious experience, as the laws of science are derived from the facts of material experience.
- d. The motto of the course:

"A doctrine is not a fiat but a formula."

Fiat money is printed paper which the government tells me is worth a dollar, or a ruble. If my patriotism, or fear, is strong enough, I will accept it at this value. But, when I try to pass it on to you and to say that it is worth so much, because I, or the government, say it is, I will have considerable difficulty. The analogy to fiat religious doctrine is obvious. Valid doctrines, however, are worth one hundred cents on the dollar, because based on religious experience.

e. Every doctrine must fulfill these requirements (see essay, *The Grammar of Theology*, *infra*, especially pp. 161-162) :

(1) It must be congruent with the legitimate conclusions of science.

(2) It must epitomize and mediate religious experience.

(3) It must evoke right action.

It is the purpose of this course to examine the fundamental doctrines of Christianity and determine whether they meet this criterion. "By their fruits ye shall know them."

DISCUSSION II.

WARFARE OF SCIENCE WITH THEOLOGY; SCIENCE TRIUMPHANT.

(In connection with this Discussion, see Discussions IX and X.)

1. History of the conflict and gradual retreat of theology before science in the various fields.

- a. Cosmogony—Geocentric vs. Heliocentric.
- b. Medicine—Incantations and Charms vs. Antitoxins.
- c. Meteorology—The God of the Storm vs. Sun Spots.
- d. Anthropology—The Fall of Man vs. The Rise of Man.
- e. Ethnology—Genesis vs. The Monuments.
- f. Philology—The Tower of Babel vs. Grimm's Law.
- g. History—Bibliolatry vs. Historical Criticism.
- h. Biology—Special Creation vs. Evolution.
- i. Psychology—The Soul vs. Consciousness.

Problem: Has science banished religion; and, if not, how may theology be reconstructed?

2. The causes of early agreement between natural philosophy and theology.

- a. The theology of the Bible and contemporaneous natural philosophy were both built on

the facts of nature, as then observed and explained.

- b. Both natural philosophy and theology used the *a priori* method. Significance of name, *natural philosophy*.
- c. Both relied implicitly upon authority: theology on the sacred books; natural philosophy on the statements of recognized authorities—e. g. Aristotle (physics), Galen (medicine). Roger Bacon was persecuted, as well as John Hus.
- d. Neither employed the method of experiment. Both merely collected and catalogued facts, without attempting to investigate causal relations.

3. Causes of later disagreement.

- a. Science was forced by the growing discrepancy between its theories and the observed facts to break with authority. It first tolerated, then espoused, the method of observation and experiment.
- b. Theology retained the old method, since the power of authority was stronger in its field and the facts upon which it is based were less susceptible to experiment. In time it quite forgot that its doctrines were derived from, or have any basis in, the facts of religious experience, and regarded them as established by arbitrary divine fiat.

4. Present position of science.

- a. Method. Induction from observation and experiment to a general formula or law. A *priori* method used only for working hypothesis.

b. Underlying theory. Phenomenal results have phenomenal causes which are discoverable. Phenomena are capable of rationalization, i. e. of statement in scientific laws.

c. Conclusions. As a result of the application of the theory of cause and effect to the observed facts, through the method of experiment, science has reached the conclusion that, in the whole range of phenomena, change occurs by evolution and not by special creation, and that the whole universe is continually developing.

5. Present position of theology.

Doctrines, like scientific laws, have grown up by working from observation and experiment to a general formula or dogma. (See Part II, *Dogma*.) The individual in determining for himself what he shall believe should use the same method as the scientist. He should use the dogma as a working hypothesis. He should then test this hypothesis by noting what has been its effect upon those who have held it throughout the history of Christianity and among his acquaintances (method of observation), and he should then try it out himself, assume that it is true and act upon it (method of experiment). It was by these methods that Romanes converted himself from agnosticism. (See Part II, *The Relevancy of Religion*.)

6. Harmony is being restored between science and theology.

a. Science is recognizing its limitations, and is ceasing to philosophize. (See Essay by Henry Fairfield Osborn, *Nature and Religion*, in Part 11.)

- b. Theology is recognizing its limitations, and is defining its new viewpoint so as not to invade the field of science. Some of the books setting forth this new viewpoint will be found in Part III.
- c. Theology is employing in its own field the same underlying theory and method as science. (See §4.)

7. Conclusion.

Theologians have fought for five hundred years to defend the theory of miraculous causation and the *a priori* method, as against the theory of phenomenal causation and the method of experiment, and have been defeated in one field after another. At every stronghold which they have defended they have asserted that, if this were forced, religion would be discredited. Small wonder if people are now beginning to take them at their word. It is a tribute to the power and ultimate validity of religion that it is still alive, when its doctors have been giving it up for five hundred years. The leaders of theology have abandoned outworn methods and recognize that a doctrine is *not* a fiat but a formula, and they are restating theological doctrines, deriving them from the observed facts of spiritual experience. When this readjustment shall have been effected, it is not too much to hope that religious beliefs will again obtain universal assent.

DISCUSSION III.

THE GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE.

1. All we know of the outside world is the sense impressions which come to us. Each of us is like a telephone operator, chained to her switch-board and unable to see beyond her office, knowing only what the persons using the telephone tell her.

2. We assume that the sense impressions are caused by something and that what they tell us is valid, as far as it goes. But we know that our senses are incomplete. For example: there are light waves and sound waves beyond those which affect our eye and ear; we cannot perceive the waves used in wireless telegraphy; and we know that the dog's sense of smell is more acute than ours.

3. A sense impression is called a PERCEPT.

4. As soon as we perceive any object we at once add to our sense impression various other sense impressions stored up in our memory about similar objects, and from these immediate and stored-up sense impressions we form a mental image. This mental image is a CONCEPT. We think in *concepts* and we remember *concepts*. We do not think or remember *percepts* as such.

5. A PHENOMENON is a succession of mental images or concepts.

6. The REAL universe is the sum total of the sense impressions, or percepts, which we have, or which we might have.

7. The CONCEPTUAL universe is the sum total of the mental images or concepts, which we have, or might have,—in other words, the sum total of phenomena.

8. Our real universe is continuous and is always moving, doing something. Our conceptual universe is discontinuous and static, always standing still. That is, each concept is considered by itself as standing still and the universe as a whole is merely the aggregate of these isolated concepts. It is because of these interstices between concepts, so to speak, that our conceptual universe does not exactly correspond to the real universe. The growth of knowledge of phenomena tends constantly to fill in these interstices and hence our conceptual universe constantly approaches more closely to reality. Owing, however, to our mental makeup, the two can never exactly correspond.

9. Scientists have confessed themselves to be wholly unable satisfactorily to define MATTER as an objective entity. For example, Clerk Maxwell, the physicist, writes (*Matter and Motion*) "We are acquainted with matter only as that which may have energy communicated to it from other matter and which may in its turn communicate energy to other matter. Energy, on the other hand, we know only as that which in all natural phenomena is continually passing from one portion of matter to another." This reminds us of the story as to the definitions given by a Christian Scientist:—"What is mind? No matter. What is matter? Never mind." The most satisfactory definition is that of John Stuart Mill (*Logic*, Bk. I, chap. 3.): "*MATTER is the permanent possibility of sensation.*" This definition, it will be perceived, is wholly subjective,—entirely an affair of perception.

10. SPACE is our mode of knowing co-existing concepts apart. Pearson, *Grammar of Science*, p. 163.

11. TIME is our mode of knowing successive concepts apart. Pearson, p. 181.

12. MOTION is a combination of the two modes. It is a change in the relative position of two concepts with change of time. Pearson, p. 182. There is no such thing as absolute motion; the motion of one thing is always relative to some other thing.

13. FORCE is a measure of how one portion of matter moves relatively to another portion, this measure depending partly on the individual character of the first (its mass) and partly on the attention it is paying to the presence of the second portion (its acceleration due to the second portion). Pearson, p. 304. More briefly, force is change in the momentum of a body incident to the presence of another body. Example, the force of gravitation.

14. ENERGY is the capacity for doing work.

15. Thus we see that all the fundamental ideas of science are purely subjective and relative.

16. CAUSE AND EFFECT. When we have two or more concepts in succession, we call the former concept the cause and the latter the effect. The cause does not necessitate the effect; it merely precedes it. For example; as a ball is thrown, its position at the first instant of its course does not necessitate its position at the second instant. Now, if the ball hits a window, the position of the ball at the window does not necessitate that the glass of the window should fly in pieces, any more than the position of the ball at the first instant necessitated its position at the second instant. The presence of the ball is the cause of the breaking of the window, but does not necessitate it. "Were our perceptive organs

sufficiently powerful, science conceives that we should see, before the impact, particles of window and particles of ball moving in a certain manner and, after the impact, the same particles moving in a very different manner. We might carefully describe these motions; but we should be unable to say why one stage would follow another. Thus, scientifically, the idea of necessity in the stages of the sequence, or the idea of enforcement, would disappear." Pearson, p. 118.

There is, we may be sure, a real cause behind phenomena, as it were a vertical causation, operative ceaselessly. But this causation is a matter for metaphysics. Science concerns itself only with horizontal causation, which is simply sequence.

The difference may be illustrated in this way: Suppose two persons to be playing checkers, and the observer to be a fly that has lighted on the board. Suppose, now, that to this fly the checkers were visible, but the players invisible. The fly would observe that, whenever a white checker moved into a square in front of a black checker, leaving a vacant square behind it, the black checker would jump over the white checker and the white checker would disappear from the board. The fly, observing that this sequence was invariable, would say that the movement of the white checker in front of the black checker *caused* the black checker to jump over it. The fly would be quite right. But he would not have explained *why* the black checker jumped. The motion of the checkers corresponds to scientific, or what I have called horizontal, causation; while the lifting of the checker by the invisible hand corresponds to metaphysical, or what I have called vertical, causation.

17. A NATURAL LAW is a FORMULA which DESCRIBES the way in which one concept follows another. For example; the law of gravitation describes how one concept called the earth moves with relation to another concept called the sun. The law of gravitation does not make the earth move around the sun; it does not even tell us what does make the earth move in that way. It simply describes the way in which the earth moves. Natural law answers the question, How? not the question, Why?

18. It is the purpose of science to describe these phenomena or successions of concepts which occur to our minds, and to lay down formulas which will describe such succession. Science does not concern itself with the actual constitution of the universe, or even with our immediate sense impressions; but only with the mental images or concepts which we form. Therefore, when we say that science discovers natural laws, all we mean is that science formulates statements, or formulas, which describe the way in which our concepts follow one another.

19. We have no reason to doubt that in the main our senses are telling us the truth, so far as they go. We have no reason to doubt that there is a Something (*Ding an sich*, *noumenon*) out there, behind the procession of phenomena, which is ceaselessly moving and changing; and that for this motion and change there is a Somewhy (energy, power, *élan*). But this What and this Why are purely matter of metaphysics. Scientists are learning that the field of science lies only in the investigation of sequence of phenomena. Science answers the question, How? not the question, Why?

DISCUSSION IV.

THE GRAMMAR OF THEOLOGY.

(See essay on this subject in Part II.)

1. So far we have studied the way in which messages come to the telephone operator. But we have neglected to inquire what goes on inside the exchange.

2. In the first place we know that the girl does not simply connect up subscribers. She herself does something about each message,—or rather all the messages except those which result in what we call reflex action. She sorts the messages and puts away a copy of each in its proper pigeon hole, which we call the memory. She gives such orders over the wire as she conceives that the information which she has received necessitates. In other words, hers is not an automatic telephone.

3. In short, there are two ways of knowing things,—from the outside and from the inside. External objects we know from the outside alone. But ourselves we know from both the outside and the inside. The formulas which express our experiences from the outside, received by sense impressions, we call laws of nature; the formulas to express our experience from the inside we call doctrines of psychology, philosophy, or theology. The *inside* information carries more weight; since we know our own mental processes at first hand, while our outside informa-

tion, whether of the world or of our bodies, we get only through sense impressions.

4. In considering what goes on inside the exchange, we note, first of all, that the operator is *affected* by every message which comes to her. No message does she receive with entire indifference. It makes her glad or sad, it gives her pleasure or pain, comfort or discomfort. The message has this effect, not alone by reason of what it contains; but by reason of what she, herself, is. For instance, any observed fact which fails to fit in with our rational scheme of cause and effect, gives us discomfort until it is "explained"; any act or happening which seems to us unjust arouses indignation. This inherent tendency, or set, of the mind, which is the subjective factor in affection (psychological), we will, for want of a better name, call a "sense".

5. Every human being has, *among others*, the following "senses":

- a. A sense for self-preservation.
- b. A sense for love; a tendency to want companionship; a desire to have others like me and an equally strong desire to like others; an inherent abhorrence of a loveless universe.
- c. A sense for loyalty, akin to the sense for love. This is the tendency which makes man a social being.
- d. A sense for rationality; the desire to arrange sense impressions in logical sequence; the desire to relate things in sequence of cause and effect; an inherent abhorrence of a helter-skelter universe.
- e. A sense for activity; a tendency to take some action in regard to each sense impression.

- f. A sense for purpose; a tendency to ask, whenever anything happens, "What is it doing that for?" An inherent abhorrence of a squirrel-cage universe.
- g. A sense for right; a tendency to say, "I ought".
- h. A sense for justice; an inherent abhorrence of injustice and of an unjust universe.
- i. A sense for reverence; a tendency to look up to some other being, human or supernatural, as an ideal.
- j. A sense for beauty.

6. These "senses" are not in themselves guides of conduct. Our sense for self-preservation does not, for instance, tell us what conduct will make for the well-being of the organism. That is for the intellect. The sense for self-preservation is the force which drives us to make the decision; and, when the decision is made, to shape our conduct by it. Likewise, our sense for right,—which is what we call conscience. Any sense impression which violates any one of these senses or tendencies gives us discomfort or pain.

7. Each one of these senses is *equally* postulated of our consciousness. We have no more right to ignore our sense for right than our sense for rationality. We should reject as false, or at least incomplete, any explanation, whether of a particular phenomenon or of the universe as a whole, which violates either our sense for rationality or for right.

8. There is, however, another aspect of reality of which we must take account. The universe, whether we regard it as an external entity or a procession of mental images, is not supine. If I go into a dark room, not knowing that a chair is there, I hit it

nevertheless. Now, the rationalist claims that phenomena do prove amenable to the demands of his sense for rationality; in other words that there is a rational order in the universe independent of any tendency of his to find it there. The same thing, however, is true as to our sense for right and for justice. We hold that the universe is in the main righteous. It is true that there is apparently much sorrow and sin. But it is also true that there is apparently much irrationality. At the basis of every system of science lies an antinomy. The religionist believes that apparent evil would, if our knowledge were complete, appear to be good. The rationalist, likewise, believes that apparent antinomy would, if his science were complete, appear to be rational. So both science and religion end, as they began, in an act of faith.

9. Science is, in the main, based upon our sense for rationality, our sense for activity and our sense for purpose.

10. Religion is, in the main, based upon our sense for right, our sense for justice, our sense for love and our sense for reverence. Religion is the attempt so to *live* as to satisfy these "senses". Theology is the attempt so to *explain* phenomena as to satisfy these "senses."

11. Now it so happens that a given phenomenon, or sense impression, may at first sight fail to satisfy both our sense for rationality and our sense for right. In other words, some law of nature may appear to contradict some deductions of our religious consciousness. For instance, science may seem to tell us that all our actions are predetermined, whereas we feel that they ought to be free. We should not, in such cases, determine off-hand to satisfy our sense for rationality at the expense of our sense for right;

we should rather endeavor to find some explanation which would satisfy both; and until such explanation appears we should at least reserve judgment.

12. Religion, however, is or claims to be, more than a way of regarding the outside world. It claims to have data of its own, a religious experience parallel with sensuous experience. This experience should be tested and analyzed by the same methods employed by science.

Let us analyze in this way the experience of subjective answer to prayer. This experience is either what it purports to be, a true intuition from God, or it is the result of self-suggestion. If the latter were the case one would expect that the answer would be in accordance with the expectation, or the wish, of the person who prayed; but it is very often not in accordance with either. A second objection to the self-suggestion theory is that, upon that hypothesis, the strength with which a belief is held, rather than the character of the belief, should count. We ought not to find any strong tendency in favor of the selection and survival of particular underlying conceptions. Now, we find in the study of comparative religion that certain conceptions, for example Incarnation and Atonement, are continually cropping up, which indicates that they have great survival value. It is very difficult to resist the conclusion that the particular beliefs, just because of their character, have worked better than other beliefs. If so, then the answer to prayer would appear to be in some manner objectively determined.

13. Religious systems vary, just as do scientific systems, through differences both in experience and in the deductions made from experience. We hold to Christianity, rather than to Mohammedanism, because we believe, both that it embodies more valid

religious experience, and that its doctrines are more accurate deductions from that experience, than those of Mohammedanism.

14. Conclusion.

A natural law is an explanation and classification of the facts of sensuous experience so as to satisfy our sense for rationality. A doctrine of theology is an explanation and classification of the facts of both sensuous and religious experience, so as to satisfy our religious senses. Neither is a fiat imposed by authority or inexorable necessity; but each is a formula whereby we resume the facts of experience. We can no more live without theology than without science. Every man has, willy-nilly, a theology. It is the purpose of this course to find an explanation of the facts of experience which shall satisfy our senses for right, justice, love, and reverence.

DISCUSSION V.

THE WILL TO BELIEVE.

1. The texture of thought. We are all weavers. Our yarns are percepts and intuitions; the loom, our nerves and brain; the pattern, our senses for rationality, activity, right, love, justice, and reverence; the finished product, our systems of science, philosophy, and religion. Our product is partly conditioned and partly free. We may not choose our yarns; but we may choose our pattern.

Problem: When belief and disbelief are both possible, which should we choose?

2. An *explanation* of a phenomenon or act is a statement of its relations to other phenomena or acts. The explanation is instinctively constructed by the mind in accordance with certain inherent tendencies or "senses,"—such as the sense for rationality, right, justice, etc.

3. An *hypothesis* is an explanation of a phenomenon or act, which satisfies some, but not all, of our mental tendencies, or "senses".

4. An *option* is a choice between hypotheses.

5. A *live*, or *practical*, *option* is one having a bearing on human conduct.

6. *Belief* is the acceptance of an hypothesis which satisfies one or more, but not all, of our mental tendencies, or "senses".

7. *Doubt* is the refusal to accept such hypothesis.

8. In all cases of practical options, doubt is, therefore, equivalent in effect to denial, since it results in the same conduct. For instance, if I doubt that I can swim a stream, I will not make the attempt, and the result is the same as though I was sure that I could not do so. In such cases I should adopt the hypothesis that will result in conduct most beneficial.

9. Most options concerning religious hypotheses are practical options. In such cases, therefore, we ought to believe. The world honors the adventurer rather than the timid creature who waits for someone else to try first.

10. Belief is legitimate only in making a choice between two hypotheses, both of which have reasonable evidence to support them. It should not lead us wildly to override evidence, or to affirm that for which there is no evidence. This is credulity.

11. In some cases the very act of belief or disbelief may create the condition which justifies it. To the lover the question as to whether or not his love is requited is a practical option. Believe, and his assurance will go far to create its response. Doubt, and—"Faint heart ne'er won fair lady." Belief and doubt may often both be objectively right.

12. Conclusion. The theory of knowledge developed in Discussions III, IV and V, and which lies at the basis of the argument in all the subsequent lectures, may be recapitulated as follows:

- a. We have certitude only of our own existence and mental processes.
- b. The outside universe we *know* only as a series of sense impressions.
- c. We instinctively *arrange* phenomena, and

state their relations to other phenomena or acts. Out of such arrangement arise our concepts of matter, time, space, motion, force, energy, and cause and effect.

- d. We make these arrangements, or explanations, of phenomena in accordance with certain inherent tendencies, or "senses",—such as the sense for rationality, right, justice, etc. Each of these senses is equally postulated of our consciousness. The senses for rationality, etc., are the basis of science. The senses for right, justice, etc., are the basis of theology.
- e. Hence the scientist, like the theologian, must at the very outset of his reasoning, make an act of faith, namely that there is an external reality behind his sense perceptions and that his arrangement and explanation of phenomena corresponds to such reality. Theology is no more subjective than science. All science as well as all religion, rests on a reasonable exercise of the Will to Believe.
- f. No explanation of phenomena is valid which does violence either to our scientific sense or to our religious sense, and it is our duty to seek an explanation satisfactory to both.
- g. In the event that no such explanation is found, it is our duty to hold final judgment in abeyance, but to act upon that hypothesis which will result in conduct most beneficial.
- h. Within the limits defined, it is not only our right, but our duty, not to await absolute demonstration, but to so construct our universe as to satisfy our religious as well as our scientific sense, and then to act boldly on that belief.

DISCUSSION VI.

THE IDEA OF GOD.

1. Practical value of belief in God.

- a. Historical—All peoples in all ages have believed in a Supernatural Power or Powers.
- b. Individual—Our own hearts register a desire to believe in such a Power, and belief gives high ideals and courage to pursue them.
- c. Social—Unbelief has always resulted in decadence. "If there were no God, it would be necessary to invent one," Voltaire.

Problem: Has modern science made it impossible to believe in a personal God?

2. Two ideas of God.

- a. Worship of ancestors, heroes and rulers. Prevailing type among the North European races, such as the Teutons and the prehistoric Nordic invaders of Greece and Italy; developed into the classical mythologies of Greece and Rome. This type was probably at the basis of the Hebrew religion.
- b. Nature worship. Prevailing type of most Mediterranean races, such as the indigenous races of Greece and Italy, developing later into the "mystery religions".
- c. Development of the Ruler God type. Victory of one nation over another established the

superiority of the Ruler God of the victors over the Ruler God of the vanquished. Political consolidation thus led to the idea of a God superior to all other Gods and finally to the conception of one God, ruler of the whole earth. We can trace this development in the Old Testament.

- d. Development of the Nature God type. At first the Greeks saw a God in every tree and every river. But systematization of material phenomena into one universe led to the conception of One God immanent in all Nature.
 - e. Both ideas found place in Christendom. In the West the Roman idea of God as a Despot, Transcendent and Absent from the material universe, predominated. Matter was base and godless and operated in general automatically. God only intervened occasionally by way of miracle. In the East the Greek idea of God as immanent in Nature prevailed. Matter was his garment and all phenomena were manifestations of him. The former concept was that of Augustine, the latter that of Paul.
3. May we believe in a Personal God?
- a. The concept of a Despot God is in conflict with science.
 - b. The concept of a Nature God is not in conflict with science. Science merely describes the succession of phenomena; it does not explain why they come. It is not in conflict with the theory that they are the direct action of an eternally creative God.
 - c. May this God be personal? Not in the sense of

human personality, for that involves limitations. But because God is not personal, it does not follow that he is *impersonal*, for by that we mean less than personal. We may hold him to be more than personal. Because we deny that he resembles a human being, we do not affirm that he resembles a stone.

- d. Science does not conflict with the idea of an immanent, super-personal God.
- e. At the same time the notion of a wholly immanent God is incomplete. A transcendent God is one who is outside of Nature and can't get in; an immanent God is inside of Nature and can't get out. (See Disc. XI and Essay, *Nicene Idea of God*, in Part II.) The true God cannot be subject to either limitation.

4. *Should* we believe in a Personal God?

- a. Since this is a practical option, and since belief in God is conducive to a more perfect life, we *should* believe. Suspension of judgment is morally and ethically equivalent to denial.
- b. But belief in God rests not alone on balancing of probabilities. There are positive evidences of his existence; and, since we look at life both from within and from without, we may find these evidences both in our own nature and in the external universe.
- c. Evidences from within.
 - i. Belief in God is a postulate demanded by our mind quite as imperatively as belief in the objective existence of an orderly material universe. Our senses for right, justice, and reverence are quite as imperative as our sense for rationality; and both senses are equally fundamental and valid.

ii. The existence of Human Intelligence presupposes the existence of Divine Intelligence. We cannot suppose that our minds are the highest psychic element in the universe. Our sense for rationality refuses to conceive the psychic to be uncaused, or to be caused by the non-psychic. The result is a "function" of (resembles) the cause. As the Psalmist expressed it, "He that formed the ear, shall he not hear?"

d. Evidence from without. While the theory of special creation obtained, it was possible to argue the existence of God from every abnormal phenomenon. Since we have come to see that there is no abnormal, the evidences of God in phenomena are harder to see. It appears at first sight to be more difficult to demonstrate the agency of God in the normal. The air would be difficult to detect, if we were unable to produce a vacuum; and there is no vacuum from God. Nevertheless, we are able to see that God is demonstrated through the whole course of nature, as follows:

i. Our interpretation of the phenomenal universe requires us to postulate a Power working for righteousness. The old argument for God proceeded from the postulate that the visible universe was good and well-ordered. We know that, to appearances, the universe is not all good. But our sense for right and for justice still demands that we find a moral purpose in it; that in some way the apparent evil is working out a greater Good. But the achievement of such greater Good requires the work of some Power for Righteous-

ness. In other words, the visible universe indicates the existence of God, not because it is good, but because it ought to be good.

ii. The course of evolution, as we observe it in the large, seems to indicate a directed progress toward higher life. In other words, it seems to show that what we conceive ought to take place is taking place. Such progress can, it seems to me, be explained only by the existence of God.

iii. Evolution, also, as we observe it in particulars, seems to be inexplicable on the theory of natural selection of haphazard variations. Scientists are coming to agree that variations do not appear to be always haphazard, but tend often, and perhaps usually, in the same direction. More, they are in pretty general agreement that many variations, which eventually result in a distinct improvement in type, are not in themselves of any assistance to the organism in the struggle for existence, and hence their survival and further development cannot be explained by natural selection. In short, variations seem to display the operation of some intelligent Power. (See Disc. IX.)

e. The evidence from religious experience. The motto of science is *Experientia docet*. If we use the method of experience, or experiment, we note that those who have believed in the existence of God, who have acted upon that belief, who have lived as they thought God desired them to live, and who have relied upon his aid, have appeared to receive aid from on high. (James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*.) In other words, those

who act on the belief in God, do achieve results *as if* by the action of God. (See Disc. XVI.) No better proof is possible of any theory, either of theology or of science.

5. Conclusion. We find that science does not preclude belief in a personal, or super-personal, God; so that, even if there were no evidence of God, we ought to believe, since the option is a practical one. But we find, further, that there *are* positive evidences of God, both within and without us. In short, the dogma of the existence of God satisfies our three criteria; it is not in conflict with science; it epitomizes religious experience; it evokes right action. Mere intellectual assent, however, is of no practical benefit. We must "practice the presence of God,"—learn to speak to him and give him an opportunity to speak to us. We must so live as one in the presence of God. So doing we shall achieve an intuition of God which is more than argument, and for which argument can but clear the ground. (See Disc. XVI.) "Whoso doeth the will of God shall know of the doctrine."

DISCUSSION VII.

THE WILL.

1. Definition.

The will, or willing, is the initiation of deliberate activity.

Problem: Is the human will really free, or is conduct pre-determined?

2. Objections to Freedom of the Will.

- a. Theological. Contrary to omniscience and omnipotence of God. Renders prophecy impossible. Doctrine of predestination.
- b. Philosophical. Violates causation and spells anarchy. Theory of determinism.
- c. Scientific. Opposed to what biology teaches of heredity; what sociology teaches of environment; what psychology teaches of the mechanism of willing (force of habit, suggestion, etc.); and what anatomy teaches of effect of lesions and mal-formations of the brain.

3. Arguments for Freedom of the Will.

- a. Philosophical. Since there are arguments both ways, this is a Practical Option; and we should believe in freedom, if such belief will be beneficial to us.
- b. Theological. Our sense for justice demands that, if we are accountable for our actions,

we must be free to choose. No real religion is possible, if we are but machines.

- c. Scientific. Neither the teachings of biology, anatomy, psychology, nor sociology force us to the conclusion that our conduct is completely determined. (See the notes covering this Discussion in Part III.)
- d. Ethical. Belief that our actions are pre-determined would result in libertinism. Without free-will there is no possibility of moral value judgments, praise and blame.
- e. Experience. We *feel* free. That's all there is about it for most of us. As said before, we know ourselves from the inside better than from the outside (Disc. IV). When our acts are not free, as in case of hypnotism, we recognize the fact. It is like the parable of the ass midway between two exactly equal bundles of hay—would he starve?
- f. Experimental. We find that those who assume that the will is free and act thereon, who in other words perform the experiment of freedom, do in fact find that the theory works. This is the final test of any theory. In short, we can accept the theory of absolute determinism only by entirely disregarding all the "inside" evidence, backed up as it is by experiment.

4. In the absence of rational reconciliation of the arguments for and against Freedom of the Will we must believe *both* that the will is determined, or at least conditioned, and that it is *free*; since we cannot, on the one hand, disbelieve in an omnipotent God and an orderly universe, nor can we, on the other hand, distrust ourselves.

5. Suggested rational reconciliation.

- a. Theological. God does not rule but overrules. God's will controls every phenomenon except such as are controlled by the wills of his creatures. God has limited himself to that extent. But self-limitation is not a contradiction of omnipotence. He wills that man should be free, yet provides counter-checks, so that freedom shall not spoil the divine plan. Abuse of freedom injures only the man himself. Example. Assume it to have been God's plan that democracy should triumph in Europe. That might have been brought about, either by the gradual democratization of Germany, or by her overthrow. Germany chose not to be democratized, but to fight. That very spirit on her part intensified the spirit of democracy in the other countries, united them against her and nerved them to efforts of which they would not otherwise have been capable. God's result was attained, yet the chain of causation was not broken. The very acts which sought to thwart God's will were the *cause* of its attainment. The pre-eminent example of such overruling is found in the Crucifixion and its consequences.
- b. Philosophical. Indeterminism is not lawless. It does not violate causation; only the cause does not *completely* contain the effect; something is added. A real creation is taking place at every moment. The result is pre-determined within limits, but not absolutely. Insofar as we exercise free will we are actually partners with God in the work of creation.

c. Scientific. There is no evidence that heredity and environment *absolutely* control the individual, we are entitled to hold that they merely set limits to his development. There is no evidence that anatomy *absolutely* controls thought. Indeed many psychologists, as Wm. James, regard the brain as an organ for releasing or transmitting mental energy, rather than creating it (Disc. VIII). It is, for example, impossible to explain memory as a matter of physiological changes stored up in the brain cells (see Bergson, *Mind Energy*). The limits within which the will of any individual is free we may call his "zone of freedom" (Disc. XIV).

6. Conclusion.

The dogma that the will is conditioned, yet free within limits, is not in conflict with science, it most certainly does epitomize our religious experience and evoke right action; hence it fulfills our criteria of validity. In practice we find that, if we act as though the will *were* free and exercise it in a certain direction, we may extend its freedom in that direction. If we act as though the will were not free, we forge new chains. Let us hold ourselves lords of our destinies and we shall find that we are freer than we think .

DISCUSSION VIII.

LIFE ETERNAL.

1. History of the belief. Burial with food and tools in the Stone Age in Europe indicates this belief. Inscriptions show it well developed in primitive Egypt. Also in China, and among American Indians,—in short in all times and races. Among Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans it became attenuated, but not entirely lost. One source of strength in early Christianity was the faith that Christ had brought life and immortality to light. This indicates that it answers a fundamental need of the human heart.

Problem: Has modern science made this belief untenable? If not untenable, can it be said to be more than a mere possibility?

2. Position of science. The power of thought grows with the growth of the brain and nervous system. Particular phases of thought are localized in particular portions of the brain,—as hearing, speech, motor activity, memory,—are inhibited by local injuries, and affected by general bodily conditions. Hence science affirms that thought is a function (mathematical) of the brain. (See dictionary definition of function, mathematical.)

3. What is a "function"? There are three sorts: production, release and transmission,—examples, steam *produced* by the action of heat on water; la-

tent energy of gunpowder *released* by the striking of hammer on cartridge; sunlight *transmitted* by glass. The office of the brain may be the release or transmission of thought, rather than its creation. No philosopher and no careful scientist would now support the dictum of Büchner that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. The brain may canalize thought, or be the means whereby thought is brought to bear on matter. An injury to the brain may not result in the absence of thought, but in inability to express thought. If this be so, then death would not spell the destruction of the soul. Science, therefore, cannot, and does not, deny the possibility of personal immortality.

4. This question is a Practical Option, and, therefore, even if the possibilities are even, it is our duty to believe; since belief admittedly results in practical benefit (Disc. V).

5. Our sense for right, for justice, for love, for self-preservation, all demand belief in immortality. These demands are just as fundamental as our sense for rationality, and no scheme of things is valid which does not take them into account. The ancient Hebrews endeavored to satisfy our sense for justice by finding the divine reward and punishment in this life. The books of Job and Ecclesiastes demonstrate their failure, and display the inevitable result,—pessimism. Hence the later Hebrews were forced to accept belief in immortality. Our sense for love demands immortality for the loved ones; our sense for self-preservation demands immortality for ourselves. Our sense for perfection demands the objective possibility of a "better". These senses must answer to objective reality (Disc. IV).

6. To suppose matter to be the creator of mind is to put the cart before the horse, since we can only

know of matter through mind. The materialistic philosopher is like the snake which, beginning with the tail, ate himself up.

7. What we know of psychology indicates, it seems to me, that thought is transmitted, rather than created, by the brain. It is impossible, for example, to explain memories as stored up physically in the brain cells like plates in a photograph gallery. The mechanism of recollecting seems rather to be the supplying of a channel through which the superphysical memory may be brought to light. (See Bergson, *Mind Energy*.)

8. Applying the method of experiment, which is the method of science, we find that this belief works; that on the whole those who have made the most of their lives have been those who were convinced that they were immortal and who lived the immortal life here.

9. Conclusion.

Science does not preclude belief in immortality. Judged by the other tests which we should apply to any theory, this theory appears to be demonstrated. But, as said before, arguments can merely clear the mind of supposed objections. This done, we shall find a sort of intuition of immortality emerging—and if we then live in accordance with this intuition, we shall find it growing to absolute certainty,—to the certainty that inspired the Christian martyrs to face death, not only with fortitude, but with eagerness. Our faith will then be vital,—the only sort worth while.

B—WHAT THINK YE OF CHRIST?

The Philosophy of Christian Doctrine.

DISCUSSION IX.

THE CREATING GOD.

1. The theory of special creation.

- a. Statement of the theory. That God specially created each heavenly body and afterward each form of living being and left them to develop through forces inherent in themselves, except as he might and did intervene and suspend the operation of such forces by way of miracle.
- b. History of the theory. Originally the relations between phenomena were imperfectly understood. Phenomena were largely regarded as independent and self-subsisting. Hence the existence of each demanded a separate creative act. When some new, or unusual, phenomenon appeared, a special creative act was presumed,—that is, a miracle. Miracle, therefore, as formerly understood, was only a special case of special creation, a special creative act performed in the course of time. With primitive man the field of miracle was very wide. All happenings which were unusual, and of which the antecedents were not clearly apparent, were as-

cribed to special intervention of Deity. As these antecedents became known, the field of *direct* intervention of Deity became more and more restricted (Disc. II), until by the nineteenth century it was confined to original creation and a score or so of Biblical miracles.

2. The theory of evolution.

a. Statement of the theory.

i. That every material phenomenon is related to an antecedent material phenomenon and that such relations are uniform,—or, as commonly stated, that all material things evolve from material causes in accordance with natural laws.

ii. That the various forms of life are the results of a growth from the homogeneous and generalized to the heterogeneous and specialized.

b. Basis of the theory.

i. Evidence from comparative zoology and anatomy.

ii. Evidence from comparative embryology.

iii. Evidence from paleontology.

iv. Experimental evidence in variation and mutation of species.

Problem: Has the theory of evolution substituted natural forces for God as the creator of the material universe and of man?

3. The philosophy and theology of evolution.

a. While the *theory* of evolution, as outlined above (§2), is firmly established, the *method* of evolution is still in doubt. As now understood by scientists it differs widely from that set forth by Darwin. He ascribed all evolution to the operation of natural selection upon minute, haphazard variations. Scien-

tists are now coming to hold that the variations are not always minute and are not usually haphazard. Often a new variety appears as the result of a single mutation. And a careful study of variations seems to show that they occur often, perhaps usually, in a given direction. This appears strikingly in the study of the evolution of particular organs. Thus, the eye appears to have developed from the skin cells of the face by a concatenated series of changes, none of which by itself would have been of any use to the organism in the struggle for existence. More, it requires a similar development, all in the same direction, of the cells over a very wide area; and should the development of one group of cells not keep pace with the others, the eye would be useless. (Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, pp. 60-97.) To us it seems that this directive Power is a personal God, acting by way of what we have called "vertical" causation. "He that formed the eye, shall he not see?"

- b. The same conclusion is reinforced by the growth of the individual. Organs appear and reach their full development in the foetus, which are only useful after birth. Some insects in the pupa stage undergo a breaking down of organs and most of the body is reduced to a jelly, out of which new organs are formed, so that the later stage does not appear to be a lineal development from the larval stage, but a fresh start.
- c. Biologists have demonstrated that acquired characteristics are not transmitted to the offspring (although this doctrine was never held

by Darwin, but was proposed by Lamarck) ; but that specific changes in the organism arise through modifications in the germ plasm. It follows that environment does not *directly* produce modification of species or affect the course of evolution.

- d. While the theory that variations in species are produced by the operation of natural selection on minute variations has been modified and supplemented as outlined above, it by no means follows that natural selection is no longer regarded as a factor in evolution. Only its function is now regarded as largely negative. It weeds out the unfit and hence gives a chance for the free development of the fit. It explains the survival, rather than the arrival, of species.
- e. The evolutionary conception, although it originated in the field of biology, has been applied to astronomy, anthropology, sociology, history, and religion, and it appears to govern all.
- f. The theory of evolution does not banish God, for it is purely descriptive; it concerns the *manner* in which development takes place, not *why* it does so. The statement that the tadpole grows into the frog does not in the least tell us why he grows.
- g. In short, there are two sorts of cause. One sort is merely the physical antecedent of the phenomenon, the other is the metaphysical power that produced the change (Disc. III). The statement that every material phenomenon is related to an antecedent material phenomenon and that such relations are uniform, does, indeed, exclude *purely* supernat-

ural elements from causation in the horizontal plane; but no amount of investigation in the horizontal plane can make it possible for us to cancel the necessity for the vertical causation. And this vertical causation, our religious senses assure us, can be none other than God. If, as we maintain, phenomena are not wholly determined by their antecedents, then God is actually continuing the work of creation day by day. And we, in so far as we exercise free will congruently with the Divine Will, are also engaging in the work of creation.

4. Miracles.

A miracle, as formerly understood, is merely a particular act of special creation; it is the intercalation of a purely supernatural term into a series of phenomena. We now hold that such special acts are impossible, or perhaps we should say unimaginable. But this impossibility relates, not to the actuality of the alleged happening, but simply to the explanation of it. A miracle *should* be defined as an act which calls into play forces with which we are unfamiliar. Death would be a miracle, if it happened only occasionally. Until we know more of the laws of nature, particularly in the field of psychology, we cannot be dogmatic. Each supposed miracle is to be judged on its own evidence.

The evolutionary theory has substituted a dynamic for a static universe. It has not abolished God; but it has ennobled our conception of him. It has given us an immanent and eternally creative God for an absentee and arbitrary God. God still acts in the world; but his action is a push, instead of a pull.

DISCUSSION X.

THE REVEALING GOD.

1. The Bible is not infallible.

- a. It is historically inaccurate. Examples: Languages were not given at Babel, nor the Law, complete, on Sinai. Both grew.
- b. It is scientifically inaccurate. Examples: There is no water under the earth; and the sun did not stand still at Gibeon; the whale did not swallow Jonah.
- c. More serious,—it is, in part, ethically immature. Example, the command of Jehovah to kill all the Canaanites; the imprecatory psalms; the law “an eye for an eye.”
- d. Most serious,—it is, in part, spiritually insufficient. Example, Ecclesiastes, the book of an agnostic and a pessimist.

Problem: If the Bible is not infallible, how can it be said to be inspired by God, since God does not err?

2. The doctrine of Biblical Infallibility is almost as modern as that of Papal Infallibility.

- a. Christ did not regard the Bible as infallible. Example, “It was said by them of old time,—but I say”.
- b. St. Paul did not so regard it. “The Law

(i. e. the first five books of the Bible) has been a child's slave to bring us to Christ."

- c. The early Church did not so regard it. In fact the early Church exercised its discretion in selecting the books of the New Testament, and, to some extent, in accepting the books of the Old Testament.
- d. In the Middle Ages the authority of the Bible was augmented; but prior to the Reformation it was screened and mitigated by the doctrine of an infallible Church, which not only determined what books should be accepted, but explained and interpreted the books, so as to mitigate the literal meaning. The Bible was accepted, not on its own authority, but on the authority of the infallible Church.
- e. At the Reformation the reformers for the most part denied the infallibility of the Church, leaving the infallible Book as the ultimate authority.

3. What is inspiration?

It is not the Books, but the writers of the Books, who were inspired. The inspiration of the Books, then, is a special instance of inspiration in general. Inspiration may be defined as the operation of the Divine Spirit in the soul of man. This operation may be ordinary, as in daily strength and counsel imparted intuitively, or extraordinary, as in the visions and experiences of mystics. The latter form is spoken of as revelation. While more striking, we are taught by St. Paul that it is not more valuable than the ordinary form. Neither form of inspiration is an infallible guide. Obviously "ordinary" inspiration is often choked and distorted by

the mind of the recipient, and supposed revelations may sometimes be insane delusions. St. John recognized this and warned that we must "test the spirits, whether they be of God". The test of inspiration is laid down by Christ, as also by St. Paul: "By their fruits ye shall know them."

4. The inspiration of the Bible.

- a. Not all inspired persons wrote. Example, Jesus.
- b. Not all inspired books are in the Bible.
- c. The books of the Bible are in part a record of revelations, as the Apocalypse of St. John and some of the prophetic writings, and in part a record of "ordinary" inspiration, as the historical and wisdom books.
- d. Judged by the criterion which our Lord laid down, all the books are not equally edifying. This indicates not an imperfection in God, but in the writer. The Spirit must needs act through a human mind and soul. He comes to us "as through a glass darkly".
- e. In general the Books show a progressive development in ethical and spiritual value. They may be said to be the record of a developing receptivity to inspiration. Therein lies their greatest value. They show God at work, not static as in the Koran. They show the gradual ennobling of religious concepts through divine influence. The authority of the Books of the Bible rests on their own inherent value, not on external authority and wholly regardless of questions of authorship.

5. Conclusion.

So understood, the Bible becomes more valuable

to us; as it no longer forces our submission, but wins our allegiance by satisfying, in the main, the very highest religious ideals of the race. The writers become real men, instead of stained-glass-window saints. They are no longer mere receiving instruments, recording automatically a celestial message. We read what they have written in the light of the problems that confronted them,—problems much like our own,—and we gain a new appreciation; the Bible means more to us, because we understand it better.

DISCUSSION XI.

THE NICENE IDEA OF GOD.

(For a fuller discussion see Part II.)

1. Definition.

The Trinity is usually defined as the Godhead in one Substance and three Persons.

2. Ordinary interpretation.

The ordinary Christian either construes this to denote three individualities united with some undefined nexus, or he dismisses the doctrine from his mind as something quite beyond rational processes. In the first case he lapses into practical tri-theism. In the latter case he regards the doctrine as an encumbrance, about which the less said the better. The concept is either grotesque or vacuous. In either case it fails to meet the criterion of a formulation of the facts of religious experience. It is not seen to have any practical bearing whatsoever.

Problem: Is the doctrine of the Trinity intelligible; and, if so, has it any practical bearing?

3. Development of the doctrine.

- a. Development of the concepts of God the Father and of God the Spirit in Old Testament.
- b. The Logos concept.
- c. The dispute as to the relation between these concepts. Arius vs. Athanasius.

- d. The question at Nicaea was not whether Christ was divine,—all parties agreed to that,—but whether or not there were three Gods. The chief concern of Athanasius and of the Council was the affirmation of the *unity* of the Deity.

4. Language of the dogma.

That there is one substance (*substantia*, οὐσία) but three persons (*personae*, ὑποστάσεις). The English words absolutely misrepresent the original. *Substantia* and οὐσία mean “being”. The word *persona* in Roman Law meant “an aggregate of legal rights and duties”. A citizen might have several *personae*; for example, as father, as guardian, as governor, as trustee. What the Early Church Fathers sought to express was that the nature of the Deity, while essentially one, is complex, three-sided in function. God in essence is one, but in his revelation of himself he has three aspects, manifestations, capacities, or functionings. This complexity of functioning corresponds to some real complexity of being; but there are not three individualities. The emphasis was upon the unity, since it was the dis-unitarian idea of Arius which called forth the doctrine.

5. Practical aspects of the doctrine.

All three concepts are necessary to a well-balanced idea of God.

- a: A God transcendent only (Father) is contrary to modern science, which requires an immanent God. (Discs. VI and IX.)
- b. A God immanent only (Spirit) tends to pantheism.
- c. A God humanistic only (Son) becomes a mere super-man, whom we may love but not worship.

6. Conclusion.

It is the peculiar glory of Christianity that it has retained all three concepts and held the balance between them. The doctrine of the Trinity is both intelligible and practical.

DISCUSSION XII.

JESUS THE MAN.

1. Conclusions of historical criticism as to the Gospel records.

First came oral tradition, reduced to writing in the Logia (45-55 A. D.) and Mark (60-70 A. D.). Matthew was compiled from these two (70-80 A. D.). Luke, also, was built on these two, together with other sources, chiefly concerning the Infancy (70-80 A.D.). John was a philosophical essay based on the Synoptics, with, perhaps, other sources (about 100 A. D.). Our earliest complete existing manuscripts date from the fifth century. But there are numerous manuscripts of portions of the Gospels from the fourth century and fragmentary materials from the third.

Problem: Does historical criticism leave us any assurance of the facts of Jesus' life; and, if so, just what did He do and how did He regard Himself?

2. Proofs of authenticity.

- a. External. Approximate agreement of all existing *manuscripts* gives assurance that we have the *books* as originally written. The immediate and universal acceptance of the *books* by the Christians of the time when the books were written gives assurance that they faithfully reproduced the existing and ac-

cepted *oral traditions*. The remarkable accuracy with which *oral traditions* were in those days transmitted for long periods of time gives assurance that the narratives of the life of Jesus were not substantially altered in the thirty years between his crucifixion and the writing of Mark and the Logia.

- b. Internal. The narrative of the life possesses consistency impossible to fiction. If the sayings were invented, the inventor must have been a religious genius as great as Jesus. The narratives contain many passages in which the theology is more primitive than that of the time when the gospels, in their present form, were written. The divergences between the several gospels, and the occasional discrepancies in different parts of the same gospel, furnish strong evidence of the absence of invention or collusion. In short, the internal evidence is conclusive as to the substantial historical accuracy of the Synoptic narratives.

3. Life of Jesus.

Beginning his ministry in Galilee he traveled about teaching and healing souls and bodies. He taught by story and homely epigram. He healed by bringing to bear, with consummate knowledge of the soul, the laws of suggestion to clear away the obstacles that hindered the healing power of God from flooding in. Causes of hostility to him (among others): Pharisees, because, while he observed the Law, he taught an ethics superseding it. Sadducees: because they feared he would start a rebellion. How would he get on to-day in these respects?

4. Death.

- a. Trial and Crucifixion. The Sanhedrin had no power of trial or sentence in capital cases; but was empowered to indict accused persons and present them for trial to the Procurator. It appears, although the record is rather scanty, that they examined Jesus on a charge of blasphemy, and then presented him for trial on a charge of treason. If Pilate observed any of the Roman criminal procedure in the trial, the record does not show it.
- b. The place of the Cross. At first the Incarnation and the Resurrection, rather than the Death, were regarded as the great redeeming acts. Later the Cross was over emphasized in the effort to find an analogy to the Jewish sin offering. Yet we should not go to the other extreme of regarding the Death as unimportant. Symbolically it set the seal upon the new covenant. (Every treaty required a sacrifice to give it validity. Cf. *σπονδαί*, the Greek word for treaty, which is the plural of *σπονδή*, meaning libation. Note, also, that sacrifices ratified God's covenants with Noah, Abraham, and Moses.) Actually it emphasized and formed the dramatic climax to the Life, without which the Life and Teachings would have lost much of their force. (See Disc. XV.)

5. Resurrection.

- a. Proofs. Paul, writing twenty years later, says that Jesus was seen by about five hundred, most of whom were then alive. This could not have been delusion, since the elements of delusion were lacking; his followers were not expecting to see him, in fact they

had all forsaken him and fled. Furthermore, such a delusion, extending to so many persons, at different times and widely separated places is unheard-of. There can be no doubt that they were all thoroughly convinced of the reality of their experience. There is no other way to account for the wonderful change which came over them: the cowards became martyrs.

- b. The place of the Resurrection. Paul gives the Resurrection the central place in the scheme of redemption. Christ by his death had conquered the flesh and by his rising in a spiritual body had made it possible for us to put on immortality. For Paul, this change to immortality takes place during this life and is brought about by Faith and the gift of the Spirit; and for the man who has been so born again the Law has lost its force. Man becomes literally a new creature.

6. The Messiahship.

- a. Jewish expectations. There were two main types of Messianic expectation, based on different lines of prophecy. One was of a human being, descended from David, a quasi-military conqueror using earthly armies, but endowed with strength by God. The other, based on Isaiah and the apocalypses (Daniel, Enoch, etc.) was of a super-human being, angel or quasi-divine, who should come from heaven with angelic hosts; a belief nearly identical with the expectation of the Second Coming now entertained by Adventists. Neither expectation included the element of a suffering Messiah. (Is. 53).

- b. Jesus' conception. Jesus seems to have realized completely his special mission first at the time of his baptism. Without doubt he considered that this mission had to do with bringing in the Messianic kingdom. His conception of the Messiah corresponded with the more exalted of the Jewish expectations above stated, plus the element of achievement through suffering,—the Messiah must first suffer before he is proclaimed from on high. This conception was compatible with an indefinite postponement of the moment of such proclamation. Besides, he saw clearly that the Jews stood in need of much preparation before they should be fit to take part in that kingdom. They must in the first place learn that Love and not the Law was to be the ruling principle. His ethical precepts can be best understood when we remember that they were intended as the constitution of the coming Messianic Kingdom. "Of such and such is the Kingdom of God." When he should have brought the Jews to an acceptance of this constitution, then, and not till then, would God proclaim it. But "of that day and that hour knoweth no one.....neither the Son; but the Father".

Until that time, it appears to have been a matter of indifference to him whether the Jews should regard him as the Messiah, or merely a forerunner of the kingdom. In fact there were advantages in remaining, so to speak, incognito, until God should proclaim him. He could better accomplish his social regeneration, if his followers were not dazzled by the immediate prospect of renown;

and he would be much less likely to incur the hostility of the Romans, thereby bringing on a crisis prematurely. Consequently, while he did not deny his Messiahship, he never openly affirmed it, until upon his trial, when he no doubt realized that then or never must he declare himself in no uncertain way. He had, to be sure, disclosed it secretly to his disciples, after Peter had stated his belief; but he had enjoined them that they should tell no man. So much in doubt were the Sanhedrin as to his Messianic claims that, up to the time of his open declaration before them, they rested their charge of blasphemy only on testimony of his assertion that he would destroy the temple.

Toward the close of his life he realized that the hostility of the Jews would end in his death; and he relied upon his disciples to carry on the preparation for the Kingdom, assuring them that, when their work was accomplished, he would return to earth and assume his throne. They understood him as promising that this consummation ("the consummation of the age," not "the end of the world," as the King James version translates it) would be shortly accomplished.

DISCUSSION XIII.

WHAT THINK YE OF CHRIST?

1. Modern emphasis on the humanity of Jesus.

Orthodox theology has always taught that Jesus had a complete human nature. Recent thought has served to emphasize the logical deduction from this doctrine,—that his was a human mind, as well as a human body,—a mind subject to the scientific limitations of the time, as well as a body subject to infirmity. He was neither omnipotent nor omniscient. “He could do no mighty work there and he marveled because of their unbelief.” “Of that day and hour knoweth no one....neither the Son, but the Father.”

Problem: If Jesus was a man, how can he be said to be divine in any other sense than men in general?

2. Development of Christology.

To understand the problem it is necessary to trace the development of the Christian teaching about the nature of Christ, called Christology.

- a. Primitive Christology. The disciples appear to have accepted the *fact* of Jesus' Messiahship almost from the first, but to have been in doubt as to its *nature* throughout his life and for long after. During his life we find them continually uncertain as to which of the Jewish conceptions they should hold, con-

tinually asking as to how and when the Kingdom should be proclaimed and what sort of Kingdom it was to be. After the Resurrection, however, they seem to have come to a fuller understanding of Jesus' interpretation of his mission (Disc. XII, 6b). This interpretation they adopted, with this addition, that the proclamation of Messiahship, to which Jesus had looked forward, they held to have been given in the Resurrection. "Born of the seed of David according to the flesh, he was declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection of the dead" (Rom. 1:3, 4). After his Ascension they momentarily expected his return with the angelic hosts to set up his earthly kingdom, which should be of Jews and ruled *by* Jews, but *for* all men who cared to come in and submit themselves to Jewish Law.

- b. Pauline Christology. Paul adopted the idea of the Palestinian Christians, except that his Messiah had less of earth and more of heaven. The drama of redemption he transferred from earth to heaven. The Kingdom was of and by, as well as for, all men. A place therein was assured to Jew and Gentile, alike, by Faith and not by the Law. This Kingdom becomes in Paul's thought the Church, which is an organism, the living body of Christ (Disc. XVIII). To Paul the Messiah partakes in some way of the nature of God; but he does not attempt to define this relation. Some of his language is susceptible of an Arian interpretation. In his later writings (e. g. Colossians) he adopts

the Logos theory in all but name. That theory, originating in the Stoic philosophy, was developed by Philo, an Alexandrian Jew (about 20 B. C. to 54 A. D.) He attempted to explain the problem of evil by supposing the world to have been created, not directly by God, but through the Word (λόγος) which emanated from God. A similar doctrine was also current among the Palestinian Rabbis, in which they gave the Word the connotation of the self-expression of Deity.

- c. Johannine Christology. Building on Paul, John develops the relationship of Christ to the Father by a further development of the Logos theory. John, with Philo, affirms, "In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God." But John adds, "and the Word *was* God....and the Word *became* flesh and dwelt among us." The Logos of Philo was neither God nor man. The Logos of John was both, thereby being a real Mediator.
- d. The problem of the two natures. Neither Paul nor John explain how Jesus could be both really God and really Man. From the second century attempts were made at solution. Gnostics and others considered his manhood unreal; and Nestorians and others, his Godhead. Others held that he was part of the time man and part of the time God. Arius taught that the divine nature of Christ was not God, but a being like God. The orthodox Church finally contented itself with the affirmation that he had the two natures, yet in one ego or self, without attempting to rationalize their relationship further.

3. Christology an attempt to formulate the religious experience as to Jesus.

This bit of history shows that the Christology of the Church was not taught it by Jesus, although his life furnished the data from which it was developed. Nor did it flash forth in a burst of revelation. But it was laboriously worked out in order to answer the question, "What think ye of Christ?" Considering Jesus,—what he did, what he said, how he lived,—his followers asked themselves, "How shall we account for this life? Though born of woman, of mind and body such as ours and subject to our infirmities; yet never man spoke as he spoke, never man lived so close to God, or brought others so close to God, never man so convicted us of sin, never man so conquered death. Can we say that such a life was merely human?" The Christology of the Church was the attempt to answer this problem. Can we, with all these things in mind, and with the additional knowledge which they did not have, of the tremendous influence of this life upon history, can we answer otherwise than as the Church has answered?

4. Suggested explanation of the two natures.

While the Church has never set forth a formula or dogma expressing the relationship of the two natures in detail, it has permitted individuals to make the attempt. Perhaps, therefore, a few suggestions may not be presumptuous.

God, in what I have termed his man-ward aspect and manner of functioning (Disc. XI), is conceived of as the perfection of human virtues: perfect love, perfect justice, perfect mercy,—and without any human vices,—in short, an ideal human nature.

Hence, we conceive of God as actuating all good endeavors. "All good gifts and all perfect gifts are

from above." All noble deeds are, hence, in a sense the acts of God.

God, also, inspires all high and noble thoughts. Said Kepler, as he contemplated his theory of the motion of the stars, "I am thinking the thoughts of God after him". All prophetic utterances are in a sense the words of God.

When the good man acts and the prophet speaks, it is in a sense God who acts and speaks. Yet the good man and the prophet "see as through a glass, darkly". Their imperfect humanity obstructs the divine activity and refracts and colors the divine message. This distortion varies. Each of us has times of transparency and times of opacity. Most of us are in general sadly opaque.

Jesus, alone, by reason of the fact that his humanity was perfect, was at all times perfectly transparent to the divine influence. He might at any time have sinned, but in fact never did. Jesus never willed other than the will of God, and therein lay his point of contact with the Divine. In him at all times God acted and spoke. In him we behold God.

The distinction between the two natures in Jesus is, rather, a distinction in our own point of view. In his manward aspect he manifested manhood perfectly, and not merely a being like man; in his Godward aspect he manifested God perfectly, and not merely a being like God.

But it will be said, wherein, then, is the personality of Jesus unique? Is not the difference between his personality and ours one of degree merely and not of kind,—quantitative rather than qualitative? I answer that the difference is both of degree and of kind. The distinction belongs to the philosophy of a bygone day. Modern science and philosophy are

coming to agree that all difference is quantitative. A microscopic increase or decrease in the secretion of a ductless gland spells idiocy. An almost imperceptible variation in the structure of brain and nerve differentiates the mental processes of men and monkeys. Yet, surely the differences between seer and idiot, man and monkey, are also qualitative.

A radio receiving instrument that is only approximately in tune to the wave-length transmitted emits, at best, only a confused buzzing; when the tuning becomes exactly correct the message suddenly becomes intelligible; the difference is qualitative. So, too, is the difference between perfection and any approach to it. The perfect human life, alone, is divine; and that life Jesus, alone, has lived.

5. Conclusion.

Neither the doctrine of the Trinity nor the doctrine of the Incarnation can be laid aside as non-essential, or quietly consigned to oblivion, without changing Christianity to something else. To apologize for or belittle them means to apologize for our religion. Nor need we apologize. The dogma of the Trinity keeps before our minds the three-fold activity and being of God, as both transcendent, immanent and humanistic, and saves us from the pantheism of Buddhism and the austerity of Judaism (Disc. XI). The doctrine of the Incarnation reminds us that God not only may express, but has expressed, himself in terms of perfect human nature. It forever prevents the divorce of religion from ethics and saves us from the immoralities of the Greek religions.

Other religions possess ethical codes as lofty as ours and have organizations, rituals, and rites analogous to ours. But none has so brought God to

man and raised man to God,—has so made easy the approach to God, which is the purpose of religion (Disc. I),—as has Christianity. Christianity has, also, in its idea of the Church as the extension of the Incarnation, included and perfected the corporate element which found its place in all primitive religions, and without which the religion of the individual becomes self-centered (Disc. XVIII).

DISCUSSION XIV.

THE JUDGING GOD.

1. Factors in human conduct.

- a. Heredity. Each human organism contains certain capacities and certain limitations which it cannot transcend. The criminal and the saint are largely born, not made. Much crime is due to inherent criminal tendencies. Like insanity and feeble-mindedness, such tendencies are mental derangements or insufficiencies and are largely the result of bodily derangements, such as malformation of organs, or abnormal secretions in the ductless glands. We cannot gather grapes from thorns.
- b. Environment. Within the limits set by heredity human conduct is powerfully modified by environment,—including food, shelter, associations, education. “As the twig is bent, the tree’s inclined.”

Problem: If man is the creature of his heredity and environment, why should God hold him to account?

2. Moral responsibility.

- a. The question of moral freedom lies at the basis of all systems of ethics except the utilitarian. Answered in the negative all the glory of sacrifice departs; the soldier dying

for his country, the martyr for his faith, are mere puppets.

- b. As stated in the discussion on Freedom of the Will, we are justified in holding that each man has at every moment a "zone of freedom," a real choice between alternatives. What these alternatives shall be is determined by our past,—heredity, environment, past conduct. (See Disc. VII and the notes on that discussion in Part III.)
- c. By deliberate and consistent choice of alternatives we gradually shift our "zone of freedom" either for better or worse. We are morally responsible for the use which we make of our "zone of freedom".

3. Conscience.

Conscience is the inherent sense for right, the urge which impels us to ask the question, "Ought I to do this?" Conscience does not answer this question, but leaves it to the intellect. Conscience is, to be sure, absolute in that in all stages of human development it has impelled man to act in accordance with his fundamental senses, such as for love, justice, and reverence. But what conduct these senses may demand of us has evolved with our evolving social relations. In any particular case the judgment as to what course of action is right under the circumstances is worked out by the intellect. The judgment of the intellect is conditioned by heredity, environment, and past conduct. The taboo of the African savage and the Code of Justinian are both answers to the same question. When the intellect has formed its judgment of right and wrong, conscience again steps in and impels us to carry it out, or makes us uncomfortable if we do not

do so. Conscience is the bailiff, who brings the parties litigant before the bar of the intellect and enforces its judgment when made (Disc. IV and essay, *The Grammar of Theology*, in Part II).

4. Sin.

- a. Subjectively, sin is the *determination* to act contrary to conscience, to violate the sense for right, or to fail to act up to one's opportunities; it is the deliberate shutting oneself off from God.
- b. Objectively, sin is the *doing* of some act in violation of one's sense for right, when the alternative lies within the "zone of freedom."
- c. From the viewpoint of anthropology the *capacity* for sin is a development from primitive innocence, a necessary stage in the progress from un-morality to morality.

5. Punishment for sin.

- a. Subjective. i. The deliberate choice of the lower of two alternatives within the zone of freedom shifts that zone lower and makes it harder to choose the higher alternative the next time. ii. The deliberate violation of the sense for right causes discomfort, remorse. iii. Deliberate shutting oneself off from God makes it harder to get into communion with him. iv. Good habits free the will, because the habit makes the minutiae automatic and frees the conscious mind for higher things. A good habit does away with alternate judgments of right and wrong which we pronounce on our actions. When the conduct is alternating between two courses attention is centered upon the conflict, and since the will is closely allied with

attention, it, too, is involved in the conflict. Hence an evil habit enslaves the will.

b. Objective. Action taken against the will of God (i. e., the inherent tendency of the universe) sets the whole force of the universe against the sinner. The universe is continually sloughing off that which runs counter to the course of evolution.

c. Punishment for sin is not imposed arbitrarily, or externally, but is a "function," or result, of the sin itself. It is imposed by the sinner upon himself. The judgment on a man is the resultant of his acts of choice produced to infinity. The effect increases in geometrical ratio, unless checked.

6. Salvation.

Salvation is such a way of life as permits the normal functioning of the individual, the coördination and legitimate functioning of all his "senses". Such a functioning does away with all conflict between his various tendencies, abolishes "complexes" (in the Freudian sense), results in a unified personality, and sets the individual free to give the best that is in him to the service of the Community. Since our "senses" include the sense for love, for reverence, and for activity, our salvation is not complete unless it includes satisfaction of these senses, which satisfaction can only be attained through participation in, and service for, the Beloved Community. (See Royce, *Problem of Christianity*; also Disc. XVIII.) In this way, and not in any arbitrary, or wooden manner, participation in the Beloved Community is essential to complete salvation. It does not follow that those who have fallen short of achieving this ideal when death overtakes them are to be for-

ever excluded from the Beloved Community. We may not doubt that their eyes will then be opened and that they will yet make their way into the Blessed Company of All Faithful People.

7. Heaven and Hell.

Since the life hereafter is but a continuation of the present life, the consequences of sin carry over into the next world. Both heaven and hell have their beginnings here. Since, however, the opportunity for communion with God appears to be greater in the next world than here, so the power to appreciate him, or the lack of it, will be more keenly felt. The sharpest sting of hell, both in this world and the next, is unpreparedness in the face of opportunity. "Of all sad words of tongue or pen, the saddest are these, 'It might have been'."

Since our sense for justice demands that punishment be remedial, we may hope for a chance of amendment in the hereafter; but it will involve a painful regaining of the ground lost on earth. Heaven we regard, not as a cessation of struggle, but as a removal of the present hindrances to achievement (Disc. XV., §3). Heaven and hell inevitably follow from the freedom of the will. If I am really free, I have power to turn in either direction.

8. Human criminal law.

a. Objects.

- i. Corrective. Reformation of the individual.
- ii. Protective. Deterring the individual from the commission of other crimes by confinement. Deterring others from the commission of crime by the example and fear of punishment.

b. Method of accomplishment.

Imprisonment and probationary oversight.

Both are necessary and are effective within limits. There is a mistaken tendency among theoretical criminologists to belittle the corrective and deterrent effect of punishment. One school would turn the prisons into schools; the other into homes for the feeble-minded. To a limited extent both are right; but the element of punishment must be preserved.

c. Limitations.

i. No human tribunal can assess moral responsibility, since it cannot know all the facts nor determine in how far the criminal act was the result of heredity or environment. "Judge not that ye be not judged."

ii. Even in its judgment as to proper measures for the protection of society it is liable to err.

iii. Criminal law has not addressed itself to the problem of raising the zone of freedom by remedying maladjustments of heredity and environment.

iv. It cannot appeal to the religious nature, which furnishes the most powerful incentive to amendment. It cannot bring the sinner to God, as does the Church in teaching and sacraments. This element the Church must supply.

v. The consequences of an act of condemnation are to definitely consign the condemned to a pigeon-hole, largely artificial, since "there is so much bad in the best of us," and to cramp the soul of the condemned in the narrow quarters of his own misdeeds, there-

by preventing, as far as we can, his rehabilitation.

vi. This is not God's way of dealing with us. Parable of the Unmerciful Servant and of the Wheat and Tares. His way is to treat us sinners as potential saints.

vii. Judgment is not creative, but loving hope is creative, it works,—the man tends to become what we expect him to be.

viii. Conclusion. While criminal law is necessary for the protection of society, it has very limited power for good. What it lacks the Church is in duty bound to supply.

DISCUSSION XV.

THE ATONING GOD.

Problem: If God is both loving and omnipotent, why does He permit sin, pain, and sorrow?

1. The answer of philosophy.

- a. Utilitarian. All ideals are the products of self-interest and what we call sin is merely violation of standards set up by society for its self-protection.
- b. Epicurean. The ideal is to obtain the greatest enjoyment; and hence there is no such thing as sin, and we have it in our power to abolish sorrow from our lives.
- c. Stoic. The ideal is duty. We must accept pain and sorrow, without attempting to explain them, and, by adherence to duty, rise above them.
- d. Skeptic. We must give up the problem as forever insoluble.
- e. Atheistic. Since sin, pain, and suffering are very real, we must conclude that there is no God.
- f. Pessimistic. There is no problem, because the world is inherently bad,—hence pain, sin, and sorrow are quite to be expected.
- g. Buddhistic. Since sin, pain, and suffering arise out of human desires, we should strive

to conquer our desires. Perfect bliss, Nirvana, will be attained when we shall have banished desire.

- h. None of these answers satisfies us. Each violates one or more of our inherent tendencies, or senses. We instinctively refuse to accept such a universe as they present. Finally, none has worked when put to the test. None furnishes a sufficient motive for conduct.

2. The answer of Christian Science.

There is no such thing as sin, pain, or sorrow; our experience of them is mere delusion. This system is faulty both in theory and in practice. In theory, because if sin, pain, and sorrow are merely mental phenomena, then so also are goodness, pleasure, and happiness. Psychology has demonstrated that an excess of any pleasurable sensation becomes pain. Excess of any virtue is a vice. Furthermore, this philosophy is an attempt to gratify our sense for justice at the expense of our sense for rationality, which is as false as the other extreme (Essay, *The Grammar of Theology*, in Part II). This theory tends toward a supercilious attitude toward those in poverty, pain, or sin. It also disregards totally the corporate element in religion. Therefore, in practice, while the Christian Scientists have done well to emphasize the possibilities of the mystical life, they have given a cold shoulder to charitable enterprises and movements for social and industrial betterment (Disc. XVI, §6d).

3. The answer of Christianity.

Pain, sorrow, and even sin are necessary evils in a universe of progress and of moral values. The problem finds its solution in the Life Eternal, which

furnishes an opportunity to progress beyond them, and in the Incarnation and Atonement, which furnish the means to do so. This we will try to show.

- a. Pain and sorrow. Progress is purposeful movement, not running around in circles. Since it is a movement, it involves struggle. Since it is purposeful, it involves an ideal. Now, unless there were inequalities, we could form no conception of an ideal. Unless we can see a better, we cannot conceive of a best. For example, some men have better eyesight than others, and hence we can form the conception of vision more keen than any of which we know, in short, perfect vision; and we all wish that we might more nearly approximate that ideal. But no one wishes that he might see out of the back of his head,—although that would be a very useful accomplishment,—because there are none of us who can see any better in that direction than any of the rest of us. If we were all on a dead level, whether intellectually or morally, we could form no conception of intellectual or moral progress. But inequality necessarily involves a lesser good, a certain amount of pain and suffering for those who lag behind. Pain is the concomitant of a losing fight. For example, the body is continually beset by the bacteria of disease, it continually struggles. So long as it is winning there is no pain. But the moment the bacteria get the upper hand pain ensues,—a cry for reinforcements. On the other hand, if the organism is completely defeated, pain ceases. Therefore, struggle is an inevitable concomitant of progress, and pain is

an inevitable concomitant, not of all struggle, but of struggle against too great odds, an evidence of partial, but not total, defeat. Pain and sorrow are neither good nor evil in themselves, but only as we react to them,—evil, if we lie down under them; good, if we use them as warnings and agencies to train and harden us for further struggle. A life of ease presents no attraction,—our sense for activity demands that we should be ceaselessly striving and achieving. (Essay on *The Grammar of Theology*. Part II.)

- b. Sin. This presents a graver problem. Yet its existence does not stamp the world as evil. Sin is the deliberate choice of the lower of two alternatives presented to consciousness (Disc. XIV). Sin is, therefore, the inevitable concomitant of free-will. Now, free-will is the permanent possibility of doing good. Without it there could be neither sin nor righteousness. You cannot eat your cake and have it. A world of free-will without sin is not only impossible, but unimaginable.
- c. The solution. Are not pain, sorrow, and sin too great a price to pay for progress and free-will? Does the joy of those who succeed compensate for the tears of those who fail? Would not a world of sinless stagnation be preferable? The Buddhist says, yes. But, before you agree with him, remember that the heaven of the Buddhist must by inevitable logic be Nirvana. Yet, would pain, sorrow, even sin, be too great a price to pay, if it lay within the power of each of us to progress beyond them? To this you will reply that in this brief life it most certainly does *not*

lie within our power to rid ourselves of pain, sorrow, and sin, and that our wills are so fast bound by heredity and environment that even an eternity were of no avail. Yet, what if a way were found to overcome these hindrances and to set each one of us, who will, upon the path of progress? This is the solution of Christianity,—an Eternal Life in which to grow and an Atonement which furnishes the means to do so.

Problem: How can the death of Christ effect atonement?

4. Atonement.

- a. Meaning of the word. Atonement does not mean buying off an angry God, or changing God's intention. Atonement is at-one-ment, *rapprochement*, reconciliation with God, a realignment of the human will so as to be in harmony with the divine.
- b. The religious experience of atonement. The necessity for atonement, the feeling that all is not right between the self and God and that some outside agency is needed to adjust this relationship, is an element in religious experience well-nigh universal. There is also a very widespread conception that this adjustment can only take place through the unmerited suffering of the outside agent. We find this idea cropping up in the most diverse religious systems. Among the Hebrews the agency was an animal that was sacrificed. In the various "mystery" religions it was the head of the religion: Serapis, Mithra, Dionysos, or Orpheus. The wide spread and persistence of this idea is evidence that it

contained an element of objective reality. Now, in the early days of Christianity the adherents of these religions came over to Christianity almost *en masse*, which indicated that, though their former religion taught them the aspiration for atonement, it did not give them the reality. During the entire history of Christianity it is a fact of universal Christian religious experience that men who felt themselves fast bound in sin and misery have been set free by putting themselves in effective relation to Christ. The fact of such transformation will not be questioned. It was this experience in Paul which made him a convert to Christianity, and the fact of Atonement is the very center of his theology. This same experience has come to such men as Augustine, Francis of Assisi, John Bunyan, and in lesser degree to all Christians.

- c. Theories of Atonement. Efforts to explain the religious experience, to rationalize it, have been made all through Christian history. But no such theories have been regarded as *de fide*. Orthodox theology simply affirms the fact, and says that in some way Christ's life, death, and resurrection (not his death alone) avail to effect at-one-ment with God.

5. A suggested explanation of the fact.

- a. The life of Christ, by showing us that God's nature may be expressed in terms of human nature, brings God down to us, and, by furnishing us a pattern of right living, tends to raise us to God. But his life would not have been a perfect pattern had he not undergone

all our pains and temptations, even to death itself. The higher personality must always undergo suffering, *sympathy*, with the lower, must enter into his sufferings, in order to raise him.

- b. God has always offered and does offer at-one-ment with himself, whereby if we would accept the offer, we might overcome sin. But man often wills not to accept the offer. Man's will needs outside help to break through the crust, which is the result of his heredity or environment, or of his own wilful misdeeds. This help he finds sometimes in a friend, sometimes in a great shock, or sorrow. Now, in Jesus we find the supreme friend and in his death the supreme tragedy.
- c. From the point of view of the individual in relation to society. (See Royce, *Problem of Christianity*, Lectures V and VI.) A sinful act always has an element of self-indulgence at the expense of the group (family, Church, city, or State) to which the sinner belongs and into whose life he has entered,—his Beloved Community. He has set back its well-being, has proved a traitor. The Community may not know of his act; but he knows it and condemns himself. In the effort to make amends for his wrong he may perform many good acts, but after all they are no more than his duty and they can never undo the effect of his traitorous act. Even though the Community may forgive him, he does not forgive himself. His remorse can only cease, if, somehow, his traitorous act should, in spite of evil intention, turn out to be for advantage to his Community. The sinner now is

brought to know the life and death of Christ. He perceives that his sin is of a piece with that of the men who nailed Him to the cross, and so that his sin had a part in it. But the life and death of Christ have been a blessing to his Beloved Community. So the repentant sinner at last is freed of his remorse and lifts up his heart to God. It was precisely this that led Augustine to exclaim of his own sinful past, *O felix culpa!*

- d. All of these elements, doubtless, enter into the fact of the Atonement. Yet all of them together seem inadequate to explain the facts of Christian experience, the immeasurable redemptive value of the life and death of Christ. Tremendous are the consequences of sacrifice, of unmerited suffering and death. Arnold von Winkelried, gathering to his heart the Austrian lances, opened the road to liberty for the Swiss. John Brown's soul marched from Harper's Ferry to Appomattox. Edith Cavell and the victims of the *Lusitania* vanquished Germany. The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church. However it may operate, whether through subjective influence alone, or whether perchance through unknown forces which it releases into activity, this much we know, that vicarious suffering does redeem; and therein lies the Christian's answer to the riddle of the universe.

DISCUSSION XVI.

THE LOVING GOD.

Problem: Is intercommunion possible between God and man; and how can God answer prayer without violating natural laws?

1. Importance of problem.

This is the vital question in religion. Unless it can be answered in the affirmative, the question of the existence of God is merely academic and has no practical bearing. It was the hunger for communication with God which accounted in large part for the rapid spread of Christianity in the first two centuries. The Roman world, which had sought this end through the "mystery" religions in vain, found it in Christianity. The burden of Paul's message is that unity is established between God and the believer. Today we see an exactly parallel movement in the rapid spread of Christian Science, New Thought, and other cults; due, perhaps, to the failure of the orthodox churches to bring out the message of Paul.

2. Possibility of intercommunion from the viewpoint of science.

Psychology teaches us that the human mind is a mountain, most of which is submerged in unconsciousness. Between the Conscious and the Subconscious there is constant intercourse. The Conscious continually sends down mental images and

their accompanying emotions, to be stored in the almost perfect memory of the Subconscious. To it, also, come a multitude of sense impressions which are never apprehended by the Conscious. The Subconscious governs all reflex and habitual bodily processes. Man never becomes truly proficient in any manual or mental work until it is largely controlled by the Subconscious. The Subconscious is constantly sending up vague, forgotten memories, colored by emotion, when these are suggested by some mental image in Consciousness. Hence most of our emotions and desires and all the mechanisms which condition conduct arise in the Subconscious. There genius has its birth. Through it even the bodily processes are powerfully influenced.

It is coming to be believed that human minds may communicate subconsciously (telepathy). Whether this is true or not, there is no scientific reason to deny that the Divine Spirit may so communicate, if we put ourselves in an attitude to receive the message. Whether or not such communication does take place ought to be susceptible of proof out of the facts of religious experience.

3. Theology affirms that the proof is to be found in the answer to prayer and in the mystical apprehension of God by the soul. Consider these in turn.

4. Prayer.

- a. Theory of prayer. We are not to suppose that prayer changes the purpose of God; but that he has ordained prayer as one of the train of causes leading to the accomplishment of that purpose. The answer to prayer is not a thwarting of natural law.
- b. Effect of prayer, subjective. It is a fact of universal experience that prayer has a beneficial effect upon the person praying,

sustains and strengthens his good intentions, and heartens him when discouraged. It brings into play the powerful forces latent in the Subconscious. The materialist will say that this effect comes from within the Self by auto-suggestion. But the evidence seems to show that this explanation will not account for the facts. (See Essay, *The Grammar of Theology*, in Part II.) Rather, we may affirm that, when the human spirit opens itself to the divine influence, a powerful element for good comes into the Subconscious from above.

- c. Effect of prayer, objective. It is, for the reasons stated above (§2), not in conflict with science to hold that prayer opens an avenue likewise for the operation of the divine power in the souls of other men, and hence influences their conduct. If we may communicate subconsciously by telepathy with other men, this would almost necessarily follow. The saints of all ages testify to the objective efficacy of prayer and modern instances abound.

5. Christian Mysticism.

- a. Theory of mysticism. Prayer is talking to God. Mysticism is letting God talk to us. If God hears us, it ought to be possible for us to hear God. Here, again, there is no scientific reason why this should be impossible. The communication, if it exists, may be understood as taking place through the Subconscious. Whether or not such communication exists ought to be ascertainable from the facts of religious experience.
- b. The mystical experience,—subjective reality.

Jesus was in constant communication with the Father and taught his followers that they might be also. The early Church was filled with persons who testified to this experience. Unusual persons, making unusual effort, have, in all ages, achieved a vivid experience of communication with God,—sometimes auditory or visual, sometimes merely an indescribable awareness of His Presence: Paul, John of Patmos, Plotinus, Augustine, Theresa, Joan of Arc, Juliana of Norwich, Francis of Assisi, Suso, Swedenborg, Cotton Mather, George Fox and other Quakers, Jonathan Edwards. This ecstatic mystical experience is not peculiar to Christianity, but has occurred in much the same form among Hindus, Mohammedans,—in short in almost all religions. The faithful in all ages have felt this Presence, though to less marked degree. The subjective reality of their experiences cannot be questioned. But materialists affirm that they were self-induced delusions. Is this explanation tenable?

- c. The mystical experience—objective reality. These experiences appear to have objective reality, for the following reasons:
 - i. They bear for the experiencer a certitude as great as sensational experience and have the same quality,—he does not question their objectivity.
 - ii. They are orderly and self-consistent and are not irrational, like a dream or a delusion.
 - iii. Although such experiences have occurred to men of all times, races, and religions, their

content (what they appeared to tell of the unseen world) has been strikingly similar.

iv. The great mystics have not been unbalanced visionaries, but have often been persons of keen and analytical minds (Paul, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas), or of unusual executive ability (Francis of Assisi, Theresa, Ignatius Loyola, Joan of Arc),—persons very unlikely to suffer delusions.

v. Such experiences, in a less marked degree, have come to most of those who have put themselves in an attitude to receive them.

vi. The results of such experiences have been almost invariably good. Far from creating introspective dreamers, they seem to result in increased sympathy and efficiency. The great mystics whom I have named have been great largely because of their experiences. The profligate Augustine and Francis become saints, the peasant Joan becomes a great general. All these *thought* that they had experienced God, and the result was *as if* they had done so. There is no more reason for doubting the objective verity of their experiences than that of any experience of the senses.

6. Manner of praying effectively and of achieving communion with God, as described by the mystics.

a. A right will. In normal persons this is of gradual growth. In persons where the lower nature is in control a violent emotional storm (conversion) is sometimes required to put the higher will in control. The attitude of both prayer and contemplation must be "Thy will be done".

- b. Contemplation. The practice of quiet waiting for God, getting rid of any distracting thoughts, so as to leave an avenue for God to enter, is essential.
- c. Asceticism. The great mystics have practiced this rigorously. A certain amount is needed by us all.
- d. Sacraments. All the Catholic mystics make use of the sacraments. The Quakers, and of course non-Christian mystics, do not. This indicates that sacraments are not essential to this experience; although, for the Quakers, the Silent Meeting has practically sacramental value. It should be noted, however, that the Catholic mystics have possessed greater practical efficiency. It would appear that the sacraments and the notion of the social nature of religion which they connote,—the corporate system of which they are a part,—act as a fly-wheel to restrain unregulated mysticism and make it an engine of efficiency. Mysticism among the Buddhists, the Sufis, or those Christians who have not developed a sense of the corporate nature of religion, tends to take the form of quietism. At any rate, it takes more than ordinary spirituality to be a good Quaker. For most of us, immersed in material things, some material aid is felt to be required to bring about a realization of the presence of God. In short, the Church and sacraments conduce to a normal life; they tend to make the mystic practical and the practical man mystical. To anyone who takes part in public worship, and especially in a sacrament, with a belief in its objective efficacy, there comes a special

sense of the presence of God that steals away his troubles and perplexities and makes the rough places plain. So that, to him, such worship becomes as necessary to health of mind as is regular exercise to health of body.

7. Spiritual healing.

- a. It is a fact of religious experience that health of mind, or soul, and health of body are interrelated, and that an agency which promotes a healthy mind, will, through the Subconscious, benefit the body. If man may put himself in touch with God to the betterment of his mind, or soul, such relationship must necessarily tend to heal the body, also.
- b. It is a fact of religious experience that this result *does* take place, as attested by spiritual healing in all ages; Jesus, the Apostles, Francis of Assisi, shrines, relics, Christian Science, Emmanuel Movement.
- c. The methods used and theories advanced vary greatly. Often no conscious appeal is made to the religious nature. But the result is the same in all cases: the sick soul is cleared of the obstacles that prevent the divine power from flooding in.

8. Conclusion.

Belief in the objective efficacy of prayer and affirmation of the objective verity of direct experiences of God are not contradicted by science; they are substantiated by religious experience; and they do powerfully conduce to a higher life. The love of God is constantly awaiting the opportunity to express itself in human lives; and it is a fact of religious experience that we may put ourselves in a position to receive it and may thereby bring health to our

souls and bodies and profoundly influence other men. This is the reward of religion. Thus does it achieve its aim of establishing effective relations with God (Disc. I). Without this it becomes a cheerless system of stoical ethics. Why should we put off to the next world what we may measurably enjoy in this? It is the supreme function of religion and of the Church today to say to those who have "lain down" under sin, pain, sorrow, or economic pressure,—and this includes us all at times,—in the words of Peter and John: "Silver and gold have I none; but what I have that give I unto thee; in the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, stand up and walk."

DISCUSSION XVII.

THE LIFE WORTH WHILE.

(Christian Ethics.)

1. What is the chief end of man? This age-old question has received various answers:

- a. Epicurean. The well-being of self (selfish).
- b. Stoic. The performance of duty (cheerless).
- c. Utilitarian. The advancement of the race (materialistic).

In this lecture we consider the answer of Christianity.

2. It is frequently asserted that the entire message of Jesus consisted in a few precepts for the conduct of the individual in private and toward his fellows and that other elements in the teaching and practice of the Church are additions and perversions.

Problem: If I deal justly and practice charity, have I not fulfilled my whole duty?

3. Historically considered this view is entirely erroneous. Jesus' message was social, not individual. As is stated in Discussion XII, he continually proclaimed that his mission was to prepare the world (or perhaps the Jewish Nation) for the Messianic Kingdom. His ethics were not merely moral precepts, but the constitution for the Coming State.

4. Fundamental law of Christian Ethics: "Thou shalt *love* the Lord, thy *God*, with all thy *heart* and

with all thy *soul* and with all thy *strength* and with all thy *mind*, and thy *neighbor* as *thyself*."

- a. Underlying principle, not the Law, but Love (Disc. XIV §8).
- b. Objects of duty: God, my neighbor and myself.
- c. Spheres of activity: emotional (soul and heart), intellectual (mind), practical (strength), (See Disc. I, §3).

5. Duty toward God: To worship and adore and do the will of God out of love for him, and not primarily for the good of others, or our own salvation.

6. Duty toward my neighbor: To labor in love for the material and spiritual well-being of others, doing unto them as we would they should do unto us, regarding ourselves as members one of another and all as joined into a Beloved Community (Disc. XVIII).

7. Duty toward ourselves: To make the best possible use of our bodies, minds, and spirits for development both here and hereafter.

8. Results of overemphasis upon one duty.

- a. Toward God. The men of the Middle Ages built great cathedrals and sacrificed themselves in the Crusades and in the monastic orders; but were careless of social and individual morality.
- b. Toward self. The evangelical reformers made salvation an individual matter. They minimized objective worship on the one hand and neglected the well-being of humanity on the other.
- c. Toward my neighbor. The present age builds hospitals and social settlements; but va-

cates its churches and considers personal religion old-fashioned.

- d. As to each of these duties our motto should be, "This ought ye to have done and not to leave the other undone". To perform one duty *completely* involves performance of the others also.

9. Spheres of activity.

We cannot completely love or serve God, or our neighbor, or ourselves, without doing so with our whole being, emotional, intellectual and practical. Our love, reverence, and service must be heartfelt, intelligent, and active, or it is incomplete (Disc. I §3).

10. The reward of life is more life, wider opportunity for development and usefulness here and hereafter.

DISCUSSION XVIII.

THE IDEA OF A CHURCH.

1. Introduction.

No philosophy of Christianity is complete without taking account of the idea of a Church, for that institution in one form or another is universal in Christendom. We find today three opinions about a Church. Some regard it as useless. Those who regard it as valuable have two opinions as to its nature. The purpose of this lecture is to evaluate the idea of a Church in the light of history and of present experience.

2. The organic idea of the Church.

The Church is a divine organism, contemplated by Christ and developed under the guidance of the Spirit, possessing and administering peculiar channels of intercourse between God and the individual. We may call this the organic conception.

3. The aggregate idea of the Church.

The Church in the broad sense is the collective name for all those who profess belief in Christ and attempt to practice a moral life. In the particular sense a Church is a voluntary association of individual Christians, uniting for their spiritual culture, the evangelization of other men, and the propagation of certain doctrines. There is no moral obligation to belong to a Church. If the Church purports to be more than this, it is a hindrance to the individual,

interposes itself between man and God, and represents a corruption of the purely spiritual religion taught by Jesus. We may call this the aggregate conception.

Problem: Why should I join the Church? If I live a Christian life, is that not all that is required?

4. The corporate religious experience.

- a. Primitive corporate religion. The earliest form of religion was tribal worship. In fact some students of comparative religion contend that the act of tribal worship preceded and produced the individual religious consciousness. (Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, Chap. I.) At any rate, the tribe was the unit and not the individual.
- b. Hebrew corporate religion. Probably, at first, tribal. Gradually the national sanctuary at Jerusalem eclipsed the local "high places" and the nation became the religious unit. The individual had religious significance primarily as a member of the Jewish nation. Every Jew was *ipso facto* a member of the religious community.
- c. Greek corporate religion. In classical times the religious unit was the tribe (*φυλή*). At the time of Christ the real religious consciousness of the Greeks was centered in the "mystery" religions. Here for the first time in the history of Europe religion was dissociated from the tribe or nation. The political organism was replaced by a purely religious organism. Those initiated into the mysteries were regarded as in touch with, or incorporated into, the mystical body of the

god. They attained immortal life by partaking of his immortality.

- d. Primitive Christian corporate religion. Jesus built upon the Hebrew idea. He planned to reform and extend the Jewish Church-State (Disc. XI). His ethical precepts were the constitution for the coming Kingdom. The Greek converts brought in the idea of the mystical body. The acceptance of this conception was furthered by the rejection of Christianity by the Jews. The result was a fusion of the two ideas into the Christian idea of the Church as the Body of Christ, the extension of the Incarnation, and the successor to the Hebrew Church-State. This Body first called itself The Community (*a Κοινωνία*). It would never have occurred to any early believer that he might be a Christian and not a "member" of the Church.
- e. Later development of Christian corporate religion. The first self-conscious act of the new Community, as distinct from the Jewish nation, was the Council at Jerusalem (about A. D. 46). From about that time the Community began calling itself Church (*ἐκκλησία*). This was several years before any of Paul's epistles were written and about twenty years before the first Gospel (Mark).

About the development of the ministry there is great uncertainty. (See Disc XX.) Of one thing we may be certain, however; the change, if any, in the form of government involved no change in the idea of the nature of the Church. For, had such a change been involved, we should have had evidences of it in the writings of the period, as we have

of the controversy involving the extension of the Church to the Gentiles.

The testimony of such writings as we have is all in support of the organic theory. "For as the body is one," says Paul, "and hath many members, and all members of the body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ. For in one spirit were we all baptized into one body.....Now ye are the body of Christ and severally members thereof." The same idea is expressed by John in the simile of the vine and the branches. And in the *Shepherd of Hermas* (early second century), we read, "The Church was created before all things; therefore is she aged; and for her sake the world was framed."

The name *Catholic* came into use in the first half of the second century; but there was no substantial change in the conception of the Church from the Council at Jerusalem to the Diet of Worms. Since the word *Catholic* has been in use so long in connection with Churches which maintain the organic theory of the Church, that theory is commonly called the Catholic (but not *Roman Catholic*, see §4g) theory.

- f. Effect of the Reformation on Christian corporate religion. Luther set out, not to found a new Church, but to reform the old one. He strove for years to give his followers bishops. In Sweden his purpose was accomplished and the Church of that country is Catholic in theory and government and Lutheran in theology. In England the Church remained Catholic in theory and government and composite in theology. It has called itself Prot-

estant because it agreed with the Protestant Churches in opposing certain doctrinal, ethical, and governmental features in the Roman Church. The Calvinistic reformers originally held the Catholic idea of the Church, but contended that the government should be through presbyters and not bishops,—or in other words that every clergyman should exercise the functions of bishop and presbyter. However, the strictly Protestant Churches soon receded from the “organic” idea of the Church to the “aggregate” idea (§2).

g. Roman theory (Formulated by the Council of Trent, 1563 A.D., and later). The Church, as a body, is the hierarchy; the laity are not conceived as entering into its life, but rather as receiving grace from it. The Roman Church, also, regards communion with the See of Rome as essential to Catholicity.

h. Eastern and Episcopal theory. The Eastern Churches (Greek, Russian, etc.) and the Episcopal Churches (English, American, and Colonial) adhere to the Catholic idea. They regard the Church as consisting of both clergy and laity. They hold the Catholic Church to consist in all those national Churches which adhere to the Catholic idea of Church, sacrament, and doctrine, and safeguard the same through government by bishops of apostolic succession.

5. Value of the organic idea of the Church.

a. Historical. As stated above, the organic idea of religion is the primitive conception the world over and has persisted in one form or other in most religions. In Christendom this

idea was universal until after the Reformation, and is still held by the great majority of Christians. The persistence of the idea demonstrates its very great survival value and indicates its validity. The Church after twenty centuries is here today and must be accounted for.

- b. Psychological basis. i. The sense for love and for loyalty is inherent and demands satisfaction (Essay, *The Grammar of Theology*, Part II). Man is a social animal. This social tendency he satisfies by grouping himself with others into a Community. Every man is better for being a loyal member of a lodge, athletic team, college, or city. He is more himself, because he has satisfied all his inherent tendencies (Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*). This tendency seeks satisfaction in corporate religion; and any religion which leaves this element unsatisfied is unnatural (Disc. I). ii. The Beloved Community creates an atmosphere hostile to materialism and favorable to spirituality. The unconscious influence of the thought and ideals of the Community upon the individual are very strong. iii. Man demands a tangible object of loyalty. Christ furnished this object while on earth and the Beloved Community does so as the extension of his life (Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*).
- c. Practical. i. The Church fosters regular habits of worship. ii. It counteracts the tendency to look upon religion as a matter of individual salvation and furthers the social gospel. Sin becomes treason to the Beloved Community. iii. In accomplishing results it

presents the advantage of the army over the mob.

6. The Beloved Community as the Body of Christ.

- a. The Beloved Community is an organism in a real sense and not by mere analogy.
 - i. The individual, like the cell, has his individual life, but also imparts something to the whole and receives something from it. No man, or cell, liveth unto himself; and no man, or cell, dieth unto himself.
 - ii. The normal functioning of the individual and of the cell are necessary to the health of the whole.
 - iii. The life of the whole is built out of the life of the cells and individuals that compose it, yet it transcends them. A body is more than the sum total of the cells which compose it.
- b. This organism is the Body of Christ.
 - i. The Church carries on the work of Christ ("Go ye into all the world and proclaim the Good Tidings to all nations"). It is the extension of the Incarnation.
 - ii. The Church has all the power of Christ. He empowered his apostles to heal the sick, pronounce forgiveness of sins, and to do "greater works than I do".

7. The Church and the individual.

- a. The function of the Church. The Church life is not superposed on the individual religious life, it is that life upon its social side. The Beloved Community is the embodiment of the social religious life of the members. Its field is parallel to the private religious life. In the private religious life of the members it aims merely to foster right relations with God. A high personal morality and religious

feeling is possible without membership in the Beloved Community; but it is incomplete and is difficult to maintain.

- b. **Limitations.** The Beloved Community does not, or should not, intervene between the individual and God in the private religious life. The individual has complete freedom of conscience and opinion, although the Community may properly, for its protection, regulate the outward acts and expressions of its members. The Roman Church overrides these limitations; but Rome is no more an argument against the idea of a Church than was Prussia an argument against the idea of a State. The Episcopal and Anglican Church is Catholic in its insistence on the idea of the Church as a divine organism; it is Protestant in its insistence on the right of private judgment and individual religious life. The balance must be maintained, however difficult that may be, since both elements are demanded by our religious nature.

8. Conclusion.

On the practical side, if it be true that our duty to God demands adoration, then it is a moral duty to make that adoration in public. And if our neighbor and society in general need religion, then it is our duty to belong to and actively further the only institution engaged in propagating it,—quite apart from any feeling which we may have that church-going does not in our particular case seem indispensable to religious growth, or that “we can be just as good without going to Church”.

It is true that the individual may, and often does, achieve a very high morality and a very close approach to God without belonging to the Beloved

Community. But he is still not in the fullest relation to God, because he has left out the social side of his nature. He who loses his life shall find it. One cannot fully live the life worth while, cannot fully realize his possibilities, without losing his life in the life of the Beloved Community. (Royce, *Problem of Christianity*; also *supra*, Disc. XIV, §6, and Disc. XVII.) The Beloved Community is not superposed on the individual, or interposed between the individual and God, it *is* the individual upon his social-religious side.

DISCUSSION XIX.

THE IDEA OF A SACRAMENT.

1. Value of public worship.

People go to church for two reasons, both legitimate: To produce an effect in themselves (subjective) and to worship God (objective).

a. Subjective value.

Psychological benefit to the worshiper is sought and obtained by sermons and hymns and the atmosphere of devotion (pure subjective). It is also sought and obtained by prayer to God for strength and guidance (objective-subjective).

b. Objective value.

The worshiper, also, goes to church for the purpose of adoration and to petition for the accomplishment of objects desired.

c. Conclusion.

The second motive is higher than the first, because more unselfish. Furthermore, the subjective result cannot properly be obtained unless the primary purpose of the worshiper is objective (Pratt, *Religious Consciousness*, pp. 298-307). Theoretically, both of these results could be obtained through private devotions; but instinctively men, even those who do not hold the organic theory of the Church, realize that these purposes can be

better accomplished in company with their fellows. A Church is a good place in which to pray.

2. Sacraments. In Christianity certain particular acts of public worship, regarded as peculiarly solemn, are called sacraments. There are two main opinions as to their nature and value. In this lecture we shall evaluate these ideas in the light of the religious experience of the past and the present.

3. The "efficient" idea of a sacrament.

A sacrament is an "efficient" symbol, an outward and visible sign whereby the divine influence is mediated to the individual, so as to result in some special religious value. In this definition the phrases "divine influence" and "religious value" are intended as the equivalent of the objective and subjective connotations of the phrase "spiritual grace." (See Webster and Standard Dictionaries, titles *Sacrament* and *Grace*.)

4. The "representative" idea of a sacrament.

A sacrament is a "representative" symbol, a memorial, a representation or a ratification by the worshiper of a relationship between God and the individual. (See Webster and Standard Dictionaries, title *Sacrament*.)

Problem: If God is everywhere, of what advantage is a Sacrament?

5. Sacramental religious experience.

- a. Primitive systems. In religions of the Ruler God type (Disc. VI) the means of atonement took the form of a sacrifice, a propitiation. In religions of the Nature God type it took the form of a ceremony whereby the believer was restored to unity with the divine nature.

These rites are to be found in every race and time; they are co-extensive with religion and are always the function of corporate, rather than private, religion.

- b. Hebrew sacrificial religion. The classical Hebrew religion was of the Ruler God type. Many, though not all, of the sacrifices were for atonement. The Hebrews also practised baptism for cleansing from sin, perhaps allied to the lustrations for purification before sacrifice.
- c. Greek sacramental religion. The Greek "mystery" religions were of the Nature God type. The ceremony of initiation was a bath, whereby the believer was grafted into some sort of unity with the deity. Thereafter he partook from time to time of ritual meals in which it was conceived that he drew nourishment from the divine life, renewed his contact with deity. These ceremonies were called "mysteries" (Disc. XV).
- d. Primitive Christian Sacraments. The primitive Church was built upon the sacraments. B. W. Bacon, a Protestant and somewhat radical historical student, says, in *Jesus and Paul*, "This 'gospel', so far as it found visible expression, was embodied, after the manner of ancient religion, not in books but in symbolic ritual. Christianity consisted in the ordinances and their interpretation. . . . The Nazarenes, or Christians, were the people who practiced the rites of baptism and the Supper. . . . Such, then, was the true 'beginning of the Gospel'. The sacraments came first, the literature came afterward. It grew up around the sacraments, interpreting and

enforcing their lessons. The first disciples did not appeal, as we do, to two witnesses, the Spirit and the Word, but to three: the Spirit outpoured from heaven, and the water, and the blood." In these sacraments the Church built upon both the Hebrew and the Greek ideas. Its baptism was both a washing away of sin (Hebrew) and a new birth in the Spirit (Greek). Its Eucharist was both a representation of, thanksgiving for, the sacrifice of the Cross (Hebrew), and a partaking of the divine nature (Greek).

- e. Later Christian history. The theory and practice of the sacraments underwent no change until about 1000 A. D. when the materialistic doctrine of Eucharistic Transubstantiation arose in the West. This doctrine followed from a crude and wooden interpretation of sacraments, whereby they were regarded as in the nature of magical charms. In reaction from this view Calvin and Zwingli enunciated the theory which I have called the "representative" theory and which obtains in most Protestant Churches. The tendency to minimize the sacraments was accentuated by the Calvinistic theory of Predestination, teaching as it did that man's salvation is individual and that nothing which he or the Community can do will alter his destined fate. They thus became of little or no religious significance and have been almost discontinued in some churches.

6. Value of sacraments.

- a. Historical. The early origin and the persistence of the sacramental idea demonstrates its very great survival value and points

to its validity; this is a fact of religious experience that demands explanation.

- b. Psychological. The consciousness of sin and of the need of at-one-ment is universal. Man has always sought a means of achieving atonement and a pledge to assure him thereof (Discs. I and XV). He has always given expression to this need in solemn corporate acts. Experience shows that in Churches where the sacraments are minimized, all public worship tends to lose its objective aspect and comes to center around the sermon. The Church tends to become an ethical or philanthropic society (Pratt, *Religious Consciouness*. pp. 298-307).
- c. Practical. Since we are not pure spirit, but have material bodies, it follows that we always use material means for producing material results. The spoken or written word, for instance, is an "efficient" symbol, or vehicle, of the thought conveyed. So, also, is a piece of music. These all have quasi-sacramental value. A sacrament is a divine word, or means of communication. The modern man, immersed in material things, needs a material aid to get out of this environment and to find "God in particular". While all acts of worship have quasi-sacramental value, the Church has restricted the use of the word to those in which the divine element is of predominating importance. The difference is perhaps one of degree; but the difference is so great as to amount to a difference in kind. (See Disc XIII, §.)
- d. Limitations. A sacrament is not a charm which will confer a benefit regardless of

the spirit in which it is received. A right attitude and intention on the part of the recipient is absolutely essential. Otherwise sacramental observance would be magic. In the Eucharist the material elements are not God, but are means by which God is made apparent to the worshiper. It is not they, but God, who is worshiped. Otherwise such worship becomes idolatry. Disregard of these limitations has often led to grave abuses.

7. Baptism.

This is the sacrament of initiation into the Church, thereby putting the recipient in the way to receive the spiritual grace (i. e. psychological value) coming later and in ever-increasing measure through participation in the life of the whole. It is a birth into a new life (regeneration). Just as the new-born babe does not at birth come into fulness of life, so baptism is merely a beginning,—a promise of grace to come. It has the additional significance of being a solemn certification by the Fellowship (Church) that it agrees to receive the candidate into its body “as a little child”.

8. The Eucharist.

In this sacrament the whole Church “shows forth” the death on the Cross, and gives thanks for it and for all blessings. In Paul’s thought it is the symbol of the unity of the Beloved Community, or rather the nexus whereby that unity is achieved and maintained. Since the loaf,—the body of Christ,—represents the Church, the worshiper, by partaking of it, in a very real way partakes of the common life of the Church, which is Christ (I Cor. XI and XII). We may express this thought in modern language as follows: If, as we maintain, there is help and

strength for the individual in the association and life of the Beloved Community, and if the physical aspect in this sacrament opens our minds (puts us *en rapport*, so to speak) to that influence, then it does really convey to us a share therein. The Church, also, affirms that Christ is really present in this sacrament.. Now, it is true that God is present everywhere; but he is not present for us unless we perceive him. For example, if you and I are in the same room and a curtain is stretched between us, we are not in each other's presence. So this sacrament draws aside the curtain between the worshiper and God. This curtain drawn aside, the worshiper may, and does, make the deepest act of adoration, or objective worship, because in this sacrament he approaches spiritually closest to God.

DISCUSSION XX.

THE IDEA OF A MINISTRY.

1. Introduction.

Like Church and sacrament, we find a ministry throughout Christendom; and this fact must be taken into account. Here again we find two main ideas as to the office of a minister; and it is the purpose of this discussion to evaluate them in the light of religious experience.

2. The "appointive" idea of a minister.

A minister is one designated by the people as preacher or pastor; and ordination is the official certification that he is fitted and authorized for those duties.

3. The "priestly" idea of a minister.

A minister is one set apart by the whole Church to constitute the organ through whom it represents God to man and man to God. He is the medium through whom the *corporate* worship is offered to God and the divine influence residing in the *whole* organism is conferred upon the individual. This is substantially the definition of a priest (Standard Dictionary); and, accordingly, where this idea obtains, the minister is commonly called a priest. This theory holds that the Church, as a body, is the great Priest, and it bestows some of its functions, particularly, upon certain men in the sacrament of ordination. The men so set apart perform their func-

tions, of which the chief is the administration of the sacraments, not as individuals, but as representatives of the entire Church. The administration of every sacrament is the corporate act of the whole Church.

Problem: Is it needful, or right, that any one should represent God to me, or me to God?

4. Religious experience of priesthood.

- a. Primitive priesthoods. From the earliest times, whenever men have realized the corporate nature of religion and have given expression to it in solemn corporate acts, they have set apart certain men to lead in the performance of such acts.
- b. Hebrew priesthood. The priests, an hereditary caste, offered the sacrifices as representatives of the whole nation.
- c. Classical Greek and Latin priesthood. The same idea obtains here. The chief priest was originally the king. In Athens under the republic he was still called *ἄρχων βασιλεύς*. In the "mystery" religions the priesthood was not hereditary. There were no sacrifices, but the priest led the mysteries.
- d. Primitive Christian. The name *priest* was not at first used, probably because the new religion wished to emphasize its abandonment of the Hebrew idea of a *sacrificial* priesthood. The manner of administering the sacraments in the first century is uncertain. When the curtain lifts in the second century we find Elders, or Presbyters, performing this function and corresponding in all but name with the *sacramental* priesthood of the "mystery" religions. Whether this practice

obtained from the first, or whether originally, as some historians conclude, each member of the congregation in turn administered the Eucharist, is in controversy. If the latter theory be true, however, it is not true to say that there were no sacramental priests. Rather, all were priests ("He made us to be a kingdom, to be priests unto his God and Father." Rev. 1:6). In the white heat of early enthusiasm the Spirit manifested himself in all. As this enthusiasm cooled, it became necessary for the Christian Fellowship to crystalize and apportion its functions to stated individuals. The name *priest* first came into use in the third century. It has continued ever since, except as it was dropped by the Protestants at the Reformation.

- e. The three-fold ministry. Deacons were instituted in apostolic times to administer the funds. The origin of diocesan bishops is obscure. The apostles exercised general supervision without territorial restriction. In the apostolic age the words *bishop* and *presbyter* were practically synonymous. Whether diocesan bishops arose through designation by the apostles, or through the elevation to primacy of one member in the several boards of presbyter-bishops, is debated. Most historians hold the latter view. The question is not important; in either case the three-fold ministry developed in the Church, under the guidance of the Spirit, as the best available means for conserving and imparting the corporate life, and has so continued since. At the Reformation the reformers in all the countries except England and Sweden were

obliged to do without bishops. Protestant Churches have been of two types as to polity: the presbyterian type, in which the presbyter exercises a certain amount of authority, and the congregational type in which the minister is merely the chosen leader of the congregation.

- g. Conclusion. The persistence of the idea of a priesthood in all religions and especially in the history of Christianity indicates that this idea has survival value and hence finds its basis in some fundamental principle of religious experience.

5. Value of a priesthood.

- a. Individual. Whenever, by example or precept, we endeavor to help another, or show him a better way, we are performing a priestly act, we are representing God to man. Whenever we pray for another we are representing man to God. Practically all of our duties upon our social-religious side, as members of the Beloved Community, are, or should be, priestly duties. Hence, in a very real sense the Church is a community of priests. We owe most of the good that is in us to some such act of another. We instinctively crave the mediation of others, the cup of cold water given in the name of a prophet.
- b. Social. A priesthood is absolutely essential to an organic religion. No organism can exist without organs. It very shortly becomes essential that the Beloved Community should set apart certain men for the exercise of the peculiarly priestly functions. If it does not do so, the whole idea of the Community as an organism very soon disappears.

- c. Limitations. The priest represents us to God only on the corporate side. He does not, or should not, in any way intervene between the individual and God, except to aid and encourage the individual to find his own means of approach. Nor must he become a crutch for the individual.

6. Roman theory of priesthood.

The Roman Church, and it alone, holds a rather different view of the priesthood than that stated. It holds that the priest derives his authority, not through the whole Church, but through and by commission of the Pope as Vicegerent of God on earth. This seriously impairs the representative idea. Rome, also, in practice, although not perhaps in theory, disregards the limitations stated in §5c.

7. Is the Apostolic Succession worth insisting on?

It is often argued that the three-fold ministry is not primitive,—therefore it is not essential and should be abandoned in the interests of unity. This does not follow. If the system is not primitive (about which opinions differ), it was a very early, normal development. Unless God entirely abandoned his Church after the first century, the system must surely be said to have his sanction (Disc. XXII). Theoretically the system is not essential to the Catholic idea of a Church. But without episcopacy it would be as difficult to maintain a coherent Church on a large scale as it would be to maintain an efficient State under a system of pure democracy. As a matter of fact we find that those who have dropped the episcopal form of government have very soon lost the ideal of the Church as an organic unity. That ideal, it seems to me, we must at all cost maintain.

8. Practical considerations.

In the last three lectures the attempt has been made to demonstrate the necessity of the corporate idea in Christianity, including the three ideas which we find correlated, namely an organic Church, an efficient sacrament, and a priesthood. It should, however, be noted that the Communions holding that idea have not always in practice produced a superior type of Christian experience. In the first place few Christian bodies present a perfect example either of the organic, or the aggregate, type. The Eastern and Western Churches, quarreling for a thousand years over the word *filioque* in the Creed, or the Anglican Church, repelling the Wesleys, can hardly be said to display perfect Catholicity. On the other hand very few Protestant Churches are purely individualistic. Furthermore, other virtues or vices in the life of the particular Communion may counterbalance its shortcomings or excellence in respect to the corporate ideal. So that it has often happened that Churches utterly lacking in that respect have developed a surpassingly high standard of personal excellence. Nevertheless, the organic, or Catholic, idea appears to be best fitted to satisfy the social instincts of mankind.

9. Conclusion.

The Beloved Community is a true organism, having a life built up out of the lives of its members, yet transcending them, as the life of the body transcends the lives of the cells. Participation in the life of that Community is essential to the fullest self-realization. The sacraments are efficient, rather than representative, symbols,—they actually *do* something,—because they actually do convey to the recipient a share in the corporate life of the Beloved Community, which is God. An organism must de-

velop organs through which it may function. Hence the Beloved Community has developed a priesthood through whom, as its representatives, and hence as the representatives both of God and man, the Community performs its priestly function of representing God to man and man to God.

DISCUSSION XXI.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE.

1. The fact of influence from without.

- a. It is unquestionable that Christianity is built upon the foundation of the Hebrew religion.
 - i. Jesus said, "I come not to destroy but to fulfill." ii. His ethics were not a new departure. He did not reject Jewish ethics; but appealed from the current legalism to the best Hebrew prophetic and rabbinical tradition. iii. His theology, notably as to God, immortality, sin, and atonement, was based upon Jewish theology, correcting and amplifying it.
- b. It is, also, unquestionable, although not so generally admitted, that Christianity in the first centuries built into its structure many elements from the current Greek religions: such as certain conceptions of atonement, incarnation, church, sacraments, and ministry (see Discussions on those subjects).
- c. It is, also, demonstrable that Christianity has from time to time, subsequently to the apostolic age, adopted, consciously or unconsciously, new elements, chiefly, but not altogether, ceremonial, from its religious and social environment: observance of December 25th as the Feast of Nativity (the primitive Church celebrated the Epiphany, rather than

the Nativity) from the Roman Saturnalia; government by provinces and dioceses from Roman law; symbolic use of the cross from Egyptian religion.

2. The fact of development within.

a. Dogmatic development. The dogmatic definition of the facts of Christian religious experience developed gradually, as the need was felt to make explicit that which was before implicit. The course of development was in general this: Attention would become focused upon some particular field of religious experience and various tentative efforts would be made to rationalize this experience, that is to relate it to the other facts of Christian experience and to the general body of accepted doctrine, religious and philosophical. The various explanations were discussed, their respective insufficiencies pointed out, and eventually a definition was worked out which met with general approval. In this way, for example, Trinitarian and Christological doctrine developed (Disc. XI and XIII). Sometimes, as in those cases, the final definition was arrived at by a General Council; sometimes, as in the case of Eucharistic doctrine, by a consensus of theologians. In argument and definition the writers made use of ideas then current in the philosophy and science of their day; but the facts with which they dealt were facts of essentially Christian experience.

b. Institutional development. The Church has always exercised great freedom in bringing into being new organs for carrying on its work. Sometimes, but not always, these

represent a practically new departure, as in monasticism (although monasticism had its antecedent in the unregulated solitary asceticism of the hermits).

Problem: Is not Christianity largely a syncretism of other religions and a corruption of the teaching of the Master; and how are we to get at the real essence of Christianity?

3. Two theories of Christian truth.

- a. Truth a deposit. According to this view Christ enunciated a body of doctrine and laid out a pattern of institutions; his teachings were supplemented by statements of his apostles as contained in the epistles, under verbal inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and such teachings alone constitute true Christianity; any additions are corruptions. This is the traditional theory, both of Protestants and Catholics; although it would hardly seem to be consistent with the Catholic theory of the Church as a living, and hence, a developing organism.
- b. Truth a growth. According to this view Christ not only taught, but *was*, the Way, the Truth, and the Life. He had many things to tell his apostles that they could not then "bear". Christ's work was only begun; and he had promised that the Spirit of Truth should lead his followers into all truth and that he, Christ, should be with them unto the "consummation of the age". According to this view Christian truth, like the Christian Church, is a body, capable of development, and not an aggregate of more or less unrelated precepts.

4. Objections to the deposit theory.

- a. When you have stripped off the "accretions" you have practically nothing left. The investigations of Harnack, who made the attempt in this manner to get at the essence of Christianity, led him to conclude that it consisted mainly in ethical precepts. Very many critics have contended that most, even of these, were not original with Jesus. It is as though one should try to find the head of a cabbage by stripping off the leaves, or to deduce the physical properties of water by a study of oxygen and hydrogen. The truth is that in living processes one plus one never equals two. It has been pointed out by Bergson (*Creative Evolution*) that biologists have made the same mistake, in endeavoring to get at the essential difference between plants and animals by investigation of the original and least differentiated forms. At that stage the two forms are indistinguishable. As Bergson points out, it is the fullest developed, and not the least developed, form which is significant. "By their fruits ye shall know them."
- b. You can never be sure of what your "deposit" consists. You are betting the validity of your doctrine on the authenticity of particular texts and upon the assumption that the doctrine therein contained was not imported from some non-Christian source. You are constantly in peril of being convinced that the text in question was a mistranslation or interpolation, or that the writing in which it was contained was not written by the man whom tradition has named as the author.

- c. This theory reduces Christianity to a museum of ecclesiastical antiquities. Every living thing grows.
- d. It does not permit of variation to accommodate religion to changing social environment. Where this view obtains the life of the Church is cramped within the trammels of a bygone age. Development is forcibly postponed; and when it comes, as it must come, it constitutes a complete break with the past.
- e. This theory is in conflict with the modern view that all history is a record of development. It is a cynical view of Christian history which rejects nineteen-twentieths of it as hopelessly corrupt and bids us dig for vestiges of the golden age in the dust of Palestine. Such an opinion is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the deposit theory and of the inorganic view of the Church to which that theory is related.

5. Organic theory of development.

The course of development of Christian doctrine can be justified and explained only on the theory that the Church is an organism. If the Church were merely an aggregate of individuals holding certain doctrines deposited with them, then it would follow that any addition to that deposit would be illegitimate and it would always remain an enclave. Hence such changes would be unjustifiable. But we find that such elements as have come into Christianity from the outside have not remained foreign, but have been baptized into Christianity and have been digested by it. For instance, the Christian Mystery was transformed and glorified from its baser prototype. The Church, like the human body, draws sustenance from its surroundings, and like the hu-

man body, it has shown a tremendous power of digestion and assimilation; while still retaining its essential nature intact. Again, like the human body, it eliminates any material harmful to its life. Elements out of line with the main stream of development, after being relegated to heretical bodies, have finally passed into oblivion. There are no Gnostics or Arians today. Unless we are prepared to say that the Spirit acted only for one brief period in Palestine, and that he was wholly absent among heathen nations before that time, and from Christianity since that time, we cannot regard the development of doctrine otherwise than as his continuous work. Says Augustine (*Retract.* I, 13,): "The very thing which now the Christian religion sets forth is from of old and was never wanting since the beginning of the human race; so that, when Christ himself came in the flesh, the true religion, which already existed, began to be called Christian."

6. Process of development.

Insofar as some historians describe the process of development as conscious and deliberate they appear to be for the most part in error. The elements may be described as follows:

- a. Similarities to other religions may frequently be explained as not borrowings at all, but simply coincidences. Example, the festival of Easter coincides with certain pre-Christian festivals in honor of the annual vernal phenomenon of generation, or the universal generative principle. Yet the date of Easter was derived, not from such festivals, but from the date of our Lord's resurrection, the Jewish Passover; and the occasion of the festival is found wholly in that event.

- b. Other similarities are due to the parallel, but unrelated, development of certain basic religious ideas common to many religions. Thus, the monastic systems of Buddhism and Christianity both arose out of a universal religious tendency to asceticism and developed along strikingly analogous lines; but there seems to be no evidence of adoption from one religion to the other.
- c. In many instances, however, a real genetic relationship may be traced. Yet, even in such instances, there was in general no *conscious* appropriation of ideas. What happened was rather that converts to Christianity unconsciously carried over the language and modes of thought to which they had been accustomed and applied them in describing and explaining the facts of Christian religious experience. Thus with the Eucharist. Instituted with the enigmatical words, "This is my body; this is my blood," the sacrament, whatever it may have meant to the earliest believers, must inevitably have been rationalized by the Greeks in line with the sacramental meals of their own religion. It was for them the Christian Mystery. This idea, while a development, was thoroughly in line with the earlier conceptions regarding the sacrament; hence it was taken into the body of Christian doctrine. Other non-Christian ideas which sought entrance, such as the doctrines of the Gnostics, were found to be opposed to the genius of Christianity, and were rejected by the Church. They were supported for a time by small bodies of heretics and finally tapered off into oblivion.

- d. In a few instances, such as the symbolic use of the cross, there was deliberate borrowing. But this was done only with non-essentials, where it seemed that a worthy custom or idea should be allowed to do duty in the service of Christ.
- e. It is sometimes said that Paul took the ethical precepts of Christ and on them built a sacramental religion. We have tried to show in the past three Discussions that the sacramental elements obtained in Christianity from the first. In the matter of the Eucharist, above referred to, it is evident from Paul's letter to the Corinthians that the Mystery connotation was already well known to them when Paul wrote. His purpose in that letter is not to establish, but to regulate it. I believe it to be demonstrable that Paul's service to theology in every field which he touched was rather in systematizing and giving practical application to the doctrine of the Church than in modifying the doctrine itself (save probably in the doctrine of Justification by Faith rather than by the Law).

7. It does not follow that change is always true development. It may be corruption. So the problem of this lecture may be restated as follows:

Problem: How may we distinguish between true development and corruption?

8. Criteria of true development.

- a. It must not run counter to the spirit of the Master's life and teaching, as gathered, not from particular texts, but from the whole record. For this purpose the study of origins is not only permissible, but necessary.

- b. It must be congruous with the genius of Christianity, the whole course of valid development up to that time. It must be a logical deduction from the main stream of prior doctrine.
- c. It must not misinterpret, or leave out of account, any facts of Christian religious experience, and it must at the same time interpret them in the language and spirit of the age.
- d. It must work. It must tend to produce a higher type of Christian life, both individual and social.

9. The value of authority.

The view of doctrine taken in these discussions does not involve lawless disregard for authority. Says Dean Inge (*Faith and its Psychology*, p. 106) : "Though we cannot for a moment admit that infallibility resides in the decisions of any man, or council, present or past, it would not be easy to over-estimate the advantages of tradition in matters of Faith. Each age is liable to be carried away by some dominant idea, which soon becomes a superstition. Authority has a steadying influence, forbidding us to ignore doctrines which for the time are unpopular and preserving to some extent 'the proportion of Faith.' In these high matters the dead as well as the living have a right to speak; and respect for authority is the courtesy which we pay to the voices of 'famous men and our fathers that begat us'."

10. Conclusion.

Doctrine has developed gradually throughout Christian history to epitomize and explain the facts of Christian religious experience. The facts have remained the same, but our explanation, our ability to appreciate them, if you will, has developed. This

development, like all good works, we conceive to have been effected through the inspiration of the Spirit. But, since the Spirit was working through human agencies, the infallibility of the results obtained is not guaranteed. However, the authority of a general consensus in favor of some doctrine is very great. The doctrine may admit of further development or reinterpretation; but the chances of total error are reduced to a minimum.

Since the Church is an organism, both its doctrine and its institutions are constantly developing,—otherwise the Church would be dead. It is not a museum of ecclesiastical antiquities. It is fruitless, therefore, to attempt to make the Church of today conform to the standard of the sixteenth century, or of the tenth, or of the first. It cannot bring back the past, or live again the inner life of those times, and conformity to them in outward appearances only is faithlessness to their ideal. (See the essay entitled *The Relevancy of Religion* in Part II.)

I trust that by a little I may have helped to make it appear that the dogmas here dealt with are not in conflict with science and that they do embody the Christian experience of the ages, the mind of a living Church.

If they do embody religious experience, they have satisfied one of the scientific tests of truth, namely the test of observation,—they fit all the observed facts. But there remains one scientific test that each man must apply for himself, namely the test of experiment. The true scientist is never satisfied to take the results of another's observation, he must test them himself. Now each individual must, if he be honest, try these doctrines in his own life, before he may either finally affirm or reject them. It was in this way that Waggett persuaded Romanes,

who was then agnostic, of the truth of Christianity. It was hardly fair, he said, that Romanes, a scientist, should refuse to apply the method of experiment to Christianity. Romanes agreed to make the experiment, and in a year became convinced. If one will honestly live for a year, as if believing in God and in the future life, in the Incarnation and Atonement, and in an organic Church and efficient sacraments, the result of the experiment may be awaited with confidence.

DISCUSSION XXII.

PRESENT DAY PROBLEMS.

The following topics are suggested for this final Discussion.

1. What has the Church to contribute to the social crisis? Should she advocate specific changes in social or industrial organization? Should she support specific remedial legislation?

2. What should be her attitude toward prevention of war? Should she endeavor to effect a Truce of God by threatening, as did the British labor unions, to lay the country under an industrial interdict, if war were declared unwarrantably? Is war always sinful?

3. What should be her attitude toward philanthropy? Should she engage in institutional work systematically, as a means of recruiting members; or should she only do so in an emergency and until some other agency should take up the work? Should the healing of the sick be one of her functions?

4. The reunion of Christendom. Is it advisable; or would it, if accomplished, result in bigotry and stagnation? If reunion is effected, how may these results be avoided? Is reunion possible and would it be permanent? The method and terms of reunion:—ecclesiastical alliances (such as the Federal Council of Churches); spiritual accord and intercommunion between independent organizations (as between the Anglicans, Swedish, and Eastern Churches);

constitutional amalgamation. The Lambeth proposals. What will the Church of the future be? What element might each of the present divisions of Christendom contribute?

PART II

THE RELEVANCY OF RELIGION.

RELIGIOUS DOUBT today is quite as much pragmatic as intellectual. For one man who regretfully puts aside his religion because it seems to be at variance with modern science and philosophy, there are five to whom the problem never presents itself in the light of what William James would call "a practical option",—who feel that religion has no appreciable effect upon the conduct of the individual, or the welfare of society, and that we are as well off without it. Such views are held by very many men and women of the highest integrity and the most sincere devotion to the service of society. To them the issues which Christians have debated and for which martyrs have shed their blood, even the great fundamental questions of the existence of God and of immortality, seem to be of small practical importance, and religion itself to be irrelevant.

Such men are impressed by the discrepancy between the ideals of Christianity and the conduct of individual Christians, by the failure of the Churches to make themselves felt in the cause of civic righteousness and social betterment, by the disproportion between the labor and wealth expended upon the Churches and their influence in the world. On the other hand they take notice of the tremendous efficiency of welfare associations having no religious affiliations. Desiring to use their effort where it will be most immediately effective, they align themselves with such associations.

Another class, while acknowledging the value of religion in general, are unable to attach any practical importance to particular doctrines, or systems. All religious systems, say they, are working to the same end, so why concern oneself with their differences? A good Methodist and a good Presbyterian, a good Catholic and a good Protestant,

nay, a good Buddhist and a good Christian, all alike are serving their fellow man and doing the will of God. If religious beliefs are to be measured by their fruits, how can we discriminate between them?

Let us be perfectly frank about this. There *is* a grave discrepancy between the ideals of Christianity and the conduct of Christians; the Churches are *not* exerting the influence which one might expect of them; the non-religious associations *are* tremendously effective; Buddhism does produce its saints. And so the problem which these questioners present is by no means trifling. Yet it seems to me that a thoughtful analysis of each of these classes of objections in turn will show that, after all, religion is relevant and belief does matter.

In all questions concerning the conduct of the individual it must be remembered that religion is only one factor, and sometimes a very small factor. All the vast weight of heredity and all the influence of environment, his home, his business, his education, tell tremendously in the conduct of the individual; and in all these respects no two men are alike. Hence comparison between individuals is absolutely worthless; the value of religion to the individual can only be determined by a comparison of his conduct before the element of religious belief was brought to bear upon him and his conduct afterward. Here the evidence is overwhelming. From Augustine and Francis of Assisi to the men of today described by Harold Begbie in his *Twice Born Men*, tales which can be matched by any priest, or preacher, or Salvation Army lassie, the power of religious belief to break down old habits and regenerate the sinner is demonstrated. That there is today so high a standard of morality among those of no religious belief is perhaps to be explained by the fact that they got their early training from God-fearing parents and that the Churches are still able to set the standard for the nation. At any rate, if modern civilization shall be able permanently to conserve morality in the absence of the religious motive, it will be an achievement absolutely unique in history.

True it is that non-religious welfare associations some-

times outstrip the Churches in their efforts for social and civic betterment. Yet is it not true that most of the support for these associations and most of the workers employed in them are members of Churches? And, after all, is it the duty of the Church to engage directly in these enterprises, or rather to inspire its members to do the work through outside agencies? The question is not by any means easy to answer. Of a certainty, if there is work of this sort pressing to be done and no other agency to undertake it, the Church must not, like the priest and the Levite in the parable, pass by on the other side. When, however, the city or state government, or some charitable organization, can be induced to take charge, should not it be allowed to do so?

The first hospitals, the first schools, and the first almshouses in Western Europe and America, were maintained by the Church. And its honorable preëminence in this regard it has never lost. There is, however, in all welfare work, apart from religion, an element of futility.

Reginald Campbell, the gifted English divine, when lecturing in this country shortly before the Great War, outlined the developments which he regarded as necessary to the welfare of this country. "You must have," said he, "prohibition of the liquor traffic, equal suffrage for women, and adequate wages for labor. These things are necessary to your well-being and I predict that they will come. Yet, when all these reforms have been achieved, your country will be not much the better for them. Nothing will solve your problems but a new appreciation of religion. You cannot have a new earth until you have a new heaven."

The fulfilment of this prophecy is startling. Prohibition and woman suffrage have been written into the Constitution, and until recently the wages of labor have been, not only high, but exorbitant. Yet prohibition does not prohibit; the votes of women have not apparently been cast very differently from those of the men; and labor was anything but wise in spending its unhopèd-for increment.

Half the world starves and all the world is rent by national and racial suspicions, jealousies, and hatreds. Were it not for sheer exhaustion, the nations of Europe would again be flying at each other's throats. We in America sit

smugly by, thanking God that we are not as other men, refusing to lift a finger to help our brothers, hugging ourselves that we are well out of the mess, and fondly imagining that we can stay out. Meanwhile, hooded gangs of cowards, some of them by day the first citizens in their communities, override our land, intimidating the defenceless, and out-matching the cruelties of the Spanish Inquisitors. The millenium is as far off today as it ever was in all history.

Right here is the crucial question. Either modern civilization is well-founded and delectable, or at the worst in need of only slight amendment, such as we may apply through our welfare associations and peace treaties, or else it is sick unto death and needs a drastic remedy. If we are well pleased with civilization as it is, then religion will make no appeal to us.

It is, indeed, just this self-satisfaction which is the greatest hindrance to religious belief to-day. The natural forces, of which but yesterday we stood in awe, are now become our menials; we have conquered a continent and enormously increased our wealth; we have given education and the suffrage to everyone and have made the world safe for democracy; why should we not feel adequate to solve all our problems unaided! We have lost the feeling of awe, the sense of dependence, the realization of sin, and the conviction that salvation must be achieved through suffering, ideas which have lain at the foundation of all religions since the Stone Age. Our latest cult is based upon the total denial of sin and suffering.

Self-sufficiency is absolutely fatal to religion. "I am come," said the Master, "to call, not the righteous, but sinners to repentance." No man, nor nation, can be truly religious to whom there does not come, at least now and then, a terrific sense of impotence and unworthiness, the mood to say with fearful heart the *Dies Irae*.

One would think that the World War and the disorders that have followed it would sufficiently warn us of the dangers of this false security. But perhaps the warnings will be unheeded. Christianity has reëstablished a fallen civilization once and it may have to do so again.

The other class of objections goes, not to the importance of religion in general, but to the value of specific doctrines. All religions, so the argument runs, have the same goal, to establish right relations between man and God and, as a corollary, between man and man; all religions alike measurably succeed; while in all religions the great body of believers, though differing sharply in matters of doctrine, go on sinning the same sins. From this it is deduced that it is the intensity of conviction, rather than the nature of the belief, which counts; that one belief is as good as another. If this be true, and it is held very widely to be true, then there is no basis for a science of religion, such as has been attempted in these essays; for I have attempted to deduce the beliefs of Christianity, not from external authority, but from the facts of religious experience.

It should be noted in the first place that it is exceedingly difficult to evaluate specific beliefs on the basis of their effect upon the believer, since they are never found in the pure state, but always as contained in a mixture with other beliefs. Thus the belief in and practice of a mystical experience of God produces one result in the Quaker and quite another in the Roman Catholic mystic, to say nothing of the Buddhist. Even as to whole systems of belief the inquiry is complicated by questions of race, customs, civilization, and other non-religious influences. The Irish Roman Catholic is a very different man, even in religious life, from his brother of Italy.

The tendency of these other influences to obscure the influence of religious ideas varies, of course, inversely with the strength of conviction behind the religious idea. Bergson has pointed out that the efforts of biologists to differentiate between the plant and the animal by taking the least developed species in each kingdom as a criterion, has proved unsuccessful, since at that low point in development there is actually no distinguishing feature; and that the difference must be studied as it achieves its goal in the highest and most differentiated species in each kingdom. So in religion. The sinners of all religions are identical; it is only the saints who are different.

To be sure the saints of all religions are alike in this, that they are all good men. But their goodness, while of the same degree, is of very different type. For example. Savonarola, John Wesley, and Billy Sunday all led great revivals, yet their aims, methods, and results differed widely, largely owing to their differences in religious belief. Francis of Assisi and General Booth were both lovers of the poor, yet the Franciscan Friars and the Salvation Army have little in common in their method of operation.

Differences of belief often outweigh identity of race and environment. Part of the Hindus are Brahmans and part Mohammedans. The former believe in a heaven consisting of absorption into the Godhead; they are mystics and pacifists. The latter believe in a warrior's heaven; they are soldiers. The Puritan religion changed the easy-going, beef-eating Englishman of Elizabeth's Merrie England to the stern, hard-hitting Covenanter of Cromwell.

Now, in these essays and discussions the effort is made to evaluate the doctrines of Christianity both on the basis of the religious experience which produced them and of their practical effect. For example, in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity it is pointed out, both that we instinctively think of God as transcendent, immanent, and humanistic, and also that those religions which have shut out any one of these characteristics from their idea of God have in turn distorted the lives of their followers. Those whose God is transcendent merely, a distant monarch speaking his will amid the thunders of Sinai, such a God as the English Puritans and the modern Germans conceived of, tend inevitably themselves to become cold and heartless and cruel. On the other hand, the Buddhist, believing in a God who is immanent only, becomes a dreamer, a quietist, looking for no greater bliss than total extinction, or absorption into the divine, impersonal essence of the universe.

In like manner, the doctrine of the Incarnation, the corollary of the doctrine of the Trinity, expresses the belief that God not only may be described in terms of perfect humanity, but that he has actually so manifested himself. The doctrine was evolved,—so to speak, forced upon the consciousness of Christendom,—as the only tenable explanation

of the facts in the life of Jesus. Behold, now, how it reacts again upon the lives of those in whose minds it is accepted. It softens for us the austerity of the Hebrew idea of God and the cruelty of the Mohammedan idea. Beyond a doubt the career of the barbaric Germans who conquered imperial Rome would have been vastly different had they been followers of Mohammed. Unquestionably, the ideal of the gentle Jesus did much to tame them and to hasten the restoration of Europe.

Nor is the force of this ideal by any means exhausted. Well does Nietzsche, to whom the ethics of Christians are an abomination, seek by ridicule and invective to discredit their Master. There is no hope for his ethics of force so long as Jesus remains the ideal. It is not by accident that Christendom, with all its faults and with its many failures to live up to its ideal, has led the world in works of mercy and charity.

When, now, the inquiry concerns present day differences of belief within Christendom itself, between its two great systems, we discern an equally close analogy between belief and conduct. The differences in doctrine do bear fruit in corresponding differences in practice. Far be it from me to draw odious comparisons, or to allot to either system unqualified praise or blame. In neither system is the issue clear-cut; in each we find a group of beliefs, of some of which we may approve and some of which we may disapprove. Yet, by and large, we may distinguish between Catholics and Protestants in their conceptions of the Church, and of sacraments.

The Catholic regards the Church as a divine organism, possessing a sanction beyond that of the will of the individual members, while to the Protestant the Church is a voluntary association of individuals. The result of these beliefs is that, while we find in the Protestant Churches a constant tendency to split, in the Catholic world schisms have come only through explosions which have shaken the Church to its very base. Individually, the Protestant will change his affiliation with the greatest facility, while the Catholic will cling to his through thick and thin. An agnostic from Protestantism will regard the Christian faith

with easy-going tolerance, while the former Catholic will repudiate it with bitter hatred. This devotion to the Church as an institution makes for tremendous efficiency in the Catholic system, an efficiency which, however, seems to be overdone when it develops into the absolutism of the Roman Church.

Similarly, the greater weight which the Catholic attaches to the sacraments colors his whole life. It is apparent in the increased devotion and reverence to be observed in his churches, where, as says Pratt in his *Religious Consciousness*, one realizes that the worshipers feel that something is really being done between themselves and God. It sometimes seems that, while the Catholic is in danger of seeking for God nowhere but in church, the Protestant is in the opposite danger of seeking God everywhere in general and finding Him nowhere. So we find that in their works of charity, though both equally abound, their methods are entirely different. The Protestant is apt to subordinate the religious element in his welfare work, the Catholic to accentuate it. In the Protestant hospital are white-uniformed nurses, in the Catholic black-habited nuns.

Specific religious beliefs do affect and color our conduct tremendously. In the religious synthesis of the future we must have both the loyalty and spirituality of the Catholic and the sturdy independence of the Protestant.

When all is said and done, however, the value to the individual or to society, of religion, or of any particular religious doctrine, cannot be determined by dissecting it under the microscope. As Bergson points out, we can get no adequate knowledge of life except from within life. Religion is either a vital process or it is nothing at all. How is one to determine the effect of Christianity on society unless society lives it; and this experiment has never been made. How is one to determine the effect of Christianity upon the individual unless he tries the experiment upon himself; and this experiment he can and should make. Only so can he be true to the scientific spirit.

I mean by this experiment not only a conformance to the ethical standards of Christianity. but a *provisional* ac-

ceptance of each and every doctrine, no matter how unreasonable they may appear. Above all, I mean, to act upon them: to practice prayer in the attitude that the prayer *will* be answered; to attend upon the Eucharist in the attitude that Christ *is* really present therein; to observe Good Friday in the attitude that Christ *did* really die and that in some way our own sin was concerned in that death; to celebrate Easter in the attitude that Christ *did* really rise from the dead and that in some way He has broken the power of sin and death and enabled us likewise to conquer them. I say, is it not the only fair thing to do, to give Christianity a trial, a thorough trial; not merely to dabble in it, but to throw oneself into its very life for a space of time, say for a year; to accept *provisionally* all its doctrines as true and to enter into its devotional life as if they *were* true.

If then, at the end of the allotted time, Christianity should still seem to be false or irrelevant, the experiment would have been at least well worth trying. The outcome of the experiment, however, if it is made in good faith, is not likely to be disappointing.

DOGMA.

When Pilate, on trial before Jesus, seeking to justify himself, propounded the riddle, "What is Truth?" he voiced a question as old as the human mind. The answers have been many, yet each fresh insight into the scheme of things propounds the question anew, and no answer has ever remained undisputed. For to answer this question correctly involves, not only finding the Truth, but knowing it when we have found it.

During the past century this question has been asked again, perhaps with more insistence than ever before. The skeptics, which class includes not only agnostics, but also those who rely on religious authority, have given up the quest as a vain undertaking. But the rest of us are still convinced that it ought to be possible to give a reason for the faith that is in us. And because theology in these latter days has not always had an answer ready, she has seemed to be discredited.

The trouble with theology has been that she inherited from Thomas Aquinas the theory that the world is divided into two kingdoms, the kingdom of Nature and the kingdom of Grace. God, to be sure, reigned in each. But, while he ruled the kingdom of Grace in person, he had let out the kingdom of Nature, after creating it, to his vicegerent, Natural Law. Man lay on the border between the two, his body in one, his soul in the other. Yet that boundary was perfectly distinct.

Such a theory worked admirably in the tidy little world in which Aquinas found himself. On one hand it gave seemingly unlimited scope for scientific investigation, while on the other hand it set free the religious consciousness to soar to heights limited by no trammels of human reason. This Kingdom of Grace was not by any means lawless. It was governed, however, not by Natural Law, but by

the direct fiat of the Almighty, as revealed in the Bible and Church, a fiat answerable neither to human reason nor human conscience.

The only trouble was that no sooner had Aquinas laid out these kingdoms than men began moving the boundary posts. The first scattered squads of invaders did not greatly tax the prisons of the Holy Office; but before long the scientists began coming over by regiments. First this outpost and then that one gave way; and the history of theology in the past five hundred years has been one of prolonged retreat. With every stronghold which they defended the theologians have insisted that, if this be given up, religion falls. Small wonder if people at last began to take them at their word.

The past half century has been a period of bewilderment; the *nouveaux riches* of science have sometimes indulged in wilful image-breaking; while the *nouveaux pauvres* of theology have been feverishly cutting over their old clothes, trying to make them hold out over the winter. The result has been a chaos of intellectual and, what is worse, of moral, values.

The friends of religion were at a loss. Each new pronouncement of science seemed to deal them another blow. They knew not where to stand. One held to this theory, another to that. The preachers finally gave it up. When half of their congregations believed that their grandfathers were monkeys and the other half were equally assured that they were descended from clay images, it was obviously difficult to preach a satisfactory sermon on the Creation. If these opinions could have been segregated in separate denominations, the case might have been more tolerable; at least the mud-slinging might have gone on in the time-honored way across ecclesiastical fences. But this new alignment cut straight across all the Christian bodies. So the preachers concluded that the pews no longer cared for their doctrinal sermons; a conclusion in which there was much practical wisdom, but which was always exactly half true.

Out of this chaos a new synthesis has been gradually shaping. It has become apparent that it is fatuous to deny the legitimate conclusions of science. It is equally apparent

that, despite all mishandling by foes and friends, religion is still very much alive and must be taken into account in the scheme of things. The kingdoms of the Angelic Doctor have been frankly abandoned. It has come to be seen that God and Nature are not mutually exclusive; that Nature is not godless, nor God unnatural. The facts of religion are in nowise impunged, only our ways of explaining them. Since the turn of the century we have achieved a new orientation both of science and theology. For the first time in ten centuries they talk the same language.

The outlines of this new synthesis have now been fairly well established. Yet, strangely enough, the preachers seem to be reluctant to proclaim it. This is not by reason of any lack of sympathy with the new viewpoint, as most of them will frankly admit in private. It seems to be rather for fear of unsettling the convictions of those in their flocks who have been trained in the old notions. Reversing the advice of Saint Paul, they feed milk to the aged. For this excess of caution there was much reason fifty years ago. There is none today. The generation coming up refuses to be bottle-fed.

For five hundred years the Church has been on the defensive. In every divinity school it has taught apologetics. Its defenders have struck valiant blows; but they have fought like men with their backs to the wall. Now, at last, it is on the offensive. The champions of the new orthodoxy write with a vigor and reality and self-assurance as refreshing as a cold plunge after a tepid bath. They have rediscovered the origin and sanction of dogma. They have demonstrated that dogma is not something imparted arbitrarily by authority, as to which the consequences of disbelief are to be felt mostly in the world to come; and they have demonstrated that dogma is evolved to classify and explain the facts of religious experience. Dogma, as has been said by W. G. Peck, is dominating conviction; and, like any profound conviction, it flowers naturally forth in human conduct. In short, a dogma is not a fiat, but a formula.

THE GRAMMAR OF THEOLOGY.

Imagine, if you will, a telephone operator, housed up from birth in a little room with neither door nor window. All day the messages come in over the wires from every part of her city. Sometimes the messages give her bits of information, not requiring action on her part; they tell her of a beautiful river, a tree, or a band playing, or perchance they describe the outside of the exchange, how the wires are carried and what sort of instruments are at the other end of the line. Sometimes they tell her of a fire, and these she connects with the fire department and orders it to the scene. Perhaps a murder is being committed, and she calls out the police.

But she does much more than receive and transmit messages, for hers is no automatic telephone. Of every message the operator keeps a copy, which she files in a pigeon-hole in which are other like messages.

Herein is a parable of ourselves. Our information of the outside world all comes to us over our nerves. These sense impressions we call percepts. We take their word for it as to what is going on in the world. When the messages come in which call for any activity, we send out orders over the wire. We relate all our percepts with similar percepts received in the past and out of them we abstract the part which we deem essential. This abstract image, or concept, we file away in the memory, along with previous similar concepts. For instance, I see a piece of cloth with red and white stripes and with white stars on a blue field. I do not remember all the little details as to material, texture and color; I relate this percept of a piece of cloth to other similar percepts stored in my memory, which I have called flags, and so I remember it.

The outside world, as it is made up for me, consists in the sum total of these concepts.

I distinguish between concepts in several ways. I distinguish between those which are simultaneous; and the measure of their distinctness I call space. I distinguish between those which are not simultaneous; and the measure of their distinctness I call time. I arrange them in groups and call the groups phenomena. I note that some groups always follow other groups; and I call the precedent group cause and the subsequent group effect.

To return to our telephone operator. She is never indifferent to the messages that come in. Every message affects her. One makes her glad, another makes her sad. One gives her pleasure, another pain. Some make her very angry. Now and then, when she gets angry enough, she pulls out the plug and refuses to answer any more calls on the offending line. Sometimes, when business is dull, she falls to musing as to what the messages really mean, whether her informants are telling her the truth, how she came there, what the exchange is for, and whether, if it is destroyed, she is going to come out alive. In musing thus she takes account, not only of what the messages tell her of the outside world, but of what she knows of the inside of the exchange and of how she works. In other words, she constructs a philosophy of life.

Now, in any philosophy of life it should be noted, first of all, that I have information of myself, both from the inside and from the outside. For example, a snake lies before me and I reach out and touch it. I see the snake and I see and feel the motion of my hand through the air and then I feel the snake. So much I know of my action from the outside. But that is only half the story. I am also aware of willing, or intending, the motion of my arm; and, when my hand touches the snake, I am aware of a feeling of fear and of loathing. These things I know from the inside only.

Of the two aspects of reality the inside is the more intimate. I know my conscious mental processes immediately. In fact these processes only possess for me absolute logical certitude. The outside world I can never know except

through the sense impressions that come to me. It is logically impossible to prove that I am not the whole of the universe. I know, furthermore, that my senses are incomplete and often contradictory. For example, a rapidly revolving wheel appears to have nothing between the rim and the hub, but my sense of touch reveals the existence of spokes. There are waves of light and sound beyond those that affect my eye and ear; I cannot perceive the waves used in wireless telegraphy; and I know that the dog's sense of smell is more acute than mine. I, however, make the assumption that there is an objective Something behind the sense impressions and that what they tell me is valid as far as it goes. Such an assumption is perfectly legitimate; yet, it is, after all, an act of faith.

My sense impressions tell me, among other things, of the existence of other human bodies, who appear to conduct themselves as I conduct myself. I have, therefore, the right to assume, and I do assume, that if I could get inside of them, I should find that the inside view of them corresponds to the inside view of myself, or rather that their inner aspect bears the same relation to their outer aspect as does mine. Here again I make an act of faith which is perfectly legitimate.

Yet, while I may and ought to believe in the existence of the outside universe, and reason about it, I must reason from the inside out and not from the outside in. To resume the picture of the telephone girl, she must begin with what she herself knows of the inside of the exchange, not what someone tells her over the wires.

The first thing to observe about myself is that I never receive any message with indifference. It makes me glad or sad, it gives me pleasure or pain, comfort or discomfort. This effect, in the lingo of the psychologist, is affection. The message has this effect, not alone by reason of what it contains, but by reason of what I myself am. A beautiful piece of music thrills me with pleasure. Yet there is nothing, intrinsically, in a certain series of vibrations to account for this effect, and I should be hard put to it to explain just what there was in the music which gives me

this emotion. This inherent tendency, or set, of the mind, which is the subjective factor in psychological affection, we will, for want of a better name, call a "sense".

I find, first of all, that I have a very strongly developed sense for self-preservation. If I should be chained to the railroad track, a train bearing down upon me would cause not only discomfort, but abject terror.

I have, also, a sense for love, a tendency to want companionship, a desire to have others like me, and an equally strong desire to like others. This sense is fully as strong as the sense for self-preservation. Indeed, in the mother it frequently overpowers the sense for self-preservation and she willingly and gladly courts death for the sake of her offspring.

Closely akin to the sense for love, perhaps a corollary of it, is the sense for loyalty. Man is, we say, a social creature. He is incomplete without the give and take of association with his fellows. "He that saveth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it." Man evaluates his fellows largely by this standard. All the world loathes a traitor.

The next item of mental baggage of which I take note is a sense for rationality, the urge or tendency to arrange my concepts in logical sequence of cause and effect. I have an inherent abhorrence of a helter-skelter universe. I will not rest for long content, as has been said, with mere cosmic weather.

I find also a sense for activity, an impulse to do something about my world. The matter cannot be better stated than has been done by William James in his *Sentiment of Rationality*:

"It is far too little realized how entirely the intellect is built up of practical interests. The theory of evolution is beginning to do very good service by its reduction of all mentality to the type of reflex action. Cognition, in this view, is but a fleeting moment, a cross section at a certain point of what in its totality is a motor phenomenon. In the lower forms of life no one will pretend that cognition 's anything more than a guide to appropriate action. The

germinal question concerning things brought for the first time before consciousness is not the theoretic 'What is that?' but the practical 'Who goes there?' or rather, as Horwicz has admirably put it, 'What is to be done?'—'*Was fang' ich an?*'—In all our discussions about the intelligence of lower animals, the only thing that we use is that of their acting as if for a purpose. Cognition, in short, is incomplete until discharged in act; and although it is true that the later mental development, which attains its maximum through the hypertrophied cerebrum of man, gives birth to a vast amount of theoretic activity over and above that which is immediately ministerial to practice, yet the earlier claim is only postponed, not effaced, and the active nature asserts its rights to the end.

"When the cosmos in its totality is the object offered to consciousness, the relation is in no whit altered. React on it we must in some congenial way. It was a deep instinct in Schopenhauer which led him to reinforce his pessimistic argumentation by a running volley of invective against the practical man and his requirements. No hope for pessimism unless he is slain!"

Let us go behind the scenes of this Punch-and-Judy show of ours once more. We find another sprite pulling on the wires,—a sense for purpose. When the savage in the jungle sees a bough suddenly waving, he not only asks, "Who goes there?" and "What shall I do?" but "What is it doing that for?" Our primitive ancestors all asked this question; and it was by virtue thereof that they got to be our ancestors. The others left no descendents; but perished in the flower of their youth. And so we steadfastly refuse a squirrel-cage universe.

If I have not wearied you with this analysis, I bid you look again behind the scenes. We find yet another sense, the sense for right. No sooner does man say, "I am," than he begins to say, "I ought". Coincidentally with the rise of self-consciousness came the sense of responsibility. From the gray drawn of history man beats upon his breast and cries, *Pec-cavi*. The taboo of the African savage, like the Code of Justinian, is an answer to the question, "What ought I to

do?" The mental tendency, or urge, which drives us to ask this question, and which makes us uncomfortable until we have answered it, is the sense for right.

There is yet another sense of which we must take account. And here I would give you a story told by William James in *The Dilemma of Determinism*. A man, he says, was recently on trial for murder of his wife. He testified that she bored him, and so to get rid of her he inveigled her into a desert spot and shot her four times. As she lay on the ground she looked up to him and said, "You didn't do it on purpose, did you, dear?" "No," he replied, "I didn't do it on purpose," as he raised a rock and smashed her skull. The prisoner, said James, was given a mild sentence and left the court-room well satisfied with himself.

I confess that, often as I have read this story, I can not read it without seeing red. I have an insensate desire to go out and find that man and put an end to his miserable existence. His act, and even the telling of it, seems to blaspheme all that I hold sacred. Now, why does such a proceeding create in us a red rage? Because it does violence to our sense for justice.

We find ourselves, also, with a tendency to look up to some other being, human or supernatural, as an ideal. We want always to be pursuing the gleam. It bores us ever to quite arrive. We want a touch of awe in our universe. What may I call this but a sense for reverence?

This catalogue does not by any means exhaust our inherent senses. There is, for example, our sense for beauty, that mysterious something within us which tunes our ear to the music of the spheres, and which has baffled all attempts at analysis. But that sense does not concern us here.

Now, it should be noted that these senses are not, in themselves, guides of conduct. Our sense for self-preservation does not, for instance, tell us what conduct will work for the well-being of the organism. We have no infallible monitor to warn us against lobster salad at midnight. That is for the intellect to determine by the method of trial and error. The sense for self-preservation simply asks the question and stands over us till we answer it. The case is

not otherwise with our sense for right. It drives us to ask of every act of ours, "Ought I?" The African savage makes one answer, the Roman lawyer another. The significant thing is the question, not the answer. The conscience is not a judge. It is rather a bailiff who brings the parties litigant before the bar of the intellect, and who, when the intellect has pronounced judgment, proceeds to enforce it.

Let us now apply these ideas to our philosophy. Our datum is, as we have seen, the percepts that come flooding in upon us. The first thing we do to these percepts is to arrange them. Without arrangement we could not even begin to remember them. Try for yourself how hard it is by a sheer effort of memory to retain and recall a jumble of unrelated facts. Our memory experts tell us that we must associate our ideas. We are to associate the name of Mr. Smith with his fire red hair, the name of Mr. Jones with his Roman nose, the name of Mr. Brown with that old-fashioned watch fob that he wears.

But we not only seek to remember, we seek to understand. The moment we seek to pass from *Wissen* to *Kennen*, the moment we seek to understand or comprehend a thing, at that moment we begin to synthesize it by identity with, or difference from, other things.

Now, this grouping, whether for the purpose of remembering or for the purpose of understanding, goes on congruently with one or other of these senses of which I have been speaking. The scientist takes the results of his experiments. He feels uneasy, for he cannot "understand" them, which is to say that they do not fit in with any other facts; they do not satisfy his sense for rationality. He tries them in this way and that way; he turns them over and about; he may find that they don't belong where he thought they did, or that he will have to rearrange his whole series to accommodate them. At last, however, they fit snugly with the other facts of his experience in a rational series of cause and effect. A bell rings somewhere within him; he now "understands" his fact, and his sense for rationality is satisfied.

So with the lover. His fair one is coy. Yesterday she wrote to him. To-day she refuses his invitation to a dance.

He turns all these things over in his mind; she loves me, she loves me not. He rests not till he knows her answer. All other judgments are suspended. What care I, says he, how fair she be, if she be not fair to me. And if, at last, she bids him hope, the stars of heaven sing for joy. If perchance, she refuses his suit, does he thereby conclude that there is no reality which corresponds with his sense for love? Perhaps, for a time; but not for long. Regretfully he turns his back and goes on searching, inveterate lover that he is, sure that somewhere, somehow, the universe holds for him a love that answers his. And when he finds that love, as surely he will if he pursues his quest, the bell rings, and he, like the scientist, is content, for he has satisfied his sense for love.

Why is it, as I have said, that the human race has from age to age mulled over the problem of evil? There is no problem of good. It is because we expect the universe to be good and not bad. Yet why should we expect this? Solely because a universe inherently bad does violence to our sense for right and our sense for justice.

But, it may be said, you are making man the measure of all things. Yes, frankly, I am, for I have no other measuring rod. *Aut Caesar, aut nullus.* The only alternative is intellectual nullity. "But," say you, "there is the external universe; why not use *it* for the measuring rod; here at least you have objective reality and are not dependent on subjective ideas." Please go back now with me to the beginning and recall that all we know of the outside universe is our sense impressions. Remember that there is no logical refutation of solipsism, and that we have arrived at the conclusion that there *is* an objective reality behind these sense impressions by an act of sheer faith. Now just for a moment let me ask you why we make this act of faith; why not remain in solitary grandeur, the monarch of all we survey. Simply because, like Alexander Selkirk, we find solitude intolerable, it violates our sense for love. Also because we find inactivity intolerable. We want something to push against. A universe that does not hit back violates our sense for activity.

And so you make the assumption that there is an out-

side universe and that it will be found to satisfy our sense for rationality. But, having called it into being in order to satisfy certain mental tendencies, you can not logically stop there. It is all or none. I insist that we should reject as false, or at least as incomplete, any explanation of phenomena which violates our sense for right, or for justice, or for love, or for reverence, just as we reject an explanation which violates our sense for rationality.

But, you say, you are reasoning with a shovel. You have lumped together all sorts of things and called them "senses," you have got primary, congenital instincts and acquired characteristics all together in one category. I might counter by asking you, what is an instinct. But I won't stop over verbal niceties, because the fundamental difficulty is that you have grabbed up the wrong yardstick again. You persist in measuring my mental tendencies by the external universe. This leads you round and round in a circle.

In my childhood I was much impressed with the fable of a snake that ate up everything in sight. Finally, when all other provender failed, the snake began on his own tail and continued until he had eaten himself up.

Now that is exactly the case with the materialistic philosopher.

The truth of the matter is that in any system of philosophy you have got to start somewhere. I prefer to proceed from the known to the unknown; from the thinker to the thing thought about. So it makes no whit of difference at what stage these mental tendencies of ours have arisen, or whether they are simple or composite. Of course, you can't box off the mental life into this or that cubby-hole, and speak of a sense for right as distinct, for instance, from the sense for justice. The divisions are arbitrary, just as are all categories of science or philosophy; but they do in the main describe our mental equipment. I take the normal, adult human being as I find him.

But, says the materialist, why take the adult; why not take the child? You do not find all your "senses" in the child. To this I would reply, in the first place, why stop at the child? Why not go back to the embryo, to the germ,

back further yet to the ancestor, and so on and on. Useful as the study of origins may be, there are many fields in which it is of no assistance. The oyster does not tell me much about my soul. We judge the mind, as says William James in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, by its fruits, not by its roots.

I would make further reply to the materialist with a *tu quoque*. If the sense for love, for right, or for justice, are developed during life under the stimulus of the environment, so also is the sense for rationality and even the sense for self-preservation. The infant has no fear, nor any tendency to avoid that which will injure him. On the contrary, any father of children will tell you that they seem to have a positive mania for self-destruction, and have to be watched constantly to keep them from doing away with themselves. The child develops a sense for love probably before the sense for self-preservation and certainly before the sense for rationality. That sense is, in fact, among the last to appear upon the scene.

To be sure, our mental tendencies develop during life. It would be too much to expect that we, like Athené, should spring full armed from the brain of our parent. But if modern biology has taught us anything, it has taught us that all the great mainsprings of conduct correspond to a mysterious potentiality inherent in the very germ. There is no plant but was seed. If we innately lacked the capacity for love or reverence, no training could put it there. There are, in the modern garden, no trees of the knowledge of good and evil. Anyhow, I, for one, cannot but feel that the very fact that our spiritual equipment has been shaped in the rough and tumble with environment, makes it a worthy instrument whereby to take account of that environment.

Returning to the fray, your materialist will contend that we have no right to use these senses as a measuring stick, because they vary in different individuals and are in some individuals lacking in part, and we have no philosophical bureau of standards. Here, of course, he is in a measure right. It is precisely because of this that we have these differences in systems of philosophy. It is because some

men deliberately throw away one or all of the measuring sticks that they arrive at different conclusions. But should we, for that, throw them all away? To do that would be to abandon all philosophy, even the materialistic, and to say with the skeptic, "I doubt even that I doubt". From such mental hara-kiri the Lord deliver us.

The fact is that the variations in mental equipment are not so great as our materialist imagines. They are probably not so great as the variations in physical equipment. Physical color blindness is at least as common as mental; yet, for that, we do not refuse the evidence of our senses. If we are building a house, we do not wait to send our foot-rule to Washington and our compass to Annapolis for correction. The business of our eternal salvation presses; we must go on with what tools we have. We do, however, get rid of the workmen whose measuring rods are too far at variance from the average. Those who lack the sense for rationality we confine in lunatic asylums. Those without the sense for right and for justice in prisons.

At any rate, the rationalist need not in this respect adopt an air of superiority, as though the sense for rationality were better standardized or more universal than the sense for right or justice. The lunatic asylums are just as full as the prisons.

There is, however, another aspect of Reality of which we must take account. The universe, whether we regard it as an external entity or as a procession of mental images, is not supine. It hits back. If I go into a dark room, not knowing that a chair is there, I crack my shins on it nevertheless. Now the rationalist claims that with his measuring rod he can explore the universe to its limits and find his way back in safety, and that his calculation will come out even; whereas the moralist is continually cracking his shins and finding that his measuring rods are incommensurate with Reality.

The truth of the matter is, however, that the rationalist's measuring rod is by no means perfectly commensurate with Reality. At the bottom of every system of science lies an antinomy. Take, for example, the concept of the ether, which was hit upon to explain the transmission of light.

Light, on this hypothesis, is conceived as waves in ether. Now, since light is transmitted without diminution to any distance, however great, it must follow that the medium is perfectly elastic, that is to say, perfectly rigid. Any substance which is in the least mushy will eventually obliterate a wave motion. Sound, for example, does not travel far, because it is transmitted through the air, which is not perfectly elastic. So, then, the ether must be more rigid than steel. On the other hand, the heavenly bodies in passing through the ether are not in the least slowed down, there is absolutely no friction. Hence the ether must be more tenuous than any material substance. Take an example nearer home. There is a relationship between bodily states and mental states, so that changes in consciousness correspond to changes in brain structure. Yet no rationalist or materialist can in the least translate movements of atoms or molecules into sight or hearing, much less into love or hate. The rationalist does not, however, on that account throw away his measuring rod, nor ought he; but he uses it so far as he can and seeks ever a synthesis in which at last his method will be completely justified. Thus, science ends, as it began in an act of faith.

The case is not otherwise with religion. The moralist, like the rationalist, comes to grief right often in exploring Reality. He finds that his measuring rods will not always fit. He starts out to find a good universe and a righteous universe and he finds much sorrow and much sin. Not so much, however, by far, as the pessimistic school would have us believe. J. Arthur Thomson, the eminent student of comparative biology, in his recent work entitled *The System of Animate Nature*, has done good service in dispelling the notion that nature is one long struggle for the right to be, a ruthless fight to the death. Struggle, indeed we do, both brute and man. But who wants to be wafted to the skies on flowery beds of ease? And more often than not, both with brute and man,—and increasingly so with man,—the struggle, as Thomson points out, is merely the effort of the individual to adjust himself to the environment.

The religionist proposes remedies for this mal-adjustment, which he bids us use, confident that in the larger

synthesis, which must include the Hereafter, his method will find justification. And so religion, like science, ends in an act of faith, a sublime and radiant *Sursum corda*.

Reviewing thus material phenomena in the light of our religious senses, we seem to come inevitably to the conclusion that the world is moral and hence that there is a God, and that man is moral and hence a really free agent, and that there is a life eternal to redress the wrongs in this. These and other doctrines of theism would seem to be established by a correct evaluation of material phenomena alone.

Religion, however, is, or claims to be, much more than a way of regarding the external world. It claims to have data of its own, as well as a method, distinct from science. It asserts that it has an insight into Reality, a religious experience. It affirms, not only that God is, but that He is the rewarder of all who trust in Him.

Now, if such be the case, the religious experiences ought to be tested and analyzed by the same methods which are employed by science. No more should be claimed for them than the evidence warrants. If they shall prove not to be capable of establishment, religion is not thereby overthrown, since it rests secure upon our well-warranted and inherent tendency to find a religious rationale of the universe. We ought, still, to say with Job, "Though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him". But if the religious experience proves to be true, it furnishes convincing experimental justification of this rationale.

Without examining the whole field of religious phenomena, let us confine ourselves to the experience of subjective answer to prayer, which is crucial to the whole matter. It will, of course, be agreed on all sides that prayer powerfully affects the one who prays. It gives him courage and clearness of vision, dispels doubts and shows him a way out of an impasse in his affairs; it produces within him a sense of the immediate presence of God; in very many cases it cures a bodily ailment. The phenomena of religious experience may be found in any book on religious psychology, notably William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, George Albert Coe, *The Psychology of Religion*, and James B. Pratt,

The Religious Consciousness. While the facts are not in dispute, they are, owing to their subjective nature, peculiarly difficult to evaluate. A very keen analysis has been made by Will Spens in his lectures entitled, *Belief and Practice*, to whom I am very largely indebted for what follows.

There is one very obvious difference between religious experience and the physical experiences which we seek to systematize in scientific study. If you go into a dark room you will knock your shins against a chair, which happens to be there in your path, entirely irrespective of your belief as to the existence, presence, and nature of the chair. On the other hand, the effect of your prayers, or of your participation in the sacraments, is very largely dependent on your expectations; more than that, it is not probable that the effects will be considerable if your expectation is merely pragmatic. You will probably not obtain spiritual benefit apart from some ultimate conception as to the basis of the benefit. On that distinction has been based the charge that religious experience is simply the outcome of self-suggestion. The facts must, therefore, be analyzed to determine whether they display elements which can not be so explained.

The fact that religious experience, in general, involves more than an antecedent expectation, that it depends on a belief as its basis, is an argument against the self-suggestion theory. It becomes a very strong argument in view of the unexpectedness of grace, in view of the fact that, while the experience is in accordance with underlying belief, it is very often not in accordance with the particular expectations that were in the mind of the individual concerned. It is a phenomenon of the spiritual life, a phenomenon to which many writers have drawn attention, and which few students of that life would hesitate to affirm, that prayer for grace is commonly not answered in accordance with the expectation of the answer. The grace supplied, or the fruit of the grace sought, is found to be different from that expected, although as effective, or more effective. This is a fact that cuts right across the view that the experience in question is simply the outcome of expectation. It implies that, while not only expectation but some definite belief as

to its basis are a normal *condition* of spiritual experience, expectation is not the *cause* of that experience.

Rejoinder may be made to this argument that the phenomenon is still explicable on the hypothesis of self-suggestion, in the view that the original ideas had undergone transformation while in the subconscious. Psycho-therapists affirm that an *idée fixée* may take a form entirely unexpected when echoed back into consciousness; just as, if you should let down a fish box containing a tadpole, you might be surprised on hauling it up to find a frog. The answer to that objection would seem to be that, if you let down the fish box several times, each time with a tadpole in it, and it came up containing now one sort of fish and now another, you would be fairly justified in assuming that the fish came in from the outside, rather than that the tadpoles had developed in such discrepant ways. Now this is exactly what happens in religious experience; the circumstances from which relief is sought being the same and the prayer being the same, the answers will be, not only unexpected, but various. When a prayer for guidance results, as such prayers often do result, in an intuition leading toward a course of conduct that runs counter, not only to the expectation of the one who prays, but to his dearest wish, the possibility of such an intuition arising by self-suggestion is small. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the answer came from without.

The evidence is, of course, cumulative. The experience of a single individual is not decisive. The weight of the testimony of experiments in all ages, races, and religions is very great indeed.

A second objection to the self-suggestion theory is still broader. If belief is not merely a condition of spiritual experience, but its source, then we ought to find that any belief which produced expectations of spiritual experience and was strongly held, should produce that experience. We should find the significant factor to be, not so much the *character* of the belief which underlay expectations, but the *strength* with which the belief and the expectations were held. We ought not to find any strong tendency in favor of

the selection and survival of particular underlying conceptions.

Now, we find in the study of comparative religions that certain conceptions, for example the conception of an Incarnation and Atonement, are continually cropping up in different directions and in different forms. The varied existence of these doctrines is not to be explained by the survival of a common primitive religion held by some stock from which different nations sprang. In the first place, there is no evidence to support a theory of the common origin of all religions. But, even if that were so, these ideas could hardly have had such universal survival, unless the ideas had had some special effectiveness. It is very difficult to resist the conclusion that the particular beliefs, just because of their character, have worked better than other beliefs.

It seems to me that we are bound to say, that while spiritual experience may not be possible without belief, it is not merely dependent on expectation, but depends on the conformity of underlying beliefs to particular types. In the measure in which the beliefs approximate these types, in that measure they appear to possess a special effectiveness, which has given them survival value. Our attitude and efforts appear to be so oriented by certain beliefs as to make possible experience otherwise unattainable,— the underlying belief has a special relation to Reality, it is in some manner objectively determined.

These considerations fortify the conclusion as to the existence of God which may be derived from the external universe, with experimental proof of a peculiarly intimate nature.

But it may be objected that the religious experience is not uniform and the dogmatic systems derived from it vary greatly. The case, however, is no better for science. The detection of Hertzian waves is a matter of yesterday. Neptune has swung around the sun from all eternity and we found her only a century ago. Surely we do not differ from the Hottentot more in religious than in scientific experience. There is not more difference between Mohammedanism and Christianity than between pre-Darwinian and post-Darwin-

ian biology. Newton taught the corpuscular theory of light. We hold the undulatory, because it better epitomizes the facts of experience. Einstein appears to have demonstrated that it, too, is at fault and will have to be modified. We regarded electricity first as a fluid, then as waves in the ether, now as a fluid again, but a very different sort of fluid than our first conception.

I believe it to be demonstrable that all religious experience is at base very similar. We are prone to forget this, because we have been taught the differences, rather than the similarities, between our faith and others. Yet there are, of course, differences both in religious experience and in accuracy of deduction. We hold to Christianity, rather than Mohammedanism, both because we are convinced that it embodies more valid religious experience, including the unique experience of Jesus and the experiences of his followers throughout the ages, and also because we feel that its doctrines epitomize and explain religious experience more accurately than those of Mohammedanism.

Whether in the field of what we call material phenomena, or in the field of what we call spiritual phenomena, there is a scientific experience and there is a religious experience,—an outside and an inside view of the same phenomena. It follows that the two systems, natural law and dogma, operate on different planes, so to speak. They take account of different aspects of Reality. Neither may legitimately contradict the conclusion of the other upon its own plane.

Natural laws are formulas worked out to epitomize the facts of scientific experience. Thus the laws of gravitation are formulas which describe the motion of one body in the presence of another. But they do much more; they enable us to repeat for ourselves the experiments performed by another. Expressed more technically, the natural law mediates scientific experience.

So with dogma. A religious doctrine to be valid must fulfil four requirements. First, it must be congruous with the legitimate conclusions of science. Truth is one, and our conclusions and explanations in one field of experience may,

and should, be tested by what we learn in other fields. Secondly, it must epitomize and explain religious experience, not only the limited experience of any of us as individuals, but the experience of the human race as a whole. It must, also, mediate religious experience. It must enable us to repeat in our own lives the religious experience out of which the doctrine grew. For example, the doctrine of the Incarnation enables us to bring home to ourselves the personality of Jesus, so that he will produce in us that devotion with which he inspired his first disciples. Finally, the doctrine must evoke right action; it must work. If any doctrine, when put to the test, shall be found to lower the ethical tone of the believer, then we have a right to assume that it is false, or at least incomplete. The dogma of the Trinity is a conclusion drawn from our experience that God is at once transcendent, immanent, and humanistic. It also mediates religious experience. In the light of that dogma we revere him as transcendent, we commune with him as immanent, and we love him as humanistic. A theology lacking either of these elements leads to a religious life which lacks them also.

This, then, is the grammar of theology, the underlying principles on which it is based. It is not based on arbitrary dogmas imposed by authority. It is built up to epitomize and explain and mediate religious experience. It is the science of the religious life.

THE NICENE IDEA OF GOD.*

Three men sat in the library of their club,—a Priest, a Lawyer, and a Captain of Infantry, home on leave. As they looked into the fire billowing up from logs on the hearth the Captain broke the silence.

“Peculiar thing, Parson, the absolute religious faith of our boys over there, coupled with comparative disregard for Churches and creeds. The world is fast becoming a huge revival meeting. The men in the trenches have stood for one, two, or three years in the anteroom of God. Many times a day a comrade’s name is called and he has marched through the door. They live always in the Presence. No wonder they are changed.

“What a mental explosion must have taken place to have broken down Anglo-Saxon reserve and produced such diaries and letters as we are getting from the men in the trenches.

“Meanwhile, the families of those who have gone beyond are striving to break down the barrier. They feel sure that they can do this by the aid of mediums, and perhaps they are right. At any rate, they, too, have found peace for their souls. The significance of this for organized Christianity is that they, like the men in the trenches, are not beholden for their religion to the Churches. Spiritualism, they fervently hold, is their sufficient religion.

“They are storming heaven; but they are doing without the official guides. I tell you this new religion is more dangerous to your Churches than the old-time agnosticism. A man with an idea is a dangerous character.

“I feel just as the rest do about your theology; yet in a way I regret that you cannot adapt the old teachings to this new spirit. For I tell you that, unless someone brings bottles,

*Reprinted by permission from *The Biblical World*, November, 1918.

this new wine is going to be drunk to intoxication, or else allowed to run away and be lost."

"Where would you begin your reconstruction?" inquired the Priest.

"Right at the beginning," said the Soldier. "Do away with such a contradiction in terms as a Trinity. The God for me is an Invisible King, a Captain of the Host, not an Abstraction. I think Wells has shown the absurdity of any other concept."

"Mr. Wells would be more convincing," replied the Priest, "if he appeared to understand what the doctrine of the Trinity really means. We have never understood it to mean what he says it means. But passing that, it seems to me that Mr. Wells is much nearer to the Christian theology than he knows, for the God of whom he conceives is in fact none other than the Second Person of the Trinity. The trouble with Mr. Wells is that he became so impressed with his discovery that he has entirely overlooked the other two Persons. His conception of the nature of God is, therefore, one sided. The three elements are essential to a well-balanced idea of the Deity."¹

"Aren't you rather severe on the gentleman for what you call his misconception of the Nicene dogma of the Trinity?" replied the Soldier. "If he has misconceived it, aren't you theologians to blame? Who knows what it means, anyhow? I will confess that I have had much the same idea about it as Wells."

"Then," said the Priest, "neither you nor Wells should condemn it until you have informed yourselves as to what it really is."

"Where would you have me go," replied the Soldier, "to find that out? I have delved into ancient tomes and sat through modern sermons, and the purport of them all is something like this: 'God is three persons and one being; three natures and one God. What this means we do not know, and it is impious to inquire. The Trinity is a mystery; but so is the constitution of matter, so is the nature of

¹See *The Meaning of Mr. Wells' New Religion*, by Bernard Iddings Bell, *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1917.

life, so is the law of gravitation. Since we cannot know, we must believe.' ”

“Such a statement,” continued the Soldier, “contains several fallacies. In the first place, the assertion that one equals three and three equals one is not a ‘mystery’. It is plain untruth. It is the negation of a fundamental axiom of logic, that the whole is greater than a part. Accepted, all logic is turned topsy-turvy and all intellection becomes at once impossible. Secondly, the statement that ‘since we cannot know, we must believe,’ while right enough within limits, is not applicable to this proposition. We cannot, must not, believe the incredible; and I submit that God does not ask it of us. We cannot reason about the unreasonable. In short, *faith* is not the antithesis of *knowledge*, but its complement. *Faith* is not opposed to *reason*. A mystery is beyond knowledge, but it is not beyond reason; much less is it contrary to reason. Faith is not, as the little girl in the story said, believing something that you know is not so.

“To put it differently, our present sciences are disjointed segments of a curve, not yet complete enough to enable us to plot the curve in entirety, but sufficient to enable us to surmise its bearing in a general way. We can say which of several curves may contain these segments, or rather, which curves cannot contain them. The function of the sciences is to extend these segments. The function of philosophy and theology is to construct the hypothetical curves which will contain these segments; not to evolve new curves out of thin air. As the sciences push out into the hitherto unknown, the hypothetical curves are tending, it is fair to assume, toward an ever closer approximation to reality. Knowledge and reason are not, in the main, faulty, but merely incomplete.

“It follows that the dogma of the Trinity, while not wholly comprehensible, ought not to be incredible or unreasonable.”

“I will grant you all this,” said the Priest, “but, really, the dogma of the Trinity is neither incredible nor unreasonable. You must not be led to condemn it by isolated utterances of preachers.”

"As to that, I appeal unto Caesar," returned the Soldier. "We will pass over the utterances of preachers, who, I grant you, are not always theologians. I will rest my case on the *Quicunque Vult*, the so-called Athanasian Creed. If that does not, in effect, affirm that one equals three and three equals one, then I lose. Or I will take the famous analogy of the trefoil, ascribed to Saint Patrick,—I submit that this analogy portrays God as a sort of spiritual Siamese triplet."

"No, no, no," interjected the Priest, "the Church does not undertake to define the manner of union; it simply affirms the tri-unity and authorizes the believer to theorize about it as he likes."

"If that be true, it is a severe indictment," rejoined the Soldier. "It means that the Church propounds a riddle and refuses to give the faithful the key. It requires them to keep their minds a vacuum on this dogma which lies at the very basis of Christian theology. Nature abhors a vacuum. The mind soon fills with all sorts of grotesque concepts. The Church is in duty bound, if it has a rational idea of the Trinity, to make it known."

"You do the rank and file of Christians an injustice," said the Priest. "Their idea of the Trinity is neither grotesque nor vacuous."

"Is it not, then?" replied the Soldier. "I affirm that my idea of the dogma is grotesque; and you insist that Wells's is. Both of us, I submit, are men of fair intelligence. But do not stop with us. Go out and inquire at random of a dozen of your flock. Ask them what they make of the *Quicunque Vult*. Then ask them what, if any, inspiration they gain from it."

"This ought not so to be. Christianity boasts that, unlike the ancient philosophies and heathen cults, its tenets furnish inspiration and practical aid in good living. If the best that can be said for a dogma is that it is harmless, then why cumbereth it the ground? Get rid of it."

During all this the Lawyer had been sitting on the edge of his chair, trying in vain to get the floor. At last he broke in:

"You are right that the dogma should be got rid of, if it is grotesque or meaningless. But I judge that the Parson has found it to be neither. Yet I grant you that he has done nothing to define the relations between the persons of the Trinity; and unless that is done, no matter how greatly the dogma may appeal to the sympathies, it cannot gain acceptance. Perhaps he feels that it would not become his cloth to engage in such a controversy; or perhaps he has himself been content not to think the problem through to the end. I believe, however, that the Church must think it through and must define the interrelation of the persons in terms of modern thought. I was at first inclined to believe, with you, Captain, that this could not be done. But further study has convinced me, not only that the dogma may be reasonably defined, but that, as originally promulgated, it was essentially reasonable, and that the unreasonable elements were imported into it later. If you like, I will explain myself."

The others settled themselves in their chairs and allowed the Lawyer free rein.

"In construing a statute, or a decree of a court," he began, "the jurist observes two fundamental canons. First, he must interpret the language in the light of the particular facts in the controversy or situation which it is framed to meet. Secondly, he must give to the words employed their accepted and usual meaning at the time and place of the pronouncement. Let us apply these canons here.

"The germs of the concepts of the First and Third Persons are found in the Old Testament. The normal Hebrew idea of God corresponded to the First Person, but was anthropomorphic. The Hebrews, consequently, thought that when He sought to enter the human soul He must needs attenuate Himself, that is, become a spirit (*ruach*=*πνεῦμα*=*spiritus*='breeze'). Thus the prophets, in speaking of a theophany, say, 'The Lord appeared unto me;' but in speaking of an inspiration they say, 'The spirit of the Lord (i. e., the Lord in spiritual form) came upon me.' There does not appear to have been any tendency to hypostatize this concept of the spirit of the Lord.

"The Logos concept originated among the Alexandrine Jews. It was introduced to relieve the Creator of responsibility for a sinful world. The creative act was conceived of as performed by, or through, the Logos, who was an emanation from God and 'of like substance'. The three concepts thus existed in embryo at the time of Christ.

"When the early Christians were making a formula to express the relationship between the divine nature of Jesus and the Godhead, they made use of this Logos concept. They also brought over the concept of the Holy Spirit.

"A dispute now arose among them as to the interrelation of the concepts of Father, Word, and Spirit, in particular of the two former. The undeniable fact that Jesus had a human nature distinct from Deity tended subconsciously to make for a concept of the Word as a Being separate from the Father, and inclined the Arians to the pre-Christian dogma of distinctness, if not disparity, between the two.

"On the other hand, the Athanasians argued, and rightly, that such a doctrine destroyed the idea of the Unity of God and tended toward the vagaries of Gnosticism and the grossness of polytheism.

"Modern Unitarians, and with them, Mr. Wells, assume that the Arians affirmed the unity of God by denying the divinity of Jesus. As a matter of fact the Arian controversy had nothing whatever to do with the nature of Jesus. Both parties affirmed that Jesus was divine. The Arians claimed that Deity consisted of three 'like' entities; that is, that the three were distinct, but that all partook of the nature of Deity. The Athanasians contended that Deity is one. It is to the eternal credit of Athanasius that the Christian religion is not tritheistic.

"Viewed, then, in the light of history, the chief concern of the Council of Nicaea was evidently the affirmation of the unity of the Deity; and its language, if ambiguous, should be so construed.

"Turn now to the words themselves. That portion of the creed formulated by the Council (the Nicene Creed as we now have it is the result of modifications made at the Council of Constantinople some half a century later) which has to do with the relation between the First and Second Per-

sons, reads as follows: 'And (we believe) in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the son of God, begotten of the Father, only begotten, that is to say of the *being* (οὐσίας) of the Father, God of God, Light of Light, Very God of Very God, begotten, not made, *One-in-being* (ὁμοουσίον) with the Father, Creator of all things both in heaven and on earth.....But those who say, "There was when He was not" and "Before He was begotten He was not" and that "He came into existence from nonexistence," or who profess that the Son of God is of different *substance* or *being*, ἐτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας (*ex alia subsistentia aut substantia*), or that He is created, or changeable, or variable, are anathematized by the Catholic Church.' (Note that those who say that the Son is ἐτέρας ὑποστάσεως from the Father are anathematized.)

"The two key words are ὑπόστασις and οὐσία. Liddell and Scott's *Greek Lexicon* defines ὑπόστασις as follows: 'Foundation; substance; in philosophy and theology it denotes actual existence, as opposed to semblance, the real nature of a thing as opposed to its outward form (the *Ding an Sich*), sometimes used as practically synonymous with οὐσία; in later theology it was limited in sense to the special characteristic nature of a person or thing, directly opposite to οὐσία (generic nature), and it was so used to translate the Latin *persona*.'

"The word οὐσία is defined by the same authority as: 'Being: existence, in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle the word signifies essence, true nature, also *being* as opposed to *not being*; in later Greek scientific works, a primary substance, an element.'

"The two words were, then, at the time of the Nicene Council, practically synonymous; and they appear to have been so used in the last clause of the Creed, which I have quoted. Indeed ὑπόστασις which was later employed to translate the Latin *persona*, is etymologically the same word as *substantia*, which is the Latin equivalent for οὐσία. The word ὑπόστασις did not mean *persona* at the time of the Council of Nicaea, much less did it correspond to the English word *person*.

"Viewed, then, in the light both of history and linguistics, the Nicene Creed is concerned solely with affirming the unity of the Godhead. It presupposes, to be sure, that the God-

head is complex ; but it does not affirm the complexity, much less undertake to define it. In fact, the Athanasians were at once accused by the Arians of Sabellianism, that is of denying that the Godhead is complex.

"It was probably to defend themselves against this accusation that the later Athanasians formulated their idea of the nature of the complexity of the Godhead. This step was first taken by the Latin, not the Greek, fathers not long after the Council of Nicaea. They gave utterance to the formula that God is of three *personae*.

"Now, this word *persona* meant originally an actor's mask (from *per-sonans*). In the fourth century, and before, the word was employed in legal terminology to denote 'an aggregate of legal rights and duties.' Thus, a corporation had a *persona*; but a slave had none. A citizen might have several *personae*, for example, as *tutor* (guardian), *fiduciarius* (trustee), and so on. The use of the word in the fourth century was restricted to this legal sense, and it very rarely had any other connotation. It was this legal term which the Fathers used in defining the complexity of the nature of Deity. Very evidently the great truth which they were struggling to express was that the nature of Deity, while essentially one, is complex, three-sided, in function. God in essence is one; there is but one center of consciousness and of will in the Deity. But in his revelation of himself he has three aspects, manifestations, capacities, or functionings—as Father, as Son, as Holy Spirit. The three aspects are simultaneous and co-eternal; they inhere in the very nature of God. In the concept of God as Father we have the aspect of transcendence; in the concept of God as Holy Spirit, the aspect of immanence. In the concept of God as Son we have God on the humanistic, or spiritually anthropomorphic, side; we have, that is to say, the aspect of God which is capable of adumbration in terms of the human personality."

At this point the Soldier broke in: "That is a very pretty theory; but I can quote you commentators who are dead against it, and who state with the assurance of authority that the distinction of Persons is far more fundamental than this."

"I grant you that," retorted the Lawyer. "On the other hand, many of the more thoughtful of the orthodox authorities are in substantial accord with this theory. But I take it that the Catholic Church derives its dogmas from councils, not from commentators."

"The corruption in the interpretation of the dogma crept in like this," continued the Lawyer. "The Greeks cast about for a word to translate *persona*. Unfortunately, they chose *ὑπόστασις*, which up to that time had had the meaning of *substance*, rather than *πρόσωπον*, which was almost the exact equivalent of *persona*. How they came to employ this word I will not undertake to say. We know that Arianism had its principal strength in the East, and that Easterns, who after the Council of Nicaea conformed outwardly, remained at heart Arians or semi-Arians. Perhaps they contrived in this way to accomplish their ends by indirection. At any rate the word, which had been the synonym of *οὐσία*, now became its antonym. But, like all adopted children, the word did not altogether lose its early traits. It connoted something far more fundamental than *persona*. The Greek word, in turn, reacted upon and modified the Latin concept.

"When the mediaeval English theologians came to write the dogma in English, they did it yet worse disservice. They made no attempt to find equivalent words, but merely transliterated the words. *Substantia* became *sub-stance*; *persona* became *person*. God, so the translation runs, is one substance and three persons. *Substance* is bad enough; it has a material connotation, and has traveled far from the Greek *οὐσία* (being). But *person* is a mere parody on the original. It denotes in English a distinct, individual, sentient being, or center of consciousness, a meaning which the Latin word never had so long as Latin was a spoken language. English-speaking Christendom should rid itself of this fantastic verbal incubus."

"With all this," said the Soldier: "I can quite agree. But have you not, in effect, evacuated your trenches to the Unitarians, leaving only dummies and Quaker guns to conceal your retreat?"

"Not so fast," rejoined the Lawyer. "It is true that I have, like the Unitarians, emphasized the Unity of the

Deity, but by a totally different process. They have come at Unity by hacking away two elements in the divine nature, the transcendent and the anthropomorphic, leaving the immanent only. I have arrived at Unity,—rather, I believe, I have brought out what the Catholic faith has always implied,—by retaining all three elements, but compacting them, making the distinction of Persons one of functioning rather than of being.”

“But why do you limit the number of Persons to three?” rejoined the Priest. “God acts in an infinite variety of ways; and if the distinction be one of function, you should have an infinite number of Persons.”

“That does not follow at all,” answered the Lawyer. “The distinction of Persons is not a distinction of functions, but of modes of functioning. The distinction is fundamental, since the three modes are, to a large extent, incongruous. A God who is immanent only might function in a variety of ways and still be but simple in nature. But a God who is at once immanent, transcendent, and humanistic, simultaneously and eternally, cannot be other than complex.”

“Your explanation may seem rational,” answered the Priest, “but it is certainly not orthodox. You will remember that the theories of Sabellius and the other so-called Modalists, which correspond exactly to yours, were held to be unorthodox.”

“If the view which I urge correctly epitomizes and explains man’s inherent thought about God, then it ought to be accepted, regardless of what some of the theologians of the past may have thought about similar views. But, since I undertook to prove that my view does really represent the Nicene opinion, you have a right to an answer to your question. I differ from the Modalists, because they taught that the three modes of functioning were assumed and laid aside by the Deity at successive points in time; that he functioned first as Father, then during the Incarnation as Son, and finally after the Ascension as Holy Spirit. Or, as some of them held, that the difference lies more in our apprehension of God than in what He is or does. Now I,

on the contrary, have been urging the view that these modes of functioning are co-eternal and inhere in His very nature. It is of the very nature of God to be immanent, to be transcendent, and to be humanistic. It is as unthinkable that he should ever for a moment cease to exist upon these three planes as that he should ever cease entirely. Hence the complexity is not simply one of outward manifestation, but represents a real complexity of being. As to what that complexity is I know as little as I know of the real nature of myself, or of any other living thing.

"Now, this solution of the problem accords with modern modes of thought in all spheres. We see our universe no longer as static, but as kinetic. The evolutionary viewpoint, which found place first in biology, has taken possession of the fields of psychology, history, sociology, economics, philosophy; in short, of every field of thought. We have come to see that nothing is static, everything is in flux. When, for purposes of analysis, we study a thing without reference to its past or future, or its interrelation with the whole universe, we are mere anatomists, poring over a cadaver. We have discovered that it is neither so easy nor so profitable as we once thought it to know what a thing 'is'. We realize that all we need to know of a thing, perhaps all we can know, is how it acts. We are consequently taking less and less interest in ontology and more and more interest in function.

"So, in theology, it is the way in which God deals with his universe which is, after all, of importance. In that respect man has always instinctively thought of God in three aspects, and always will. God acts transcendentally; he is above and beyond nature; he creates and rules it. God acts also immanently: he is in nature, and most of all in the heart of man, if man will but seek him there. God acts, also, anthropomorphically in a spiritual sense. That is to say, the divine mind is comparable to the human mind. We feel sure that the attributes of the human mind, such as love, mercy, justice, are to be found in perfection in the divine mind. In this aspect God is capable of expression in terms of perfect humanity.

"Historically speaking the doctrine of the Trinity was evolved to explain the life of Jesus. Considering Jesus,—what he did, what he said, how he lived, his followers asked themselves. 'How shall we account for this life? Though born of woman, yet never man spoke as he spoke; never man lived so close to God, or brought others so close to God; never man so convicted us of sin; never man so conquered death. Can we say that such a life was merely human?' This question the early Church answered unanimously in the negative. The hypothesis of simple humanity did not fit the facts. The problem then confronting Christendom was what to think of the God-like element in the Life? Was it an angel who lived in Jesus, or a Being like God, or was it God himself? All three theories contended for recognition. Arius held the second view. Athanasius with inspired insight realized that such a doctrine, if adopted, would reduce Christianity to tri-theism. On the other hand, it was obvious that the God-like characteristics displayed in the life of Jesus were not those of a transcendent Creator, nor yet of an immanent superpersonal Spirit. Here was displayed an aspect of Deity of which the world had till then not been aware, an aspect, however, which enormously enriched man's experience of God. So Athanasius convinced the Church of the truth of the idea of God which found expression in the Nicene Creed.

"Yet, while historically it was the fact of the Incarnation that necessitated the doctrine of the Trinity, that doctrine finds its deeper sanction in its profound agreement with all human experience of God. It is hard for us to think about God without conceiving him in the three ways. Possibly the human mind, under the inspiration of the Spirit, might have thought its way through to the doctrine of the Trinity, even had not the Incarnation forced the issue. The Logos theory of Philo and the Memra (Word) doctrine of the Palestinian rabbis, two parallel but independent lines of thought which were current about the time of Christ, indicated a general tendency in the direction of an affirmation of the triune nature of Deity.

"Contradictory though they appear to be, these three ideas of God have entered willy-nilly into the theologic

thinking of every race and creed since the beginning. Sometimes, to be sure, one or other of these ideas has been magnified so as to eclipse the others; but the eclipse is never quite total, and, such as it is, the result is achieved by sophisticated reasoning, not by instinctive feeling.

"Conceive a God of but one Person, one mode of functioning, and you will see how distorted the picture is.

"Picture God as transcendent only. He sits in majesty above the heaven of heavens. He formed the material universe and set it spinning, as a clock-maker makes a clock and winds it up. He is not immanent; if he interferes at all, it is to frustrate and annul the processes of nature. He is not humanistic; he cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; the homely virtues of our human nature are not for him. He is the German Thor, the God of the destroyers of Belgium.

"Picture God as immanent only. Not being transcendent, he (or shall I say It?) is caught in the toils of matter as a fish in a net. Not being humanistic, he is impersonal. He doeth good; he also doeth evil, since he is All. Evil, indeed, is but an undeveloped good. His ethic is quietism; his reward, Nirvana. He is the God of Buddha.

"Picture God as humanistic only. Such is the God of Mr. Wells. He is strong, but not almighty; good, but not perfect; wise, but not omniscient. We may love, respect, and pity him; we cannot fear him. He is not the Lord of men and angels; he holds not the keys of heaven and hell. Above him stands the Veiled One. He is Zeus prostrate before *Ananké*.

"An adequate idea of God demands the three concepts. In all well-balanced theologies they exist, at least implicitly. It is the peculiar glory of Christianity that it formulated what was before implicit, and has succeeded fairly well in maintaining a balance between the three.

"Yet Christianity is failing today to bring this truth home to the masses by shrouding it in the verbiage of a past age and permitting, if not fostering, an obscurantist interpretation repellant to the modern mind.

"Instead of the trefoil let us picture our idea of God by that other symbol, the triangle. So understood, the idea

ceases to be grotesque or meaningless and becomes the formulation of age-old truth, implicit in the very foundation of theologic thinking, a mystery still, as it always will be, but a reasonable, nay a necessary, mystery."

NATURE AND RELIGION

BY HENRY FAIRFIELD OSBORN.

(Note: The following article is reprinted by permission from *The Churchman* of June 24, 1922. The author is the well-known paleontologist and author of *The Origin and Evolution of Life* and of *Men of the Old Stone Age in Europe*. This article illustrates the present attitude of men of science toward religion, and registers the change which has taken place in their attitude since the closing years of the nineteenth century. The italics and capitals are Dr. Osborn's.)

May I call the attention of the readers of *The Churchman* to a change of attitude on the part of leaders of scientific thought in Great Britain and in the United States which I believe marks the opening of a new era in both science and theology. I give first a number of citations from *Nature* (Sept. 2, 1920), the official medium of British scientific opinion, entitled "The Unity of Science and Religion":

"The Cardiff meeting of the British Association will be marked . . . because of two noteworthy events. One was the suggestion . . . that the time had come for a new *Challenger* expedition for the exploration of the oceans, and another was the enlightened sermon, which we print in full elsewhere, delivered by Canon E. W. Barnes, a distinguished mathematician, who is both a Fellow of the Royal Society and a Canon of Westminster. We do not hesitate to say that not for a long time has such a conciliatory attitude been presented to men of science by a leader in the Church as is represented by Canon Barnes' address. The position taken up in it is one upon which the two standards of science and religion can be placed side by side to display to the world their unity of purpose. For Science and Religion are twin sisters,

each studying her own sacred book of God and building a structure which remains sure only when established upon the foundation of truth."

The writer goes on to say that the day of bitter controversy between dogmatic theology and often no less dogmatic science is past and gone, and that no one would wish to recall it. He continues:

"The scientific view of religion, now accepted by men of science and Churchmen alike, is that religion is the spiritual life of the individual, and subject to development. Progress is possible here as elsewhere, and in fact the history of the forms of religion shows a gradual purification and emancipation advancing with the gradual refinement of experience. The goal, as a reviewer has said in these columns, is a union of God and humanity, and the end must be the concrete realization of unity in life and purpose for which, as for the unity of the world as object of the sciences, the reality of the Divine immanence is the only sure ground . . . Whatever the end may be, we are urged to the quest by that something within ourselves which has produced from a primitive ancestry the noblest types of intellectual man, and regards evolution, not as a finite, but as an infinite, progress of development of spiritual as well as of physical life."

In this connection I also quote from a recent work by a pupil of William James, the greatest philosopher America has produced:*

"It is a rather odd fact that a word so repeatedly on the lips of men and connoting, apparently, one of the most obvious phenomena of human life should be so notoriously difficult of definition as is the word Religion . . . The truth is, I suppose, that 'Religion' is one of those general and popular terms which have been used for centuries to cover so vague and indefinite a collection of phenomena that no definition can be framed which will include all its uses and coincide with everyone's meaning for it. Hence all definitions of Religion are more or less arbitrary and should be taken rather as postulates than as axioms. In this sense I shall myself propose a tentative definition of Religion, not at all as a final or complete statement, nor because I think it of any great importance, but because I intend to write a book about Religion, and

**The Religious Consciousness* (Chap. 1). By James B. Pratt. The Macmillan Co., New York.

it therefore seems only fair that I should tell the reader in advance, not what the word means, *but what I am going to mean by the word*. The definition which I propose is the following: RELIGION IS THE SERIOUS AND SOCIAL ATTITUDE OF INDIVIDUALS OR COMMUNITIES TOWARD THE POWER OR POWERS WHICH THEY CONCEIVE AS HAVING ULTIMATE CONTROL OVER THEIR INTERESTS AND DESTINIES."

It is not the definition of religion to which I would call attention, but the recognition on the part of several leading men of science that the religious state of mind is a reality and that the spiritual life is an essential and important part of man. The importance of the spiritual side of man and of spiritual values has been expressed recently by one of the leaders of American scientific thought, Professor R. A. Millikan, distinguished physicist of the University of Chicago:*

"From my point of view there are two things of immense importance in this world, two ideas or beliefs upon which, in the last analysis, the weal or woe of the race depends, and I am not going to say that belief in the possibilities of scientific progress is the most important. *The most important thing in the world is a belief in the reality of moral and spiritual values.* It was because we lost that belief that the world war came, and if we do not now find a way to regain and strengthen that belief, then science is of no value. But, on the other hand, it is also true that even with that belief there is little hope of progress except through its twin sister, only second in importance, namely, belief in the spirit and the method of Galileo, of Newton, of Faraday, and of the other great builders of this modern scientific age—this age of the understanding and the control of nature, upon which, let us hope, we are just entering. For while a starving man may indeed be supremely happy, it is certain that he cannot be happy very long. So long as man is a physical being, his spiritual and his physical well-being cannot be disentangled. No efforts toward social readjustments or toward the redistribution of wealth have one thousandth as large a chance of contributing to human well-being as have the efforts of the physicist, the chemist, and the biologist toward the better understanding and the better control of nature."

**The Significance of Radium.* By R. A. Millikan. *Science*, July 1, 1921, pp. 1-8.

This was first brought to my own mind in a scientific way through my experiences in exploring the caverns of central and southern France, and witnessing the work of man inspired by something akin to our spiritual nature, at a relatively remote period of human development. As a consistent evolutionist I am naturally a believer in the very gradual growth of the spiritual and religious side of man. Two years ago I talked this question over with an intelligent divine in the Roman Catholic Church. He was inclined to fix 15,000 years as the period in which the religious nature of man first manifested itself. We need not be concerned, either with fixing a period for the beginning of the religious and spiritual life or for the equally mysterious question of where the development of the religious and spiritual life may lead us. To my mind the main thing for human progress is the recognition by all men that man *has* a spiritual and religious nature which we must take account of in our studies of the evolution of man, past, present, and future. I take it that this is about as far as most of my scientific *confrères* are ready to go at present. This attitude is profoundly different from that which I encountered as a student of biology and philosophy in Cambridge University forty years ago. I recently met in England the sole survivor of the brilliant group of men who dominated British thought toward the end of the nineteenth century; as soon as we touched on religion and philosophy I observed that all the embers of the long gone period were fanned into flame, and that I was speaking with a naturalist of the past type, not of the present and future.

In 1863 a prophetic letter was addressed by Charles Kingsley to Frederick Dennison Maurice:

"I am very busy working out points of Natural Theology, by the strange light of Huxley, Darwin, and Lyell. I think I shall come to something worth having before I have done. But I am not going to reach into fruit this seven years, for this reason: The state of the scientific mind is most curious; Darwin is conquering everywhere, and rushing in like a flood, by the mere force of truth and fact. The one or two who hold out are forced to try all sorts of subterfuges as to fact, or else by evoking the *odium theologicum*. . . . But they find that now they have

got rid of an interfering God—a master-magician, as I call it—they have to choose between the absolute empire of accident, and a living, immanent, ever-working God.”

In his conception of the true relation between our knowledge of nature and our religious sentiments, Charles Kingsley was sixty years ahead of the Church of his day. If his influence had prevailed we would have been spared sixty years of vain controversy between science and theology.

PART III

SUGGESTIONS TO THE LEADER OF THE DISCUSSIONS

INTRODUCTORY.

It is the purpose of these discussions to make a somewhat thorough analysis of the philosophical and practical basis of the ideas current in Theism and Christianity, and to endeavor so to evaluate them as to show their compatibility with modern scientific concepts. The task is not easy, nor can the outlines in the nature of the case be expressed so that he who runs may read.

As stated by P. N. Waggett in *Religion and Science*, when he was asked why he did not write a sixpenny tract in defense of Christianity, he replied that there was no sixpenny defense for Christianity. The argument to be worth while at all for college students, must strike down to the very basis of their philosophy. It is believed, however, that the outlines are not so abstruse as to baffle the college student, certainly not after the first collegiate year. The ideas which are discussed, he will find to be the same that he has met with in his college lecture room. At any rate, I have been able to use these discussions to advantage with college and normal school students, groups of mature persons who have not had a college education, and even with high school students; although for this purpose they need much adaptation.

Any harmonization of science and theology may proceed from one of two points of view. It may be approached through the consideration of the particular sciences, taking up each in turn and showing how the concepts involved in each science may be and should be related harmoniously to the Christian system; or we may start from the side of theology, interpreting its doctrines in the terminology of modern science and philosophy.

In this course the latter method has been adopted for two reasons. In the first place I feel myself entirely unqualified to discuss intelligently all the concepts in the field of the modern sciences, and in the second place such a discussion, if it were possible, would, after all, have given the student merely a fragmentary and unrelated theology. It seems to me preferable not to attempt, in such a course as this, to do more than establish in the student a new point of view, a new orientation, a new method whereby he can go on to draw his own deductions as to particular sciences.

The leader, however, may find that for his particular group some modification of this method is necessary, and may find it advisable to particularize somewhat as to the scientific concepts.

It has been very commonly found to be the case, especially among college students, that the doubts are not so much intellectual as pragmatic. The student does not find himself in the position of wanting to believe in the teachings of Christianity and being withheld only by its supposed conflict with science. Rather, he is not persuaded that religion is at all worth while bothering about, that it does not count for much in the lives of its adherents nor exert any appreciable influence on society, and that in any event particular doctrines cannot be said to do so. To these questions the present volume is not, of course, primarily addressed. In fact these questions will not perhaps find their answer upon the printed page at all. The conclusive argument must be *ad hominem*. Every man must solve this problem for himself, with whatever aid can be afforded to him in friendly counsel, since it is primarily a problem not of the intellect but of the will, not of the head but of the heart. Nevertheless, it is possible to present some considerations as to the value of religion, and this has been attempted in Discussion II and in the essay entitled *The Relevancy of Religion*.

The method of development of each particular discussion is substantially the same. In the first eight it is necessary to clear away possible objections from the point of view of science. For example, in the discussion upon Immortality one must first demonstrate that there is no valid scientific

objection to belief in immortality. That done, we next proceed to develop the positive side of the argument out of the facts of human religious experience, first stating what the experience is, and then what deductions or doctrines can reasonably be drawn from it. In the discussions from IX to the end, there is no such apparent conflict with science to be dealt with, and, consequently, the method of development in these lectures begins with the religious experience and deduces from it the doctrine. In each outline the paragraph entitled "conclusion" will be found to embody the general viewpoint and spirit of the discussion. It is believed that a fairly consistent observance of this method of procedure will result in driving home to the student the viewpoint, that doctrine is after all only an orderly statement of a conclusion from the facts of religious experience.

In connection with each discussion, the leader should bring out the practical bearing and effect of the particular doctrine discussed. (See essay entitled *The Relevancy of Religion*, Part II). I have endeavored to indicate this practical bearing in a general way; but the discussion will usually be found to involve an argument *ad hominem*, which cannot well be foreseen.

As to the method and spirit of the leader no finer discussion has appeared than that of Father Waggett above referred to. One can hardly do justice to the subject without having first made himself familiar with that book. Attention is especially called to Chapters 2, 3, 6, and 7. Any particular warning is perhaps needless, that the method of argumentation which Father Waggett calls the method of anathema is perfectly fruitless in a course of this sort. Absolute frankness and open-mindedness is essential.

A few suggestions as to the use of this outline. The outline is in part a guide book through the literature referred to in these notes. The leader certainly, the student if he will, should be familiar with these books, for obviously the outline is merely a skeleton, and unless supplemented by this outside reading, will appear to be full of arbitrary and unreasoned assertions. I have not developed the argument except where it departs from the authorities referred to. This in part accounts for the fact that some discussions

are presented in a more skeletonized form than others. The fuller treatment was deemed necessary in some instances where an adequate treatment did not appear to be at hand in any available book on the subject. I would not have it thought, however, that I endorse all that will be found in these authorities, nor in any of them. For example, one can admire the skill with which Karl Pearson demonstrates the subjective nature of the basic ideas of science, without following him in his systematic skepticism. So far as possible, however, I will endeavor to point out in these notes just where, in my opinion, the several writers are not altogether to be relied upon.

I have sought to pin the discussions down to earth by stating in each outline some question which the student will be asking himself. The practical bearing of the problem and of the solution given in the lecture ought to be emphasized. If theology be not practical, there is really no occasion to bother about it.

This outline is merely a suggestion. One using it will no doubt omit much that may not prove useful for his purpose and add much in places where the treatment does not seem to him to be adequate. He will above all clothe it with flesh and blood from his own rich experience and breathe into it the breath of life.

The discussions may, of course, be split up at will. I have found it possible to complete the entire course in just about the length of the ordinary school year.

When the number of discussion periods is limited, so as to preclude covering the entire course outlined, it has been found very satisfactory to cover the first four discussions and then to take the vote of the group as to which of the others should be discussed. Every group will be found to have its own peculiar problems and point of view.

I should strongly advise that at each period the leader should first complete what he has to say and then allow a short time for open discussion. The other method, of taking the whole course as a series of discussions, has the advantage of appearing more spontaneous and drawing out the students to make their own conclusions, but seems to me to have one or two serious objections. In the first place

the discussion is very apt to go off at a tangent and at the end of the period no conclusion has been arrived at. In the second place, if the group is a large one, the discussion is fairly likely to be monopolized by two or three to the exclusion of the others, and their interest will be lost.

It has been suggested that the interest of the students might be increased by assigning some particular aspect of the subject involved in each outline to particular students to investigate and report upon to the class. I have never tried this. I doubt if such investigation would be fruitful in advance of the discussion; but the leader might at the close of each period assign particular features of the discussion to be reported upon further at the next session.

DISCUSSION I.

The important portions of this discussion are sections 3 and 5. The student must first be convinced of the tremendous practical bearing of theology before he will be persuaded to devote his time to the remainder of the course.

The subject of "Modern Doubt" is discussed from the popular standpoint, in Chapter 1, of Richard L. Swain's *What and Where is God?* Also in the opening chapters of Percy Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica*. This book, which was published in 1899, though in many respects valuable, represents a point of view which has been, in a measure, superseded. There has been a general reaction against some of the more extreme views which the author presents. I have endeavored to indicate in these notes, from time to time, the extent to which I believe he may be relied upon.

As to the matter covered in Discussions I to IV read chaps. 1-4 of Charles Gore's *Belief in God*.

At this time attention should be called to William Kelly Wright's *A Student's Philosophy of Religion* (Macmillan, 1922). It is extremely valuable to the leader of a discussion group. It deals with the history, psychology, and philosophy of religion and of some of the principal specific religious beliefs. Upon each point the author summarizes the divergent opinions, both past and present, and then states his own opinion. A valuable bibliography follows each chapter. The book is condensed yet most readable, and should prove invaluable as a book of reference. It

illustrates the new and sympathetic viewpoint of philosophy toward religion; such a book would not have been written twenty years ago. But one *caveat* needs to be observed. The author's definition of religion as man's effort to conserve social values is too utilitarian. To be sure, religion has always had this result, as the author points out from time to time; and this result is strong proof of its validity. Yet certainly this end was not the principal factor in any religion, nor was it ever a conscious factor at all.

NOTE ON THE RELATION OF BELIEF TO CONDUCT.

The man in the street is prone to say that it makes no difference what you believe in religious matters; that it is what you do that counts. Of course the latter part of this assertion is unquestionably true, but it is astonishing that such people fail to see that conduct is largely conditioned by belief. This is the more astonishing in view of the almost superstitious faith which is current today in secular education as the cure-all for the ills of society. Yet the opinion of the man in the street has some justification in view of the notion which has obtained in some quarters as to the function of belief in the scheme of salvation.

The Reformation, upon its dogmatic side, consisted largely in a reaction against the overemphasis which had been current in the everyday theology, although not in the careful definitions of the Church, as to the efficacy of external religion, the efficiency of works. This reaction took two main courses. With Luther it resulted in the doctrine of justification by faith alone; with Calvin it resulted in the doctrine of predestination. According to the Lutheran theology, the all-important element in salvation was reliance by the individual upon divine grace. According to the Calvinistic theology, grace was a free gift of God bestowed according to his absolute will, regardless even of any seeking by the individual; certain men were predestined for salvation and others for damnation and the outcome of that lottery *could never be determined during the life of the individual*, nor could he change it by any act of his.

The tendency of both these lines of thought was to minimize the importance of right conduct, to postpone salva-

tion to the next world. Hence in the common thought of the followers of these two theologies, although doubtless not in the thought of the founders, there arose a feeling that a sort of magical efficacy resided in the act of submission to the divine will, in a formal assent to, and affirmation of, the existence of God and his overruling power, the divinity of Christ and his saving grace. The consequences of such a formal affirmation would be apparent in the next world, but not necessarily in this. These ideas became part of the religious atmosphere of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, and were shared to a great extent by members of Churches which did not acknowledge the spiritual leadership of Luther or Calvin.

It is this false and magical view against which modern opinion has reacted. The reaction has gone to the other extreme of denying any potency to intellectual belief. Of course, intellectual belief does largely condition conduct, and hence is a factor in salvation; but it is a factor only insofar as it does influence conduct, and the extent of that influence can be measured here and now and not entirely in the next world. In the words of the Master, men do not gather grapes from thorns.

The extent to which belief influences conduct depends upon the vitality of the belief, the certitude with which it is held. If our belief in immortality amounts merely to a pious hope, it enters but little into our everyday life. If, however, it amounts to a certitude as great as our belief in our present existence, it will inevitably enter into every judgment as to our course of conduct. We will plan for the life both here and hereafter so as to bring about its full fruition, not merely within the short span of three-score years and ten, but within a future indefinitely expanded; we will relegate to its proper place the question of what we shall eat and what we shall drink and wherewithal we shall be clothed.

NOTE ON THE MEANING OF THE WORDS DOGMA AND DOCTRINE.

Strictly speaking these words are not synonymous. Webster's Dictionary differentiates them thus: "Doctrine is that which is taught, put forth as true, and supported by a

teacher, a school, or a sect. A dogma is a doctrine formally stated; a definite, established, and authoritative tenet. In their ecclesiastical application it is usual to distinguish between doctrine, any teaching or opinion, and dogma, such teaching as a part of the confession of a Church."

It is, therefore, apparent that the formula which epitomizes the facts of religious experience, the antithesis of a natural, or scientific, law, is not a doctrine, but a dogma. Thus one would not, strictly, speak of the doctrine of gravitation or of the Trinity; but one might speak of the doctrine of Newton or Einstein about gravitation, or of the doctrine of Arius or Athanasius about the Trinity. Nevertheless, the word "dogma" has acquired, wrongly as I believe, the connotation of a teaching, arbitrary, unreasoned, and even unreasonable. So that, for the purpose of these discussions the word "doctrine" has usually been employed.

DISCUSSION II.

This discussion is based on Andrew D. White's *Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom*. If possible, the leader should be familiar with this book, but if a shorter discussion of the same subject is preferred, it may be found in Hardwick's *Warfare of Science and Religion*, which is an S. P. C. K. Publication. For the ordinary student the material in section 1 will not require particular emphasis. He is already all too familiar with the conflict. But students will not infrequently be found to have no adequate idea that there is such a conflict. In that case, for their own protection in the future, they ought to be thoroughly convinced of the reality of the problem, even at the cost of making the leader appear as a destructive, rather than a constructive, critic. If it is desirable to go into this matter in detail, one of the subjects covered by section 1 might be assigned to each member of the group to investigate and present to the class.

Upon the question of scientific doubt and the application of the scientific method to dogma read Waggett's *Religion and Science*, chaps. 1 and 2 of Spens' *Belief and Practice*, and the opening chapters of Percy Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica*. Also, see the essay on *Dogma* and the first part of the essay on *The Nicene Idea of God* in Part II.

NOTE ON THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF SCIENTISTS

This is, perhaps, the appropriate place to express a warning against a too sweeping interpretation of the statement contained in the outline of this discussion that science is realizing its limitations and is ceasing to philosophize. This statement is true in the main and is, I believe, becoming increasingly true. Probably no scientist of the attainments of Ernest Haeckel would today announce as his deliberate judgment the materialistic philosophy set forth in *The Riddle of the Universe*. Yet, there are, of course, scientists, as there are theologians, who do not recognize their limitations. In the less circumspect statements of even careful scientists one also finds occasional lapses into unguarded assertions capable of a positively materialistic interpretation, which they would themselves probably be the first to repudiate. Frequently in the classroom the instructor deems it necessary to make sweeping statements with a view to challenging the attention of the students, or breaking down preconceptions which interfere with their disinterested investigation of the phenomena with which he is dealing,—statements which, if not positively materialistic, at any rate guard with incredible laxity against such interpretation.

This has been the case in all the sciences which deal with life, notably biology and psychology. Biologists, however, show an increasing tendency to acknowledge the limitations of a purely mechanical explanation of vital processes, an increasing disinclination to philosophize and an exceedingly conscientious and open-minded investigation of phenomena. In psychology, on the other hand, the line between physics and metaphysics is often difficult to perceive and the temptation to overstep it is constantly present and seems to have proved well-nigh irresistible. So that in the subject matter covered by discussions VII, VIII, and XVI it would be by no means fair to say that the conclusions of most psychologists and theologians are in agreement. It appears to be the tendency of most psychologists, though by no means of all of them, to exclude any non-mechanical element in mentality, not only for the purposes of experiment, in which such a procedure is quite proper, but also as an ulti-

mate philosophy. Their philosophy does not express itself in the crudely materialistic terms of fifty years ago, that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile, or that thought is an epi-phenomenon, a by-product, of fermentations in the brain, but in the more subtle dogma that the self is completely described as the stream of consciousness.

This attitude is very easy to understand. The field of mental phenomena has been the last stronghold of obscurantism and is still the happy hunting ground of all sorts of fantastic vagaries. Scientific psychology has had a hard fight and cannot be expected quite yet to assume the dispassionate and judicial attitude. It owes whatever progress it has made to the employment of the mechanical hypothesis and the limit to the use of this hypothesis has not yet been reached. It would indeed be unfortunate if this line of investigation should be foreclosed. Nevertheless, there is absolutely nothing in the results of psychological investigation to justify the dictum that mental phenomena are *merely* mechanical, a fact which is recognized by such psychologists as James, Bergson, and others. In fact data are accumulating which can only by constantly increasing ingenuity be reconciled to that hypothesis. So that one may be permitted to prophesy that within the next few years the basic metaphysical ideas current among psychologists will be radically modified. Meanwhile, it is sufficient to say that the criterion of valid dogma, which I have stated to be that it shall be congruent with the legitimate conclusions of *science*, does not by any means require that it should be harmonized with the present *philosophical* position of some psychologists.

DISCUSSION III.

This discussion and the two following should be thoroughly understood by the students, as they lie at the basis of everything that follows. As pointed out by Father Wagget in the book cited, the only prophylactic against scientific doubt is inoculation with a reasonable idealistic philosophy. It is that point of view which I have endeavored to present to the student in these three discussions. If that point of view is not grasped, the argumentation throughout

the course will fall upon absolutely deaf ears. The purpose of this particular discussion is to jar the student loose from the current conception of the man in the street, a conception which is augmented rather than diminished by his college lectures, that there is something particularly objective about science and the concepts that lie at the basis of science, in comparison to the concepts at the basis of theology. I want him to cease to think that matter is the only ultimate reality; and hence in this discussion I have endeavored to show the subjective and relative character of the concepts of science. The only thorough-going discussion of this point of view with which I am familiar is Karl Pearson's *Grammar of Science*, especially the first eight chapters. No one should, I believe, attempt to present this course without being familiar with that book. Discussion IV is intended to present an antidote to the skeptical conclusions of Pearson. These by no means follow from his argument.

DISCUSSION IV.

In this discussion the effort has been made to present a view-point of the theory of knowledge which shall afford a basis for an idealistic philosophy and theology. If the student is thoroughly inoculated with such a philosophy, he can be trusted to study his various sciences in the light of it and make his own application of it. Hence this discussion is of prime importance, and should be given such time as is necessary for thorough understanding. Feeling that an outline is inadequate to present my argument, I have written the subject matter out in full in the essay with this title contained in Part II. In addition, both leader and students should read the essays contained in William James' volume, *The Will to Believe*, especially the essays entitled *The Sentiment of Rationality* and *The Dilemma of Determinism*. (James uses "sentiment" with the same connotation with which I use "sense".) Read, also, chaps. 3 to 5 of Will Spens' *Belief and Practice*. See also chapter 18 of Wright's *A Student's Philosophy of Religion*.

A graphical statement of the points of similarity and difference between a scientific law and a religious doctrine may be given as follows:

	WHAT IS IT?	ON WHAT IS IT BASED?
A scientific law	is an explanation	of the facts of experience
A religious doctrine	is an explanation	of the facts of experience
HOW ARE THE FACTS VIEWED?	WHAT DOES IT DO?	WHAT DOES IT SATISFY?
from the outside	so as to satisfy	our senses for rationality, activity, etc.
from the inside	so as to satisfy	our senses for right, justice, purpose, love, reverence, etc.

DISCUSSION V.

The point of view of this discussion is to furnish a sort of anchor to windward for students who are unable to bring themselves to agree thoroughly with the philosophy presented in the previous discussion. The outline follows very closely William James' essay, *The Will to Believe*, contained in the volume of the same name. It may appear inconsistent to taper off an argument which presents a very positive view of the validity of religious concepts with an invitation to the student, at least whether he believes this or not, to bet his future course of life on the possibility of its being true,—which is, in the last analysis, what James' position amounts to. As a practical matter, however, this argument will appeal to very many students; and it is essentially valid, because it is an invitation to give the religious hypothesis the test of experiment: and that experiment cannot be performed unless the student will hold it for true *and act upon it*. Some scientific men, adopting this position, never get beyond it, holding that religion *must* be true and yet that the universe *must* be merely mechanical. They keep their science in one mental room and their religion in another. That position is unsatisfactory; but it makes it possible for the student to perform the experiment. Having won him so far, the leader has at

least obtained his interest to hear him to the end, and he may then be convinced that the universe *must not* be merely mechanical.

This volume of essays by James ought to be available to the students, for his style is delightful and persuasive.

DISCUSSION VI.

The first three sections are a resumé of John Fiske's *The Idea of God*. He treats this theme more fully in *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, but for practical purposes the smaller volume is better. Fiske's ideas as to the religious effect of the two ideas of transcendence and immanence are valid and his general treatment of the subject is very valuable. Modern investigators, however, do not agree with him as to the history of the development of the ideas. An excellent summary of the latest scholarship will be found in part I of Wright's *A Student's Philosophy of Religion*.

Sections 4 and 5 take the matter up where Fiske leaves off and present positive arguments for belief in God. This phase is handled with delightful adequacy in the volume entitled *The Being and Attributes of God* in Francis J. Hall's *Dogmatic Theology*. From the point of view of religious experience see William James' *Varieties of Religious experience*. A remarkably good popular presentation of the question of the existence of God is found in Richard L. Swain's *What and Where is God*, particularly Chapter 2. Read Chapters 2 to 10 of R. W. and Paul Micou's *Basic Ideas in Religion*. Psychology of belief in God is discussed in Chapter 10 of James B. Pratt's *The Religious Consciousness*. A philosophical treatment, but in entertaining style, is to be found in J. R. Illingworth's *Personality, Human and Divine* and *Divine Immanence*. In this connection chapter 3 of Charles Gore's *Belief in God* is valuable; although I find myself unable to agree with the rationale of inspiration and miracles, or with the belief in devils, as set forth in subsequent chapters of that book. Excellent presentations of the arguments for the theistic point of view in the light of modern philosophy will be found in chapter 19 of Wright's *A Student's Philosophy of Religion* and in Vernon F. Storr's *The Argument from Design* (Longmans, Green & Co.).

DISCUSSION VII.

Read the essay entitled *The Dilemma of Determinism in The Will to Believe*, above cited, also Chapter 18 of R. W. and Paul Micou's *Basic Ideas in Religion*. This volume is exceedingly important for the thorough student, although rather too extended for the average college man. See also chapter 20 of Wright's *A Student's Philosophy of Religion*.

NOTE ON THE MEANING OF "NATURAL LAW."

A source of misunderstanding exists in the use of the word "law" in the sciences. It is generally recognized that it does not connote an ordinance or statute fixed by authority, and yet this connotation is continually creeping subconsciously into our reasoning and must be guarded against. There is a constant tendency to think of the phenomenon as caused by the law, instead of the law as a description of the course of the phenomenon.

A much more frequent occasion of loose thinking in the sciences is due to failure to recognize that the word has a very different meaning in the organic sciences than in the inorganic sciences. In the latter it is a formula which epitomizes an invariable sequence, while in the organic sciences it is a formula which expresses merely an average, or mean, sequence. Thus, Newton's Laws of Motion and Boyle's Law of Gases express sequences which occur in every individual case and enable us to predict the course of the sequence with absolute accuracy. Mendel's Law of Heredity, on the contrary, expresses merely an average sequence, based on the *probability* of certain combinations of determiners appearing in the chromosomes in the germ plasm of the offspring. In formulas based on the actions of social groups, such as the "laws" of economics and sociology, the individual action is still more indeterminate and the number of instances required to obtain a true average is exceedingly greater. Thus, Gresham's Law by no means predicts what any individual will do with his money, nor does the Law of Malthus determine how many offspring he will leave. Hence, when we speak of society being governed by economic or social laws, we use the word in a Pickwickian sense; we do not in the least imply that the wills of men are co-

erced, or their course of behavior predetermined, by forces beyond their control. All that we mean to say is that in a given situation reasonable men will, more often than not, arrive at similar judgments as to what action to pursue.

NOTE ON SCIENTIFIC DETERMINISM. The theory of theological determinism, or predestination, which so long beclouded religion, has been tacitly abandoned and to-day hardly needs refutation. Philosophical determinism has received such adequate treatment at the hands of William James in his volume entitled *The Will to Believe*, that to add anything were an impertinence. There remains, however, scientific determinism in its several forms, which demands consideration.

By scientific determinism I mean the theory that human conduct is *completely* determined by bodily states and external stimuli. This theory meets one in several fields: biology, anatomy, psychology, and sociology. It would be obviously impossible in a brief note to do more than present a few suggestions to indicate that absolute determinism is not a necessary conclusion from the data of any of these sciences.

In biology, we learn that many characteristics, such as color of hair and eyes, which develop in the life of the individual, arise out of certain "determiners" which are to be found in the chromosome of the germ. Exactly what these "determiners" are, or how they operate to produce the unit characteristics in later life, has not been worked out. (The latest conclusions are set forth in Conkling *Heredity and Environment*, and more in detail in Thos. H. Morgan's *The Physical Basis of Heredity*.) Biologists expect, also, to be able to demonstrate that the growth of every portion of the body of the individual will be found to be related to some specific structure or quality of the germ. This last conclusion is as yet hypothesis. Yet granting it to be true, biologists will merely have gone a little further in describing the manner in which development takes place; they will have filled in a few of the interstices in the description of the process. For example, the presence of the blue-eye determiner in the germ is not the cause of blue eyes in the child at the age of ten years in any other sense than are his blue eyes at that age the cause of his having blue eyes

at the age of twenty. There is as yet no direct experimental evidence that human mental characteristics arise out of determiners in the germ; and in the nature of the case it will be extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to obtain such evidence. There is, however, abundant statistical evidence for the inheritance of mental characteristics and recent psychological study seems to have isolated certain unit mental traits, which are entirely analogous to Mendelian characteristics. To such evidence the same conclusions apply. If it should be demonstrated, for example, that poetical genius in a lad of ten answered to some antecedent quality in the germ, that antecedent quality would not be the cause of the lad's genius in any other sense than is his budding genius at ten the cause of his developed poetical ability at twenty.

In anatomy and psychology, we learn that bodily states and mental states are interdependent. But William James—who was, by the way, a physiologist before he became a psychologist—has pointed out that it does not by any means follow that the bodily state causes the mental state (James, *Human Immortality*). To be sure, the bodily state *conditions* the mental state, that is to say, it sets certain limits. But science has never demonstrated, and has no right to conclude, that the interdependence between bodily and mental states is absolute. The difference between a condition and a cause may be illustrated in this way: I desire to walk across the room. If my legs are paralyzed I will be unable to do so; if they are not paralyzed I may do so. My freedom of will in that respect is conditioned on my having normal legs. Yet the fact that I possess normal legs does not cause me to walk across the room, since I am still free to remain where I am.

In sociology, we learn that the influence of environment upon the individual is very great, often overwhelmingly great. Some sociologists contend that its influence is so great that, given two individuals with the same hereditary equipment, their behavior throughout life will vary absolutely with environment. But for this they have not a scintilla of proof, either experimental or statistical. It is mere surmise and appears to run counter to our every-day experience.

In short, absolute scientific determinism has not been demonstrated and cannot fairly be deduced from any present scientific knowledge. We do know that our wills are conditioned by many factors of heredity and environment. But any careful scientist will aver that there is no scientific evidence that the will is not free within limits.

The position outlined in this note has been very fully and cogently set forth by Professor Edwin G. Conklin in his presidential address before the American Society of Naturalists in 1913, and reprinted by him under the title of "Genetics and Ethics" as chapter 6 of his *Heredity and Environment*. That chapter is exceedingly valuable at this point.

DISCUSSION VIII.

The second and third sections are based on William James' *Personal Immortality*. This is a short and delightfully written essay and ought to be read by the students themselves to remove the supposed scientific objections to immortality. Coming from a physiologist and psychologist, it should have particular weight. Another popular presentation is Chapter 11 of Lyman Abbott's *The Theology of an Evolutionist*; also Chapters 5 and 6 of Swain's *What and Where is God*. For a more philosophical and thorough discussion see Chapter 15 of Micou's *Basic Ideas in Religion*; also Henri Bergson's *Mind Energy*; also chapter 22 of Wright's *A Student's Philosophy of Religion*. Psychology of belief in immortality is discussed in chapter 11 of James B. Pratt's *The Religious Consciousness*; also in the volume of essays entitled *Concerning Immortality* by a group of English writers (Macmillan). It might prove of interest at this point to devote one session to open discussion of the question of spiritualistic manifestations. Men who were in the service during the World War will understand what I mean by an intuition of immortality. I observed that the recruit, after two or three months of doubt and dread, commonly achieved an awareness of the reality of things unseen and an assurance of immortality which produced that calm assurance of mind that has often been wrongly described as fatalism. The soldier was not a fatalist, he was only a believer. I have never known

one who had achieved this faith to fall a victim to a neurosis. A statistical study of the subject would have been interesting.

DISCUSSION IX.

Some of us have become accustomed to take the theory of evolution for granted. The Fundamentalist controversy has, however, temporarily reopened the issue. The evidence upon which the theory of biological evolution is based has been presented in popular form, and without polemical intent (the book was written in 1916), in Thomas Hunt Morgan's *Critique of the Theory of Evolution*.

For a popular presentation of the theory and factors of biological evolution see H. W. Conn's *The Method of Evolution*, still useful though somewhat out of date. For a thorough discussion of the process of biological evolution from the point of view of a thorough-going scientist, who is at the same time sympathetic to the non-mechanical viewpoint, read J. Arthur Thomson's *The System of Animate Nature*. The style of this book is delightful and the subject-matter accurate. From the same point of view, presenting a still more anti-mechanical interpretation of evolution, read Henri Bergson's *Creative Evolution*. For a thorough discussion of the bearing of evolution upon theology, see the first part of F. J. Hall's *Creation and Man* in his *Dogmatic Theology*. For a popular discussion of evolution from the standpoint of religion, read Lyman Abbott's *The Theology of an Evolutionist*, especially for this discussion. Chapter 2. For a more thorough-going discussion, Chapters 3 to 5 of Micou's *Basic Ideas in Religion*. In regard to the theory and actuality of miracles, read Chapters 9 and 10 of Lyman Abbott's *The Theology of an Evolutionist*; Chapter 18 of Percy Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica*; and pages 443 to 451 of Micou's *Basic Ideas in Religion*. These citations present the matter from several angles. For the rationalistic viewpoint of fifty years ago, see Lecky's *Growth of Rationalism In Europe*.

The glaring defect in the treatment of the subject of miracles by Lecky, and to a less extent in the treatment by Gardner, is that they arbitrarily accept or reject portions of the gospel narrative solely in accordance with whether

the event described comports with their *a priori* notion of possibility. This is pointed out by N. J. Figgis in his *Civilization at the Crossroads* and by Charles Gore in his *Belief in God*. For example, they reject the account of the miracle of the loaves and fishes, because it appears to be impossible. Yet the story is contained in all four Gospels. Furthermore, the Gospel of Mark contains accounts of two such feedings, which look like two independent traditions of the same act, and hence add enormously to the value of the evidence. Finally, if such an event did take place, there must have been hundreds of witnesses living when the evangelist wrote. This miracle, therefore, on the face of the record, becomes one of the best authenticated facts of Jesus' life. Such treatment of the evidence as would be involved in regarding this account as mere allegory would render futile any attempt to get at the facts of Jesus' life, or indeed of any event in history. On the other hand, it does not at all follow, as argued by Figgis and Gore, that we are obliged to conclude that the occurrence was a miracle in the old sense of being a clean break in the continuity of material, phenomenal causation. It does seem to be beyond dispute that some real occurrence lies at the basis of these accounts; but as to just what happened and how it happened, the forces involved, we must await further enlightenment. The same thing may be said for some of the other accounts of miracles.

This discussion should cover two periods. At the first period some member of the group might lead a discussion as to the scientific conclusions concerning organic evolution.

DISCUSSION X.

A complete resumé of the history of the New Testament criticism during the nineteenth century is found in Albert Schweitzer's *The Quest of the Historic Jesus*.

For a semi-popular presentation of the results of Biblical higher criticism, read articles on the particular books of the Bible in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, also G. B. Gray's *A Critical Introduction to the Old Testament*, and Arthur S. Peake's *A Critical Introduction to the New Testament*. For

the New Testament see also Arthur C. McGiffert's *Apostolic Age*, Adolph Harnack's *Chronology of Ancient Christian Literature* and Chap. 8 of Chas. Gore's *Belief in God*. For a popular presentation of the modern theory of inspiration and a popular statement of present conclusions as to the composition of the books, George Hodges' *How to Know the Bible* is unequalled. From the same point of view Chapter 4 of Lyman Abbott's *The Theology of an Evolutionist*, also Chapter 9 of Richard L. Swain's *What and Where is God*. For the psychology of inspiration read William James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*, and Streeter and others, *The Spirit*. A detailed discussion of authorship and date of Biblical writings would lead too far afield, and is not recommended unless demanded by the group. The best of these books for one wishing to get a general idea of the subject of this discussion is Hodges'.

DISCUSSION XI.

The outline follows the argument contained in my essay entitled *The Nicene Idea of God* to be found in Part II. Another and somewhat variant discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity is contained in Chapter 3 of Illingworth's *Personality, Human and Divine* and Chapter 7 of his *Divine Immanence*. The practical bearings of the doctrine are interestingly presented in Bernard I. Bell's article, *The Meaning of Mr. Wells' New Religion* in the *Atlantic Monthly* for November, 1917. See also, essays I and II of *The Spirit*, Streeter and others. A discussion of the Trinitarian doctrine from the point of view of theological authorities in the past is to be found in Francis J. Hall's *The Being and Attributes of God*. With reference to Dr. Hall's entire *Dogmatic Theology* it should be stated that the work is of prime importance as presenting a very exact and scholarly compendium of the authorities throughout the history of Christian thought upon all the doctrines of Christian theology. The book is written from the viewpoint of reliance upon authority. This method of presentation embodies what would seem to be a viewpoint difficult to maintain at the present time. However, the book is exceedingly valuable as a precise statement of the orthodox position. Any modern attempt to restate the doctrines of theology must use

this, or some similar book, as a sort of mariner's chart. The modern student, to be sure, while he will probably arrive at the same port in the end, will vary his course considerably from that of the ancient writers; but it is quite essential for him that he should be able at every point to measure the extent of that variance, and for this purpose the work of Dr. Hall is quite essential.

DISCUSSION XII.

As to the authenticity of the documents see books cited in the note on Discussion X.

No two modern writers upon the life of Jesus agree as to details, and it would be hopeless to expect that any treatment of that life would prove entirely satisfactory to all persons to whom it was addressed. I have endeavored, however, in this discussion to follow what appears to me to be the main stream of present historical conclusions. The supplementary reading to which reference is here made will differ in many details from my conclusions, but will be the more valuable on account of the variety of view points. The following are suggested: Chapters 15 to 23 of Percy Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica*; Essay 3 of the volume entitled *Foundations* by seven Oxford men. For Jewish apocalyptic expectations of the Messiah read Robert H. Charles' *Religious Development Between the Old and New Testaments*.

The past thirty years have witnessed a complete change in the views of historians as to the Jewish ideas of the Messiah and Jesus' own conception of his Messiahship. The rationalistic school had made out that he regarded his mission to be primarily ethical reform, and the Kingdom of God, which is preached, merely a purified human society. The so-called eschatological school of critics has shown that, as he said, "My kingdom is not of this world", and that the apocalyptic and eschatological ideas of his time were his also; and that primitive Christianity was, likewise, essentially mystical and sacramental.

With regard to Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica*, my own idea is that it fails to give due importance to these elements and represents the old, superseded, rationalistic point of view. A presentation of the thorough-going eschatological

interpretation of Jesus' life is to be found in chapter 19 of Albert Schweitzer's *Quest of the Historical Jesus*. Schweitzer probably went too far. A moderate, and probably, in the main, correct, interpretation is that contained in parts I and II of Shailer Mathews' *The Messianic Hope in the New Testament*, also in George Tyrell's *Christianity at the Crossroads* and in Alfred Loisy's *The Gospel and the Church*.

DISCUSSION XIII.

Here again the possibilities of interpretation are myriad. A popular presentation very much in line with my own is contained in Chapter 4 of Richard L. Swain's *What and Where is God*; also Chapter 5 of Lyman Abbott's *The Theology of an Evolutionist*. A more detailed study of the development of Christology will be found in essays 4 and 5 of *Foundations*; Chapter 32 of Percy Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica*; Part III of Shailer Mathew's *Messianic Hope*. For a conservative reconsideration of the problem see Will Spens' *Belief and Practice*, Chaps. 6 to 8.

The sinlessness of Jesus, referred to in section four of the Discussion, is evidenced not so much by the fact that no sinful act is reported of him as by his own complete lack of consciousness of guilt or of the need for contrition. He was self-assured of perfect harmony with the will of God, and the justice of this assurance his followers never questioned. Upon his trial no charge was placed against him, except that he claimed to be the Messiah. It was for this reason that he assumed, and was accorded, the right to proclaim God's will. "He taught them as having authority."

DISCUSSION XIV

A good popular statement of the factors in human conduct is contained in Edwin G. Conklin's *Heredity and Environment in the Development of Men*. His recent book entitled *Direction of Human Evolution* is also valuable.

Upon the hereditary and environmental causes of misconduct, read Charles R. Henderson's *The Cause and Cure of Crime*, and B. G. Lewis' *The Offender*. The application of the teachings of Christ to the problem of crime is discussed in Hugh E. Willis' *The Law of Social Justice*.

DISCUSSION XV

The fact of atonement, or the realization of the need of atonement, as a religious experience is fundamental and practically universal. It is only when we attempt to rationalize this experience and explain just how the life and death of Christ operated to produce atonement that we find differences in theory. The Discussion presents one or two aspects of the theory of atonement, and other aspects will be found in the following citations: Essay 6 of *Foundations*. Chapter 31 of Percy Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica*. Chapters 7 and 8 of Lyman Abbott's *The Theology of an Evolutionist*. Lectures 5 and 6 of Josiah Royce's *The Problem of Christianity*. Essay, *God and the World's Pain*, in volume entitled *Concerning Prayer* (Macmillan).

DISCUSSION XVI

A scholarly discussion of the subject of this discussion and indeed of all the underlying concepts of Christian theology from the point of view of religious experience is to be found in Will Spens' *Belief and Practice*. The classic discussion of subconscious mentality is Joseph Jastrow's *The Subconscious*. For the general subject of this Discussion read Essays 2 to 8 of *The Spirit*; William James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*; Part II of Wright's *Philosophy of Religion*; Chapters 15 to 20 of James B. Pratt's *The Religious Consciousness*; Worcester, McComb, and Coriat, *Religion and Medicine*; C. M. Addison's *The Theory and Practice of Mysticism*; see also *Concerning Prayer* (Macmillan), especially the essays entitled *Prayer and the Mystic Vision* and *Prayer and Bodily Health*. The life of a modern mystic is told in *The Message of Sadhu Sundar Singh* by B. H. Streeter. For one desiring to make a more thorough study of mysticism the standard work is Evelyn Underhill's *Mysticism*.

DISCUSSION XVII

Chapter 16 of Percy Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica*. A collection of essays entitled *Property* by a group of English theologians.

On the social ethics of Christianity see Shailer Mathews' *The Church and the Changing Order*; Walter Rauschen-

busch's *Christianity and the Social Crisis, Christianizing the Social Order*; and *The Social Principles of Jesus*; and Charles K. Gilbert and Charles N. Lathrop's *The Social Opportunity of the Churchman*.

DISCUSSION XVIII.

The Philosophy of Loyalty and *The Problem of Christianity* by Josiah Royce and Chapters 1 and 4 of James B. Pratt's *The Religious Consciousness* lay the foundation for the conception of the Church as an essential element in the religious life and a spiritual organism. An excellent shorter treatment is to be found in Essay 7 of *Foundations*. Read also Chaps. 12 to 14 of Will Spens' *Belief and Practice*. A remarkably fine interpretation of the beginnings of the Church is contained in Essay 4 of *The Spirit*. Upon this point also the entire third book of Percy Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica* is in point, especially Chapters 26, 38, and 39, but there is much there stated with which one will differ. But he gives far too little weight to the mystical and sacramental elements in early Christianity. Alfred Loisy's *The Gospel and the Church* is much more in accord with recent scholarship.

For details as to Church history and doctrine consult the articles in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* and in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*. The articles in both of these are exceedingly valuable, not only for this discussion, but for all of those which follow. A very remarkable evaluation of the Catholic theory of the Church is the recent work of W. G. Peck entitled *From Chaos to Catholicism*. Mr. Peck is a member of a group of Free Church ministers in England, who, while convinced of the validity of the Catholic or organic idea, have remained in their respective Churches and are working from that point toward the reunion of Christendom. Admirable from the same point of view is the chapter entitled *The Historic Approach* in *Approaches Towards Church Unity* edited by Newman Smyth and Williston Walker (Yale Univ. Press, 1919).

DISCUSSION XIX.

Upon the theory of sacraments read Charles Gore's *The Body of Christ*. The first part of this book is especially

valuable. The latter portion of the book seems to me to go too much into detail in support of particular theories on the nature and operation of the Eucharist. See also Will Spens' *Belief and Practice*, Chaps. 9 to 11. Upon the psychological aspects of sacraments read Chapters 12 to 14 in James B. Pratt's *The Religious Consciousness* and Essay 7 of *The Spirit*; also essays 8 and 9 of *Concerning Prayer* (Macmillan), being essays entitled *Worship* and *The Eucharist*. Upon the origin and early history of the sacraments and their relation to the Greek mystery religions, read Chapters 26, 35, and 36 of Percy Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica*. Upon the whole subject of the early development of Church, Sacraments, and Ministry, a useful popular treatment is James H. Ropes' *The Apostolic Age*, and somewhat more extended treatment in Arthur C. McGiffert's *The Apostolic Age*.

DISCUSSION XX.

The concept of priesthood is discussed in the articles under that heading in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* and Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*. The historical origins of the Christian ministry are discussed in J. B. Lightfoot's *Dissertations on the Apostolic Age* and also in *Foundations*. An interesting discussion of the subjects contained in Discussions XVIII, XIX, and XX is scattered through the volume entitled *The Holy Eucharist* by P. N. Waggett.

DISCUSSION XXI.

A very good compilation of doctrinal history is George P. Fisher's *History of Christian Doctrine*. Less detailed, although more valuable in bringing out the thread of development, is Alexander V. G. Allen's *The Continuity of Christian Thought*, although colored overmuch with the author's preconceptions. The value of authority is stated in Essay 8 of *Foundations*. The whole principle of authority and development in matters of doctrine is discussed by Dean Inge in *Faith and its Psychology*. The point of view of the traditional Roman Catholic theologians is stated by John Henry Newman's *Development of Doctrine*, and the point of view of the modernists in the Roman Catholic Church

is set forth in *The Programme of Modernism* by certain anonymous Italians and in Alfred Loisy's *The Gospel in the Church*. The point of view of the latter seems to me to be particularly sound. As to the development of doctrine by Paul, read Part III of Shailer Mathew's *Messianic Hope in the New Testament*, where the writer brings out the essential continuity in thought between Jesus and Paul (which has often been denied). Mathews, however, does very tardy justice to the corporate and organic nature of the primitive Church (pp. 269-273) and entirely overlooks the sacramental element, which was all-important.

DISCUSSION XXII.

Approaches towards Church Unity, edited by Newman Smyth and Williston Walker; also *The Proceedings of the Lambeth Conference of 1920*. Also the literature circulated by the Secretary of the World Conference on Faith and Order; also the report of the Joint Committee on Reunion appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Free Churches of England.

A BOOK LIST

Reference has been made in the preceding notes to a number of valuable books to be used in connection with the several discussions. These notes do not purport to offer a complete bibliography, and only those books are suggested from which ideas have been gained that find a place in the text. For general purposes, indeed, the number may be still further reduced. For the purpose of presenting what is, perhaps, a minimum selection, chosen with reference to readability, I venture to propose the following twelve-inch book list:

Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science* (first eight chapters).

William James, *The Will to Believe*.

William Kelly Wright. *A Student's Philosophy of Christianity*.

John Fiske, *The Idea of God*.

William James, *Human Immortality*.

Lyman Abbott, *The Theology of an Evolutionist*.

George Hodges, *How to Know the Bible*.


Alfred Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*.

B. H. Streeter and others, *Foundations*.

B. H. Streeter and others, *The Spirit*.



Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library



1 1012 01016 1893